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RÉSUMÉ 
La présente thèse examine tro is questions fondamentales liées aux emiSSions initiales 
d ' actions . Le premier chapitre examine les déterminants des opérations de fusions et 
acquisitions dans les cinq aimées subséquentes à l'introduction en bourse. Nos résultats 
montrent que le changement dans la prop01tion d 'actions détenues par les initiés et la 
présence de spéciali stes de capital de risque sont associés positivement à la probabilité 
qu 'une entreprise introd uite en bourse s'engage dans des opérations de fusion-acquisition. 
Nous montrons auss i qu 'une plus grande asymétrie d' information affrontée par la cible lors 
de l'évaluation de l'acquéreur diminue la probabilité de s ' engager dans des acquisitions par 
actions. En outre, il ressort de nos résultats que la probabilité de s ' engager dans une série 
d ' acquisition est liée positivement à la sous-évaluation initiale et aux émissions subséquentes. 
Le deuxième chapitre examine l' effet des opérations multiples de fusion-acquisition 
réalisées durant la première année après 1' introduction en bourse sur la performance 
financière à long terme et la survie des entreprises nouvellement introduites. En utilisant 
différentes approches, nos résultats montrent que la détérioration de la performance sur cinq 
ans des entreprises ayant réalisées plusieurs acquisitions, pendant la première am1ée, est 
significativement plus marquée que celle des entreprises ayant effectuées une seu le 
acqu isition indépendamment de l' indice de référence utilisé. Nos tests empiriques montrent 
aussi que la probabilité de non-survie des entreprises introduites en bourse est associée 
positivement au nombre d'acquisitions réalisées durant la première am1ée après cotation. 
Dans le troisième chapitre, nous explorons la relation entre l'utilisation prévue des fonds 
levés lors de l' introduction en bourse et la performance financière et opérati01melle des 
entreprises introduites. Nous examinons quatre catégories d'utilisation prévue de fonds : 
investissement, réduction de la dette, marketing ou promotion des ventes et objectifs 
généraux. Nos résultats montrent que les entreprises qui ont annoncé que les fonds levés 
seront utilisés pour des fins d ' investissement ont réalisé la plus faib le dégradation de la 
performance financière ou opérationnelle sur les trois ans d 'après introduction. Toutefois, 
lorsque l'utilisation prévue des fonds est le paiement des dettes, la sous-perfom1ance devient 
significativement imp01tante. Nos résultats suggèrent que le marché réagit favorablement aux 
intentions d' investissement et défavorablement aux intentions de paiements de dettes 
annoncées par les entreprises. 
Mots clés: Émission initiale d ' actions, fusions , acquisitions, performance 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates three fundamental issues regarding initial public offerings (IPOs). 
The frrst chapter examines the acquisition motive for IPOs in the five years following their 
going public. We fmd that high change in insider ownership post-IPO positively affects the 
likelihood of an IPO frrm to engage in acquisition. Our results also show that venture-backed 
IPOs are more likely to make acquisitions than their counterparts. We show that high extent 
of information asymmetry faced by the target when evaluating the acquirer decreases the 
likelihood of stock-financed acquisitions and that IPO fm11S with higher underpricing and 
those conducting seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) are more likely to be frequent acquirers. 
The second chapter examines whether making frequent acquisitions in the first year of the 
IPO affect the long-run stock performance and the survival profile ofiPOs differently than do 
in:frequent acquisitions. Using different approaches, we fmd that frequent acquirers 
experience significantly poorer performance in the five years following the IPO than 
in:frequent acquirers regardless of the benchmark used. Our empirical tests also show that 
being a frequent acquirer in the first year after going public increases the probability of not 
surviving and that the higher the number of acquisitions is, the higher is the probability of not 
surviving. 
In the third chapter, we explore the role of intended use of proceeds on explaining the 
long run stock and opera ting performance of IPO firms . W e examine four categories of use of 
proceeds: investment, debt repayment, marketing and sales promotion and general corporate 
purposes. Our results show that IPOs stated investment as primary use of proceeds exhibits 
little or no underperformance in the three years following the IPO. However, when the stated 
use of proceeds is debt payrnent, IPO fums experience poor and significant 
underperfom1ance. Our results suggest that the market will react favorably for IPOs 
specifying investment plans for the use of proceeds while it has less favorable view for tho se 
stating debt repayment. 
Keywords: initial public offerings, acquisitions, mergers, perfom1ance 
INTRODUCTION GÉNÉRALE 
L ' introduction en bourse ou l' émission initia le d ' actions représente une étape cruciale 
dans la vie d ' une entreprise. E lle offre aux entrepri ses émettrices plusieurs avantages. Elle 
leur donne la possibilité de lever des fo nds propres nécessaires pour Je financement et le 
développement de leur croissance. Elle représente un mécanisme de so1iie pour les bailleurs 
de fonds. Elle amé liore la notoriété de la société cotée sur Je plan financier et commercia l, 
offre une visibilité permanente à travers J' attention régulière portée à l' évolution de ses 
résultats et renforce sa crédibilité sur le plan national et international qui constitue un vecteur 
important de croissance. 
Les études empiriques sur les introductions en bourse ont généralement examiné le 
comportement boursier à cowi, moyen et long terme des entrepri ses émettrices et tenté 
d ' expliquer plusieurs anomalies. qu ' on associent aux émiss ions initiales, par exemples, la 
sous-évaluation initiale ou «underpricing», la contre-perfonnance à long terme et le 
regroupement des émissions pendant les périodes de fo1ies activités « hot issues ». 
Récemment, les travaux sur les introductions en bourse se sont orientés vers l' étude des 
décisions corporatives prises par l' entreprise après son introduction en bourse, notamment les 
opérations de fusion -acquisition. Ce sujet a suscité l' intérêt de plusieurs chercheurs. Par 
exemple, Brau et Fawcett (2006) ont envoyé un questionnaire à 336 responsables financiers 
afin d ' identifier les motivations de s ' introduite en bourse. Ces auteurs constatent que les deux 
principales motivations d ' une entreprise à s' introduire en bourse est l' étab lissement d ' une 
valeur au marché des titres et la création d ' un moyen de paiement pour les prochaines 
acquis itions. Cependant, les études empiriques ayant tenté d ' expliquer le rôle joué par 
l' introduction en bourse dans le développement des opérations de fus ion-acquisition restent 
rares . Pourtant, Celi kyurt et al. (2010) ont analysé l'activité des fus ions et acquis itions de 
1295 entreprises introduites en bourse entre 1985 et 2004 et ont constaté que l' appétit de ces 
entreprises à s ' engager dans des transactions d ' acquis ition a augmenté après leurs 
introductions en bourse. Également, Ritter et al. (2013) ont montré que le nombre 
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d' entreprises nouvellement introduites en bourse qui deviennent acquéreuses ou acquises 
dans les années post-émission a augmenté au cours du temps. Dans ce travail de recherche, 
nous proposons d ' explorer la relation entre l ' introduction en bourse et les opérations de 
fusions et acqu isition. Il comporte trois chapitres, visant chacune des objectifs spécifiques et 
se fondant sur une méthodologie propre. 
Le premier chapitre examine les déterminants des opérations de fu sion-acquisition 
réalisées par les entreprises nouvellement introdu ites en bourse durant les cinq années suivant 
l' ém iss ion. En premier temps, nous testons l'impact du changement de la structure de 
propriété après la cotation sur la probabilité qu 'une entreprise s'engage dans des transactions 
d 'acquisition. Notre objectif est d' éva luer l' effet du changement du pourcentage détenu par 
les initiés après la cotation sur la probabilité d 'effectuer des opérations de fusion-acquisition 
durant les cinq années après 1' introduction en bourse. Par ailleurs, les études antérieures ont 
montré que les entreprises soutenues par des cap ital-investisseurs ont une meilleure 
performance financière. Nous proposons ainsi d 'évaluer si l' appo1t en capital de risque aide 
l' entreprise nouvellement introduite en bourse à s' engager dans des opérations de fusion-
acquisition. En deuxième temps, nous mettons l' accent sur les facteurs qui peuvent expliquer 
le mode de paiement des opérations d 'acquisition post-émission. Celikyurt et al. (2010) ont 
montré que la sous-éva luation initiale des entreprises introduites en bourse est liée 
positivement à la probabilité de s' engager dans des acquisitions par actions. Cependant, ces 
auteurs n'ont pas tenu compte de l' asymétrie d ' information qui peut exister entre l' entreprise 
émettrice et l' entreprise cible. Nous estimons que si l' entreprise cib le est confrontée à un 
niveau élevé d ' information asymétrique, elle pourrait refuser l 'offre par actions pour éviter de 
recevoir des actions surévaluées. Nous examinons par la suite le rô le joué par les 
investisseurs institutionnels dans le choix de mode de paiement. Les travaux antérieurs ont 
démontré que les investisseurs institutionnels qui détiem1ent en même temps des actions dans 
l' entreprise acquéreuse et dans l' entreprise cible participent activement dans la décision 
d 'acquisition et le choix de l' entrepri se cible (Matvos et Ostrovsky, 2008; Harford et al. , 
20 11 ). Cependant, aucune étude empirique n 'a examiné 1 ' effet de ces investisseurs communs 
sur le choix du mode de paiement des acquisitions. Finalement, nous effectuons un lien entre 
les caractéristiques des entreprises introduites en bourse et le nombre d 'acquisitions réalisées 
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dans les cinq années suivant l' émission. Notre objectif ici est d' expliquer pourquoi une 
entreprise tend à s'engager dans une série d' acquisitions successives alors qu'une autre ne 
réalise qu ' une seu le acquisition durant cette période. Nos résultats montrent que la 
probabilité de faire une acquisition durant les cinq années suivant l' émission est liée 
positivement au degré de changement du pourcentage d' actions détenues par les initiés et à la 
présence d' un capital-investissem dans le processus d ' introduction en bourse. Nous montrons 
aussi que l' information asymétrique affrontée par la société cible lorsqu 'elle évalue les 
actions de l' entreprise acquéreuse est associée négativement à la probabilité de s' engager 
dans des acquisitions par actions. De plus, nos résultats montrent que les investisseurs 
institutionnels communs jouent un rôle impo1tant dans le choix de mode de paiement dans les 
opérations d ' acquisition post-émission . Nos tests empiriques révèlent aussi que le degré de 
sous-évaluation et les émissions subséquentes sont liés positivement à la probabilité qu ' une 
entreprise introduite en bourse réalise plusieurs opérations d' acquisition successives durant 
les cinq années subséquentes à 1' introduction en bourse. 
Le deuxième chapitre s' intéresse à l' impact de l' activité de fusion-acquisition sur la 
performance à long terme et la survie des entreprises introduites en bourse. Les études 
antérieures ont démontré que les entreprises introduites en bourse ont tendance à effectuer 
une série d' acquisitions successives dans la comte durée après leur cotation. Celikyurt et al. 
(2010) constatent que 77% des entreprises introduites en bourse s' engagent dans des 
opérations de fusion-acquisition dans les cinq années suivant 1' introduction et que ces 
entrepiises effectuent, en moyenne, 3,64 acquisitions durant la même période. D ' après 
Hovakimian et al. (201 0), les entreprises introduites en bourse accomplissent en moyenne 2 
acquisitions durant les 3 ans post-émission. Ce travail se distingue des études antérieures en 
quatre points. Tout d ' abord, nous effectuons une comparaison entre la performance financière 
à long terme des entreprises introduites en bourse qui ont réalisé une seule acquisition durant 
la première année après l' émission de cell es qui ont réalisé plusieurs acquisitions durant la 
même période. Ensu ite, nous tenons compte du problème de regroupement des acquisitions 
durant la période de ca lcul des rentabilités. Notre objectif est de corriger le biais qui peut 
exister dans le calcul des rendements anom1aux puisque tout nouvel évènement corporatif 
observé durant la période de calcul des rendements peut affecter les résultats obtenus. Étant 
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donJlé que les résultats de pe1fo rmance dépendent étroitement du choix du groupe de 
comparaison dans les méthodes de calcul des rendements anom1aux, nous util isons la 
méthode d' appariement sur le score de propension (propensity score matching). Il s' agit 
d ' une nouvelle technique statistique qui a l' avantage d 'apparier les entreprises en tenant 
compte de plusieurs dimensions simultanément. A insi, elle permet de neutra liser le bia is de 
sélection lié au choix du groupe de contrôle. La dernière section du chapitre 2 est consacrée à 
l' analyse de survie des entreprises introduites en bourse qui s 'engagent dans des opérations 
d' acquisition la première année après la cotation. Nos tests empiriques montrent dans 
l' ensemble une plus faible sous performance pour les entreprises introduites en bourse qui ont 
effectué plusieurs acqui sitions une a1111ée après la cotation. Notre étude de survie révèle que 
la probabilité de non-survie après l' introduction en bourse augmente avec le nombre 
d ' acquisitions réa lisées durant la première année après cotation. 
Le troisième chapitre vise à examiner la relation entre l' utili sation prévue des fo nds levés 
lors de l' introduction en bourse et la perfo rmance financière et opérationnelle à long terme 
des entreprises. Les travaux antérieurs ont principalement considéré le cas des émissions 
subséquentes d 'entreprises pub liques (Walker et Y ost, 2008; Autore et al., 2009) et à notre 
connaissance, aucune étude antérieure n' a exploré cette question de recherche pour les 
émiss ions initiales d ' actions. Nous nous intéressons particulièrement à quatre utilisations 
souvent mentionnées dans les prospectus avant l' introduction en bourse à savoir: (i) le 
développement de la croissance ou investissement (autrement dit les fonds levés seront 
utilisés pour financer la cro issance à travers so it des acquisitions, des dépenses en recherche 
et développement ou des dépenses d ' investissement du capital), (ii) la réduction de la dette, 
(iii) la promotion des ventes ou marketing, et (iv) obj ectifs généraux (les entreprises qui ont 
choisi de ne pas donner une raison cla ire pour leur utili sation). Dans l' ensemb le, nos analyses 
révèlent qu ' il y a une di fférence significative entTe les performances fmancières et 
opérationnelles des quatre groupes étudiés. Plus spécifiquement, une plus faible perfo rmance 
est observée pour les entreprises qui ont déclru·é que les fonds levés seront utilisés pour payer 
une partie de la dette. 
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infom1ation asymmetry faced by the target when evaluating the acquirer decreases the 
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1.1 Introduction 
"1 see M&A as the upside to our core case. There are a lot of opportunities to build 
our position, bath in frozen and d1y (foods) . "1 
Robert Gamgort, Pinnacle Foods CEO - after 
Pinnacle Foods' IPO (March 28tl', 2013) 
Why some fun1s go public while others continue to be p1ivate remains an in1p01tant 
question in corporate finance. Despite the existence of many theories addressing this 
question, lack of data on private firms before they become public linuts the development of 
empirical research. Pagano et al. (1998) have conducted one of the few empirical studies2 that 
exan1ine the motives for initial public offerings (IPOs). Having access to a unique data set 
covering accounting infonnation for a large sample of privately and publicly held firms in 
Ital y, they fmd that Italian fi1ms go public to rebalance their capital structure after a pe1iod of 
high investment and growth rather than fmance subsequent investment. Other studies have 
used surveys of corporate executives to empirically test the motivation for going public. For 
instance, Brau and Fawcett (2006) survey 336 chief fmancial officers and find that the 
creation of an acquisition currency and the establishment of market priee are the two most 
important reasons for going public. Based on Brau and Fawcett (2006)'s fmdings, Celikyurt et 
al. (20 1 0) explore the acquisition motive for IPOs. Their results show that 77% of firms make 
at least one acquisition within the fmt five years of the IPO and that the typical IPO finn 
makes four acquisitions in this five-year period. Wiggenhom et al. (2007) exan1ine the 
acquisition activity of over 5,000 US firms that went public during the 1992-2001 time period 
and fmd that there were more than 400 acquisitions made by new ly public firms within a year 
of going public, while less than 100 were targeted for takeovers. Hovakimian and Hutten 
(2010) fmd that 36% of IPOs complete at least one acquisition in the tl1ree years following 
1 Robert Gamgort, Pinnacle Foods CEO was Interviewed after Pinnacle Foods' IPO (March 28ù', 2013) 
at CNBC's "Squawk on the Street" and reported by Paul Toscane 
(http://www.cnbc.com/idll 00600 175). 
2 Rosen et al. (2005) also examine how the probability of going public is affected by various bank 
characteristics and find that banks with higher profits and more leverage are more likely to go public. 
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the IPO and, on average, an IPO fmn makes two mergers and acquisitions (M&As) within 
the same time period. Their results con:firm that IPOs facilitate subsequent acquisitions, using 
the cash raised at the IPO. Ritter et al. (2013) also confim1 that too many IPO fm11S are 
subsequently involved in M&A deals, either as a target or an acquirer. Hsieh et al. (2011) 
propose a mode! that links a firm ' s decision to go public with its subsequent acquisition 
activity. They focus on the informational role of IPOs by suggesting that IPOs reduce the 
valuation uncertainty of the bidder leading to a more efficient acquisition strategy. They fmd 
that the costs of going public are positively related to the likelihood of observing a merger 
within five years of an IPO. 
Our study contributes to this literature in severa! ways. First, we examine why IPO fmns 
become acquirers shortly after their going public. In pa1ticular, we investigate the impact of 
post-IPO change in insider ownership on the likelihood of making acquisitions in the post-
IPO period. Our rationale is that ownership dispersion following IPO could increase agency 
problems between shareholders and managers who may refuse any corporate decisions for 
entrenchment pw-poses (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Mikkleson, 1997). Additionally, the role 
of venture capital in the IPO market is important and has been the subject of considerable 
debate in finance. For instance, numerous studies have examined the influence of venture 
capitalist stock holdings on IPO firm valuation, underpricing, and long-term performance 
(see Megginson and Weiss, 1991 ; Barry et al. , 1990; Brav and Gompers, 1997, among 
others). In this paper, we contribute to this strand of literature by examining the effect of IPO 
venture backing on the likelihood of conducting acquisitions. Specifically, we analyse the 
acquisition activity of IPO fmns during the lockup period and investigate whether venture 
backing influences the likelihood of IPO fmns to conduct acquisitions during this period. 
Second, we investigate the method of payment in M&As following IPO. Celikyurt et al. 
(2010) show that an IPO creates publicly traded stock that can be used as a fonn ofpayment 
for acquisitions. They suggest that IPO fmns with greater underpricing conduct more stock-
financed acquisitions . However, these authors do not consider the level of information 
asymmetry faced by the target fmn when evaluating the IPO acquirer. We expect that an IPO 
fmn could use theil· overvalued stocks to pay for acquisitions only when the target shows a 
willingness to accept such an offer. Otherwise, the deal would not succeed. In other words, 
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the degree of information asynm1etry faced by the target when evaluating the acquirer could 
decrease the likelihood of an IPO firm with high leve! of underpricing to engage in a stock-
fmanced acquisition. In addition, we explore whether institutional cross-holdings influence 
the payment method in post-IPO acquisitions. This issue is not addressed in prior literature 
although previous studies argue that institutional shareholders could affect managerial 
corporate decisions including M&As (Harford and Li, 2007; Harford et al., 2011). 
Third, our paper innovates by distinguishing between frequent and infrequent acquirers 
and examining why some IPO fmns engage in only one acquisition while others carry out 
frequent acquisitions in the years immediately following their IPO. The comparison between 
these two types of acquirers could indeed add to our understanding of managerial behaviour. 
Finally, we cover the period from January 1980 to December 2010 and use a larger 
sample of IPOs3 (6,705) than those found in previous studies which allows us to draw 
conclusions with greater confidence. 
We fmd that higher change in insider ownership following IPO increases the probability 
of IPO mergers in the five years following the IPO, suggesting that IPOs in which post-IPO 
insider o.wnership remains high tend to avoid acquisitions in the post-IPO period. T1ùs result 
could be explained by managerial entrenchment purposes. Consistent with the predictions of 
the venture backing hypothesis, we fi.nd that venture-backed IPOs are more likely to engage 
in acquisitions within five years following IPO than non-venture-backed IPOs. However, 
they are less likely to engage in M&A activity during the lockup period, suggesting that the 
pressure of venture capitalists to disengage from the IPO firm may drive them to avoid 
acquisitions during this period as any new corporate event will change the fundamentals and 
the risk profile of the company. 
Exanùning the determinants of payment method in post-IPO acquisitions, we fmd that 
IPOs with high degree of underpricing conduct more stock-financed acquisitions after the 
3 Our final sample includes 2,547 IPOs firms involved in 5,853 mergers and 4,158 IPOs fmns that did 
not conduct any acquisitions during the five years following the IPO date. Hovakimian and Hutton 
(2010) 's sample, for example, includes 2,059 œo fmns conducting 4,265 mergers and 3,712 IPO 
fmns without any acquisitions in the frrst tlrree years after the IPO. Celikyurt et al. (2010) consider 
1,295 IPOs with IPO proceeds greater than $100 million (in 2004 dollars) . 
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IPO. However, higher extent of information asymmetry faced by the target when evaluating 
the acquirer decreases the likelihood of stock being used in acquisitions. Our results show 
that IPO fm11S may not be able to exploit thei.r overvalued stocks to pay for acquisitions when 
there is a high level of infom1ation asynm1etry between the acquirer and the target. 
Investigating the role of cross-holdings in explaining which acquisition payment method IPO 
fmns may choose, we fmd that IPO acquirers with a high level of cross-holdings are more 
likely to conduct stock-financed acquisitions. 
Overall, our results suggest that specifie IPO characteristics significantly influence not 
only post-IPO acquisition decisions, but also the choice of the paYJnent method in such 
events. Our findings also show that IPOs with higher underpricing and those that make 
seasoned equity offerings are significantly more likely to be frequent acquirers 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present our hypotheses. Data and 
sample selection are discussed in section 3. In section 4, we present our empirical results . 
Section 5 analyses the detenninants of frequent acquisitions by IPO fmns. In section 6, we 
run some robustness tests. Section 7 concludes. 
1.2. Hypotheses development and construction of variables 
Our first and second hypotheses focus on the effects of ownership structure and venture 
capital backing on the likelihood of an acquisition, while our third and fourth hypotheses 
focus on the effects of infom1ation asymmetry and cross-holdings on the acquisition method 
ofpayment in post-IPO M&As. 
1.2.1 Ownership structure hypothesis 
Previous IPO literature has shawn that the transition from private to public ownership via 
an IPO has a significant effect on the fmn's ownership structure. Specifically, previous results 
have shawn that insider ownership, including management ownership, decreases while 
extemal blockholders increase after the IPO. Mikkelson et al. (1997) analyse a san1ple of283 
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U.S. IPOs thé:!t occmred dming the 1980-1983 period. They find that the median ownership 
stake of the officers and directors declines significantly from the year before the IPO to ten 
yea.rs later. Roosenboom and Goot (2005) examine the ownership structme of 118 IPOs in 
the Netherlands. They fmd that management stock ownership declines from 42.5% to 28.6% 
after the IPO. Alavi et al. (2008) investigate the impact of the pre-issue ownership structure 
on key decisions su.rrounding an IPO using 565 Australian fm11S that went public between 
1995 and 2005. They find that the pre-IPO managerial ownersh.ip decreases from 46.07% to 
30.18% and that new blockholder ownersh.ip emerges, representing 3.62%. Besicles the 
change in the ownership structure, IPOs also drive the dilution of stock ownership, which 
could increase agency problems between managers and shareholders. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) argue that the interest of managers and other stockl1olders becomes less closely 
aligned as managers ' stakes decrease and the ownership becomes more dispersed. Post-IPO 
agency problems are likely to be acute during corporate control events such as acquisitions. 
In fact, the incentives of managers and shareholders could diverge when newly public fm11S 
decide to engage in acquisition. Managers who are afraid of losing control and motivated by 
managerial entrench.ment are more likely to pursue their own interest rather than that of the 
shareholders in the acquisition event. Jensen (1986) suggests that managers of fums with 
large free cash flows are more likely to undeJiake low-benefit or even value-destroying 
mergers reducing the value of their firms . To the extent that the funds raised in IPOs increase 
the free cash flow avai lable to the fmns ' managers, conflicts of interest between shareholders 
and managers tend to be more severe. Taking these results into account, we expect that IPO 
finns with high change in their insider ownership may be inclined to engage in more 
acquisitions following IPO. Therefore, we predict the following: 
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Hl: The likelihood of an IPO finn to engage in an acquisition is positively associated with 
the change in their insider ownership. 
To test this hypothesis, we use the change in insider ownership (CRINS) as a measure of 
inside ownership for each IPO finn. Insider ownership change is defmed as the absolute 
value of the difference between post-IPO and pre-IPO inside ownership as rep01ted in the 
Thomson Financial ' s SDC New Issues database. 
1.2.2 Venture capital backing hypothesis 
Numerous studies have examined the influence of venture capitalist (VC) stock holdings 
on IPO finn valuation, underpricing, and long-te1m perfonnance. Megginson and Weiss 
(1991) examine the role ofVC certification by comparing U.S . VC-backed IPOs to non-VC-
backed IPOs matched by industry and offering size between 1983 and 1987. They find that 
the first day returns of VC-backed IPOs are significantly lower than those of non-VC-backed 
IPOs. Barry et al. (1990) suggest that VCs could take an active role in monitoring comparues 
that they have invested in since they own significant equity positions and therefore can 
participate directly in the govemance of their portfolio f11TI1s . They fmd that ownership, the 
length of board service, and the number of venture capitalists invested in the pre-IPO firm are 
negatively related to IPO underpricing. Brav and Gompers (1997) examine the effect of V Cs 
on the long-run perfonnance of newly public firms using a sample of 934 venture-backed 
IPOs and 3,407 non-venture-backed IPOs during the period 1972-1992. They find that VC 
IPOs outperform non-VC IPOs using equally weighted returns. Krishnan et al. (2011) 
examine the relation between several VC reputation measures and subsequent IPO issuer 
perfom1ance. They confmn that VC reputation affects the long-tenn performance of IPOs. 
Ragozzino and Reuer (2007) consider IPOs as an information diffusion mechanism that can 
help to reduce the information asymmetry between bidders and target fmns in M&A activity. 
They suggest that the involvement of a VC at the time of an IPO can signal the quality of an 
entreprenewial fmn. Consistent with this view, we consider that VCs facilitate post-IPO 
acquisitions as they provide skills and M&A expertise as well as external relationships that a 
newly public fmn generally needs. We predict the following hypothesis: 
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H2a: VC-backed IPO finns are more likely to conduct an acquisition after the offering that 
non-VC-backed ones. 
Nevertheless, newly public fmns could suffer from the venture capitalist involvement 
when conflicts of interest arise in the post-IPO period. Previous literature suggests that VCs 
sell their shares more aggressively than other shareholders at the expiration of the lockup 
period . Brav and Gompers (1999) examine the priee reaction at the time of the lock-up 
expiration and find that VC-backed IPO firms have priee declines that are more than 2% 
grea ter than non-VC fim1s at lockup expiration. They suggest that VC-backed IPOs could be 
associated with a larger number of shares coming to market when the lock-up expires. Field 
and Hanka (200 1) examine insider share sales in the year after the IPO using l ,948 lockup 
agreements in the period from 1988 to 1997. They fmd that VC investors sell more 
aggressively than other pre-IPO shareholders. Examining the trading volume and abnormal 
returns around the expiration date, they fmd that the three-day abnonnal return is almost three 
times larger for venture financed fums than non-venture financed fu111s. They also find that 
the tlu·ee-day abnom1al volume is five times higher for venture-backed fmns. These results 
suggest that VCs have an incentive to sell theil: shares quickly after the IPO. To the extent 
that VCs want to disengage from their relationship with the IPO fim1 and to cash out rapidly 
after the IPO, they could discourage any acquisition during the lockup petiod. This leads to 
the following hypothesis: 
H2b: VC-backed IPOs are less likely to make acquisitions during the lockup period than non-
VC-backed IPOs. 
To test this hypothesis, we use VC backed, a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if 
the IPO is backed by a venture capital fitm, and zero otherwise. Following Arikan and 
Capron (20 1 0), we construct a continuous measure for the lockup period (Lockup) by taking 
the natural logarithm of the number of da ys between the IPO date and expiration date. 
1.2.3 Infonnation asynunetry and the acquisition cunency hypothesis 
Prior empirical studies argue that an IPO creates publicly traded stock that can be used by 
newly public fums as a form of acquisition payment. Given the information asymmetry 
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between bidders and potential target fim1s , the former could issue overvalued stocks to pay 
for future acquisitions . Shleifer and Vishny (2003) argue that many frrms have incentive to 
exploit overvalued equity when making an acquisition. Their theoretical model shows that 
fums with overvalued stocks are more likely to conduct acquisitions, survive, and grow, 
while frrms with undervalued equity are more likely to become takeover targets. Celikyurt et 
al. (201 0) fmd that IPO fm11S with high degree of underpricing conduct more stock-fmanced 
acquisitions ·after the IPO. They suggest that fim1s go public to exploit acquisition 
opportunities when their equity is overvalued. However, the use of overva]ued stocks to pay 
for acquisitions is close! y related to the extent of infonnation asynm1etry between buyers and 
sellers in the M&A market. In fact, the success of a stock-fmanced acquisition depends on the 
willingness of the target to accept such an offer. When faced with an equity offer, the target 
might realize that the IPO fim1 wishes to use overvalued stocks to pay for the acquisition and 
thus might refuse the offer. Chemmanur et al. (2009) examine a sample of publicly traded 
acquirers and target firms involved in 817 acquisitions announced between 1978 and 2004. 
They fmd that a higher probability of cash offerings is associated with high extent of 
infonnation asymmetry faced by the target when evaluating the acquirer. They suggest that 
the choice of the exchange medium in acquisitions is detemuned by the private infonnation 
held sirnultaneously by the acquirer and target frrm. Consistent with this view, we consider 
that the success of a stock-financed acquisition using overvalued stocks is related to the 
degree of the information asynm1etry the target faces when evaluating the acquirer. Thus, we 
propose the following: 
H3: The probability of stock-fmanced acquisitions is negatively associated with the extent of 
information asymmetry faced by the target in its evaluation of the acquirer. 
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Following Celikyurt et al. (2010), we use Underpricing as a measure of overvaluation 
around the IPO, which is defmed as the priee run-up in the fu-st trading day after the IPO and 
measured as the difference between the flrst day closing priee over the offer priee. To 
measure the extent of information asymmetry faced by the target when evaluating the 
acquirer, we use two proxies as Chemmanur, Paeglis, and Simonyan (2009) . The frrst one is 
the number of analysts following the acquirer (N UMA). A higher number of analysts implies 
lower information asymmetry. Bhushan (1989) shows that more analysts following indicates 
that more private information will be disseminated to outside investors. Hongjun et al. (2007) 
also fmd that analyst activity leads to h:igher priee information content. The second measure 
we consider is the standard deviation of analyst forecasts (STDFOR) . A larger standard 
deviation implies less agreement between analysts and consequently a higher level of 
information asymmetry. These proxies are calculated, as reported by IBES, for the last month 
of the fiscal year preceding the acquisition announcement. 
1.2.4 Cross-holdings hypothesis 
Recent empirical studies emphasize the influence of shareholder cross-holdings on 
managerial corporate decisions including M&As. Matvos and Ostrovsky (2008) suggest that 
institutional shareholders of acquiring companies which hold substantial stakes in the target 
flrms are more likely to vote for mergers with negative acquirer mmouncement returns 
because they can make up for the acquirers ' !osses with the gains from the targets. They point 
out a con:flict of interest between shareholders who hold only shares in the acquirer and the 
cross-owners. They show that cross-owners are more likely to vote for mergers with negative 
returns than shareholders holding only shares in the acquirer, but not in the ones with positive 
returns. Harford et al. (2011) suggest that cross-holdings influence target selection. They find 
that the bidder managers consider their shareholders ' cross -holdings when selecting merger 
targets. Other studies argue that deals driven by acquirer stock overvaluation do not produce 
the necessary synergy gains (Harford and Li, 2007; Gu and Lev, 2011). Fangjian et al. (2012) 
find a decrease in the acquirer' s stock priee and an increase in the target's stock priee after 
the deal announcement for acquisition motivated by acquirer stock overvaluation. They 
suggest that targets in acquisition by overvalued acquirers realize higher premiums. 
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Nonetheless, examining whether cross-ho ldings affect the method of acquisition payment has 
been neglected in past empirical studies. We expect that IPO fmns tend to use stocks to pay 
for future acquisitions if high leve! of IPO institutional shareholders own shares in the target 
firms as they could offset their potentiallosses on acquirer shares with gains in target ones . 
Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis : 
H4: The probability of stock-financed acquisitions is positively associated with the leve! of 
institutional cross-holdings. 
Cross-holding exists when a bidder shareholder also holds shares in the target finn. Our 
main measure for cross-ownership is the nurnber of institutional bidder shareholders that own 
shares in the target (NUMCRH) . We also use COM_HOLD, a variable that measures the 
percentage of the bidder and target frrm's 'shares that are cross held. We likewise use the total 
institutional ownership in the bidder's equity (BIEQOW) and the total institutional ownership 
in the target's equity (TAREQOW) to evaluate the impact of these holdings on the choice of 
payment method in post-IPO mergers. Furthe1more, given the fact that large shareholders are 
more likely to have the ability to influence the corporate decisions of the bidding managers, 
we consider that large cross-owners could have an effect on the paytnent method in 
acquisitions. We defme a large cross-owner as an institutional shareholder who owns more 
than 5% in the frrm. To test this effect, we consider two variables: (1) LARBCR, a dummy 
variable taking the value of one if there is a large cross-owner in the bidder's equity, and zero 
otherwise; (2) LARTCR, a dunm1y vmiable taking the value of one if there is a large cross-
owner in the target's equity, and zero otherwise. 
1.2.5 Control variables 
Besides the primary variables described above, we also include a nurnber of controls that 
could be related to the likelihood of post-IPO acquisition and the choice between cash or 
stock as payment method. We use total gross proceeds (Proceeds) defined as the raised 
capital at the time of the offering. The total gross proceeds is also a proxy for IPO finn size. 
W e also control for the use of a prestigious underwriter, using the rankings of Loughran and 
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Ritter (2004t We defme the variable Prestige, a dummy variable that takes the value of one 
if the IPO's underwriter is in the top tier (ranks 8 and 9), and zero otherwise. We also include 
a dummy variable Private that takes th.e value of one if the target is a private fm11, and zero 
otherwise. We also use Relatedness, a dun1111y variable that takes the value of 1 if the target 
finn is in the same 3 digit SIC code as the acquirer, and zero otherwise. 
To control for the effect of periods of high M&A activity, we use Ha1ford ' s (2005) 
industry merge wave indicator. A merger wave is identified when the number of acquisitions 
over 24 months exceeds the 95th percentile of the simulated probability distribution based on 
ten years ofM&A activity. We defme Merger wave, a dun1111y variable taken the value of 1 if 
an M&A wave occurs in any of the five post-IPO years we consider. 
To control for subsequent raised capital in the fi.ve years following the IPO, we defme 
SEO, a durnmy variable that takes the value of 1 if the IPO finn conducts an SEO during the 
five years following the IPO, and zero otherwise. We also use Bubble, a dunm1y variable that 
takes the value of 1 for IPOs during 1999 and 2000, and zero otherwise to control for the 
bubble period. Table 1.1 surnmarizes the definitions of all the variables considered and their 
expected sign. 
4 We thank Professor Jay. R. Ritter for making IPO underwriter reputation rankings data available on 
his web site. 
Variable name 
Primarv variab les 
CRINS 
NUMCRH 
COM HOLD 
BIEQOW 
TAREQOW 
LARBCR 
LARTCR 
VC backed 
Underpricing 
NUMA 
STDFOR 
Control variab les 
Proceeds 
Prestige 
Priva te 
Merger wave 
Bubble 
SEO 
Relatedness 
Table 1.1 Variables, descriptions and their expected signs 
Description 
Insider ownership changes defined as the absolute value of the 
difference between post-IPO and pre-IPO inside ownership 
The number of cro s-boldings 
The percentage ofbidder and target sbares that are cross beld. 
The total of institutional ownership in the bidder's equity 
The total institutional ownership in the target's equity 
Dummy variable: 1 if there is a large cross-owner in the bidder's 
equity and zero otherwise. 
Dummy variable: 1 if there is a large cross-owner in the target's 
equity and zero otherwise. 
Dununy variable: 1 if the IPO is backed by a ventme capital 
finn and zero otherwise. 
The difference between the fi.rst day closing priee and the offer 
priee given as a percentage of the offer priee. 
The number of analysts following the acquirer 
The standard deviation of analyst forecasts 
The natmal logarithm of total proceeds 
Dummy variable: 1 if the underwriter is top ti er and 0 otherwise 
Dummy variable: 1 if the target is private and zero otherwise. 
Dummy variable: dummy variable taken the value of 1 if an 
M&A wave occurs in any of the five post-IPO years we 
consider, and zero otherwise. 
Dummy variable: 1 for bubble IPO market, and zero otherwise 
Dummy variable: 1 if the IPO firm conducts an SEO during the 
five years following the IPO, and zero otherwise. 
Dununy variable: 1 if the target finn is in the same 3 digit SIC 
code as the acquirer, and zero otherwise. 
1.3 Data and sample selection 
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To construct our initial sample of IPOs and mergers, we use Thomson Financial ' s SDC 
New Issues and Mergers & Acquisitions databases. Using a sample period from 1980 through 
2006, our IPO dataset consists of 7,206 U.S. IPOs, excluding ADRs, unit offers, and IPOs 
with offer priees under $5 . We also exclude financial firms (one-digit SIC 6) and utilities 
(two-digit SIC 49) from the IPO sample. Our merger sample consists of U.S. completed 
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mergers that were announced between 1980 and 2010. We require that the merger transaction 
value exceed $1 million. Additionally, we restrict our focus only to acquisitions of ptivate, 
public and subsidiary targets. The resulting set contains 31,726 acquisitions. Since our 
objective is to examine the decision togo public and its role in facilitating subsequent merger 
activity, we collect the data on M&As that take place within a five-year period following the 
frrm's IPO, including the IPO year. Thus, merger data are available through the end of 2010 
and we end the IPO sample in 2006 to allow us to track the five-year merger activity for all 
IPO frrms in our sample. Both IPO and merger sets are combined, resulting in 7,107 mergers 
made by 3,048 IPOs. We also require that IPO frrms have available data in COMPUSTAT. 
This results in a final sample of 2,547 IPO firms involved in 5,853 mergers. The remaining 
IPO fim1s did not conduct any acquisitions during the five years following the IPO date 
(4,158 IPOs). Data on asymmetric information measures comes from IBES while the 
infom1ation on institutional ownership comes fi·om the Thomson Reuters Institutional 
Holdings (13f) database. The sample size varies for different tests and hypotheses due to the 
availability of necessary data items. 
Table 1.2 reports descriptive statistics for the IPO san1ple. The number of IPOs in our 
sample and the total proceeds vary over time. Higher levels are observed, especially during 
the Intemet bubble (1999-2000). For the whole sample, we calculate an average underpricing 
level of 20.89%. When we exclude the 1999-2000 period (where underpricing levels 
averaged 65%), we calculate an average underpricing level of 13%. 
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Table 1.2 Descriptive statistics ofiPO sample. 
% ofiPOs Average% of 
Number of making IPO Average IPO Sum ofiPO 
IPO year IPOs acquisitions underpricing proceeds ($mil) proceeds ($mil) 
1980 75 18.67 NA 16.21 1,215.93 
1981 203 21.67 NA 11 .72 2,378.95 
1982 83 24.10 NA 12.27 1,018.39 
1983 442 22.62 NA 20.12 8,893.69 
1984 183 19.67 NA 12.72 2,327.84 
1985 183 19. 13 3.70 19.20 3,513.99 
1986 367 28.6 1 12.42 25.88 9,497.04 
1987 283 24.03 5.07 43.06 12,186.81 
1988 104 39.42 5.48 79.26 8,242.91 
1989 127 36.22 8.99 59.55 7,563.46 
1990 108 61.1 1 11 .48 27.65 2,986.64 
1991 270 49.26 20.46 46.01 12,422.79 
1992 403 48.88 10.88 52.53 21,171.03 
1993 519 48.94 14.68 55.34 28,720.8 1 
1994 457 45 .30 10.05 51.76 23,653.36 
1995 466 49.36 21.93 64.57 30,088.9 
1996 729 48.29 18 .92 66.86 48,741.84 
1997 499 45 .89 12.12 69.54 34,699.62 
1998 271 53.51 27.18 122.37 33 ,161.68 
1999 429 61.07 72.70 121.59 52,165.32 
2000 341 48.97 57.25 160 .26 54,649.84 
2001 74 56.76 18.33 358. 15 26,503.5 1 
2002 65 50.77 12.06 23 1.97 15,078.14 
2003 53 43.40 13.29 136.89 7,255.45 
2004 171 38.60 10.52 169.84 29,043 .79 
2005 148 46.62 10.89 159.94 23 ,670 .82 
2006 153 41. 83 11.83 181.38 27,752.32 
1980-2006 7206 42.30 20.89 73.35 528 ,604.98 
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Table 1.3 presents descriptive statistics for the M&A sample. A large number of 
acquisitions occuned between 1994 and 2000 with an average of 1 ,907 acquisitions. The total 
acquisition amount reached its h.ighest level in 1999 and 2000, which co.incides with the 
highest IPO proceeds. As Rau and Stouraitis (2011) and Hovak.imian and Hutton (2010) point 
out, this result suggests that IPO waves are followed by an .increase in the aggregate merger 
activit/. Figures 1.1 and 1.2 confinn our observation. 
5 Schultz and Zaman (2001) confin:n that internet IPOs in the late 1990s were followed by series of 
acquisitions. 
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Table1.3 Descriptive tatistics ofM&A sample. 
Numberof 
acquisitions by % of acquisitions A vera ge deal Sum of deal transaction 
Acquisition year public frrms by public fin11S transaction ($mil) ($mil) 
1980 40 0.13 222.51 8,900.57 
1981 269 0.85 163.60 44,007.80 
1982 339 1.07 74.09 25 ,116.31 
1983 644 2.03 59.13 38 ,080.01 
1984 966 3.04 11 7.59 113,589.98 
1985 405 1.28 296.64 120,139.50 
1986 530 1.67 185.42 98,274.54 
1987 553 1.74 169.58 93,775.07 
1988 569 1.79 186.72 10,6243.35 
1989 704 2.22 172.35 12,1335.94 
1990 701 2.21 85 .1 7 59,701.86 
1991 662 2.09 67.17 44,467.68 
1992 873 2.75 62.85 54,866.60 
1993 1156 3.64 102.91 11 8,964.97 
1994 1419 4.47 110.96 157,448.51 
1995 1536 4.84 131.90 202,604.48 
1996 1928 6.08 173.61 334,711 .99 
1997 2316 7.30 168 .61 390,498.76 
1998 2232 7.04 323.30 721 ,614.07 
1999 2003 6.3 1 422 .69 846,642.23 
2000 1914 6.03 487 .1 2 932,352.21 
2001 1147 3.62 336.1 1 385,519.13 
2002 1067 3.36. 211.46 225,625. 10 
2003 978 3.08 192.29 188,056.95 
2004 1138 3.59 265.70 302,637.60 
2005 1185 3.74 400.28 474,334.09 
2006 1177 3.71 420.97 495,479.96 
2007 1176 3.7 1 305.68 359,480.51 
2008 831 2.62 231.45 192,334.25 
2009 628 1.98 570.64 358,363.62 
20 10 640 2.02 350.29 224,184.23 
1980-2010 31726 100 228.03 783,935 1.85 
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Figurel.l Aggregate IPO activity, aggregate acquisition activity and acquisition activity by 
IPOs 
Note: This figure presents aggregate IPO, aggregate acquisit ion activity and acqu isition activity by IPO fi1ms. 
Annual aggregate !PO activity is scaled by the total number of IPOs during the sample period. ArulUal aggregate 
acqui iti on activity i scaled by the total number of acqui sitions during the sample period. Annual acquisition 
values by TPO finn are sca led by the total number of acquisitions conducted by lPOs. 
0,101 
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_..,._ Acquisition dea l values 
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Figure 1.2 Acquisition deal values and IPO proceeds by year 
ote: This fi gure represents acqui ition deal values and IPO proceeds respectively scaled by the sum of 
acqui sition values and the sum ofiPO proceeds du ring the sample period 
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Table 1.4 summarizes the acquisition activity undertaken by IPO fim1s for windows 
extending up to five years after the IPO date. Y ear 0 denotes the year of the IPO. W e observe 
that 21% ofiPO fi1ms make at least one acquisition in their IPO year and 47% ofiPO firms 
make at !east one acquisition in year 1. These observations confm those of Celikyurt et al. 
(2010) and Brau et al. (2012), namely that a significant number of fmns become acquirers 
shortly after the IPO. Moreover, we find that many fmns make more than one acquisition 
within five years following their IP06. The average number of acquisitions by an IPO fm is 
2.33 , while the mediannun1ber of acquisitions in the first five years after going public is 2. In 
Table 1.4, we also present frequent acquisitions year by year. We define a frequent acquirer 
as an IPO firm that conducts at !east two acquisitions in a given year. We frnd that 30.22% of 
IPO firms conduct more than two acquisitions in the year after the IPO. This percentage 
varies between24.18% and 27.77% in the following years, suggesting that IPO finns tend to 
be frequent acquirers in the sh01t period in1111ediately following their IPOs. 
Table 1.4 Acquisition activity ofiPO finns over time 
Year 0 Year 1 Year2 Year 3 Year4 
Number ofiPOs making at lea t one acquisition 525 1201 918 736 660 
Percentage of IPO frrms making at !east one acquisition 20.61 47.15 36.04 28.89 25.91 
Number ofiPOs making frequent acquisitions 130 363 255 178 165 
Percentage ofiPOs making frequent acquisitions 24.76 30.22 27.77 24.18 25 
Total number of acquisitions by IPO finns 708 1827 1356 1022 940 
Percentage of acquisitions 12.09 31.21 23.16 17.46 16.06 
Figure1.3 shows aggregate acquisitions, aggregate IPOs, and IPOs making acquisitions 
by industry. We observe that IPO fums make more acquisitions in manufacturing and service 
industry groups than in other industry groups. 
6 White our main focus in this paper is on M&A as a motivation to go public, we should mention that 
some IPO fums do not become acquirers over their fust five years for severa! reasons (e.g. financial 
distress or bankruptcy, going private, become acquisition target, etc.). We leave these issues for future 
research. 
Services 
Wholesale and retail trade 
Sanitary services 
Communication 
Transportation 
Manufacturing 
Construction 
Natural resource 
Agriculture 
0 0,05 0,1 0,15 
• Acquisitions by IPOs • IPOs 
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0,2 0,25 0,3 0,35 0,4 0,45 
Aggregate acquisitions 
Figure 1.3 Number of acquisitions, number of IPOs and number of IPOs making acquisitions 
by industry 
Note: This figure il lustrates the total number of acqui sitions by IPOs, the total number of fPOs and the aggregate 
acqu isition activity ela sified by industry. Acquisitions by IPOs in each industry are caled by the total number of 
acqu isitions made by IPOs in ali stud ied industries. Total number ofiPOs by industry is scaled by the sum ofiPOs 
in ali industries. Aggregate acquisitions by industiy are scaled by ai l acquisitions in ali studied induso·ies. · 
1.4 Results 
1.4.1 Univariate results 
Panel A of Table 1.5 presents the summa.ry statistics for IPO firms making acquisitions 
and those that do not du.ring the five years following their IPO. We find that IPOs making 
acquisitions in the five years following their IPO are significantly more underpriced than 
.those that do not. The mean underpricing of IPO firms making acquisitions is 27%, whereas 
it is 20% for those that do not. Our results show that venture backed IPOs are significantly 
more likely to engage in acquisitions than non-venture backed IPOs. We also find that change 
in insider ownership is significantly higher for IPOs making acquisitions as compared to 
those that do not. 
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Panel Bof Table 1.5 presents summary statistics for cash and stock acquisitions. We fmd 
that underpricing is significantly higher for IPOs making stock acquisitions than those 
making cash acquisitions. The mean underpricing of IPO acquirers in stock acquisitions is 
40% as compared to 24% for IPO acquirers in cash acquisitions. The mean proceeds at the 
IPO date is significantly higher for IPOs that conducted cash acquisitions tl1an for those that 
conducted stock acquisitions, thereby supporting the capital infusion hypothesis of Celikyurt 
et al. (2010). IPO firms seem to use theil· stocks to pay for acquisitions in periods of high 
M&A activity and dwing the hubble period. We fmd significant differences in means and 
medians for the variables Bubble and Merger wave. Comparing the means and medians of the 
proxies for information asynm1etry, we fmd that NUMA is significantly higher for stock 
acquisitions than for cash acquisitions. The mean number of analysts following the acquirer is 
5.29 for stock acquisitions, whereas it is 4.60 for cash acquisitions. Our results also indicate 
larger standard deviation of analyst forecasts followli1g the acquirer li1 cash-fmanced 
acquisition although this result is not statistically significant. 
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Table 1.5 Summary statistics and urùvariate tests 
Pane l A: S u mma ry sta ti stics and uni vari a te tests for lPOs tha t d id not m ake acquis ition s and lPOs tha t did 
Tota l fPOs that did not make acguisitions IPOs that make acguisitions Di ffere nce Di ffe rence 
N Mean Median STD N Mean Median STD in means in medians 
Underpricing 1754 908 0.20 0.09 0.45 846 0.27 0. 14 0.48 -0.07 -0.05 
(-3.23)*** (-4.82)*** 
Proceeds 1754 908 3.44 3.48 0.96 846 3.65 3.63 0.87 -0.2 1 -0. 15 
(-4.83)*** (-5.04)*** 
Prestige 1754 908 0.55 0.49 846 0.63 0.48 -0.07 0.00 
(-3 .11 )*** (-3. 1 0)*** 
VC backed 1754 908 0.45 0 0.49 846 0.50 0.50 -0.05 -1.00 
(-2. 13)*** (-3. 1 0)*** 
CHINS 1754 908 0. 18 0. 16 0.1 2 846 0.24 0. 18 0.35 -0.05 -0.02 
(-4.33)*** (-4.49)*** 
SEO 1754 908 0.3 1 0 0.46 846 0.46 0 0.50 -0. 14*** 0*** 
(-6.24) (-6.17) 
Bubble 1754 908 013 0 0.34 846 0. 17 0 0.37 -0.04*** 0*** 
(-2.29) (-2.29) 
Merger wave 1754 908 0. 17 0 0.38 846 0.20 0 0.40 -0.03** o.oou 
(- 1.99) (- 1.99) 
PaneiB: Summaty s tati s tics a nd uni vari ate tests for cas h fmanced and stock fin an ced acqui itio ns . 
Total Cash-financed acguisitions Stock-financed acguisitions Di fference Difference N Mean Median STD N Mean Median STD in means in medians 
Underpricing 20 10 1211 0.24 0. 11 0.54 799 0.40 0. 18 0.64 -0. 16 -0.09 
( -5.85)*** ( -6.97)*** 
Proceeds 20 10 1211 3.92 3.93 0.97 799 3.72 3.63 0.87 0. 19 0.30 
( 4.67)*** (5. 16)*** 
Prestige 2010 1211 0.68 0.46 799 0.77 0.42 -0.08 0.00 
( -4. 11 )*** (-4 .1 0)*** 
VC backed 2010 1211 0.45 0 0.50 799 0.59 0.49 -0. 14*** -1.00*** 
(-6.54) (-6.48) 
Priva te 2010 1211 0.57 0.48 799 0.72 0.45 -0. 14 0.00 
( -6.82)*** ( -6. 74)*** 
Bubble 2010 1211 0.10 0 0.30 799 0. 18 0 0.38 -0.07 0.00 
(-5. 10)*** (-5.07)*** 
Merger wave 2010 12 11 0. 17 0 0.37 799 0.32 0 0.47 -0. 15 0.00 
(-7.9 1)*** (-7.99)*** 
SEO 2010 1211 0. 19 0 0.39 799 0. 16 0 0.36 0.03 0.00 
(1.86)* (1.86)* 
Relatedness 2010 1211 0.62 0.48 799 0.61 0.49 0.01 0.00 
( 0.03) ( 0.03) 
NUMA 1823 111 4 4.60 3.62 709 5.29 4 4.36 -0.68 -1.00 
( -3.62)*** ( -4.03)*** 
STDFOR 11 19 753 0.04 0.02 0.03 44 1 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 
( 0.3 1) ( 0.04) 
NUM CRH 164 48 2.00 2.07 0.98 11 6 2.50 2.48 1.02 -0.50 -0.41 
(-2 .88)*** (-2.66)*** 
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Note: Thi s tabl e resumes summary stati stics and uni valiate tests. Panel A reports the results for IPOs not making 
any acqui ition within the fi ve years fo ll owing th e TPO and lPO making at !east one acquisiti on within the same 
time period respectively. Panel B reports results fo r cash-financed and stock-financed acquisitions respectively. 
Underpricing is the pri ee run-up in the first trading day after the TPO; it is defin ed as the difference between the 
first day closing p liee and the offer pliee given as a percentage of the offer pri ee. Proceeds is the naturallog of the 
total capital raised at the ti me of the !PO. Prestige is a dummy variable th at takes the va lue of 1 if the underwri ter 
is in the top ti er and 0 otherwise. VC backed is a du mm y taking the value of one if the TPO i backed by a venture 
capital finn and zero otherwi e. Loc/eup is the naturallogarithm of the number of days between the IPO date and 
expirati on date. CHJNS i the absolute va lue of the di fference between post-IPO and pre-TPO in side owner hip. 
SEO is a du mm y va riable th at takes the value of 1 if the JPO fm11 condu cts an SEO du ring the fi ve years fo ll owing 
the TPO, and zero otherwise. Bubble is a dummy va1iable that takes the value of 1 for lPO du ring 1999 and 2000, 
and zero otherwise. Metger wave is a dummy variable ta ken the va lue of 1 if an M&A wave occurs in any of the 
fi ve post-IPO years we consider, and zero otherwise. Priva te is a dummy that takes the va lue of 1 if the target is a 
pri vately held firm and zero otherwise. Re/atedness is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the acquirer and the 
target are in the sa me industry and 0 otherwise. NUMA i the number of analysts fo ll owing the acq ui rer. SDTFOR 
is the standard deviation of analysts' earnings fo recasts about the acquirer. NUMCRH is the natural logarithm of 
the number of cross-holdings. Th e results of t-tests for th e difference in means and non-parametri c Wilcoxon rank-
sum tests for the difference in medians are reported in parentheses. ***,**and * indicate significance at the 1%, 
5% and l 0% levels respecti ve1y 
1.4.2 Determinants of post-IPO acquisition activüy 
We rw1 the following logit regression7 to test the effect of IPO characteristics on the 
likelihood of an acquisition: 
Yi = /30 + /31 Underpricingi + f3 2 Proceedsi + f33 Prestigei + f34 VC backedi + 
/35 SEOi + f36 CHINSi + f37 Bubblei+f38 Merger wavei + Ei (1) 
The dependent variable in regression (1) takes the value of 1 if an IPO fmn makes at 
!east one acquisition during the five years following its IPO, émd zero otherwise. Table 1.6 
shows the results. We fmd that the degree of underp1icing is a positive and significant 
detenninant of making acquisition within the frrst five years following IPO, suggesting that 
IPO fmns with a higher degree of underpricing are more 1ikely to involve in M&A 
transactions. We also find that firms with higher proceeds are more likely to engage in 
acquisitions following the IPO. Thus, the capital raised from the initial offering help newly 
public fmns to grow through acquisitions. The subsequent capital raised via seasoned equity 
offerings also seems to influence the ability of an IPO fmn to conduct acquisitions shortly 
after their going public decision. The coefficient of SEO is positive and significant at the 1% 
7 We also consider a Tobit estimation to take into account the number of M&A after going public and 
our results remain qualitatively unchanged.· 
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level. Thus, conducting an SEO within the five years following the IPO increases the 
likelihood of an IPO fim1 to conduct acquisition8. Testing our ownership structure hypothesis, 
we find a positive and significant relation at the 1% leve! between CHINS and the probability 
of making acquisitions within 5 years following IPO. This suggests that a higher decline in 
insider ownership following IPO is associated with a higher probability of IPO mergers9, 
supporting Hl. Our results also show that the coefficient of VC backed is positive and 
significant which indicates that VC-backed IPOs are significantly more likely to conduct 
acquisitions than non-VC-backed IPOs in the five years following the IPO, providing support 
forH2a. 
During the lockup petiod, company insiders are forbidden by definition to sell any of 
their shares. Consequently, IPO fmns are restricted from making corporate events during this 
period. Venture capitalists who desire to cash out quickly after the firm goes public may 
make pressure on management teams to avoid any acquisition during the lockup period. To 
test this hypothesis, we run the following regression: 
Yi = {30 + /31 Underpricingi + {32 Proceedsi + f33 Prestigei + /34 VC backedi + 
{35 SEOi + f36 CHINSi + {37 Bubblei+/38 Merger wavei + {39 Lockupi + /310 VC backed * 
(2) 
The dependent vatiable takes the value of 1 if an IPO fmn makes an acquisition during 
the lockup period, and zero otherwise. W e use the Heckman procedure to correct for the 
selection bias since we are interested only in IPO acquirers . In the first stage, we use a probit 
8 We also estima te eq. (1) using the number of SEOs made in the five years following IPO Instead of a 
dummy variable (SEO) and find that the higher the number of SEOs is, the higher is the likelihood to 
engage in M&As activity. 
9 Gao and Jain (2012) considera sample of 1,963 fm11S that conducted an IPO during the period 1997-
2000 and also fmd that the presence of founder CEOs lowers the probability of post-IPO change of 
control. Further, Bauguess and Stegemoller (2008) examine the effect of ownership structure on the 
ftrms ' li kelihood of making an acquisition using S&P500 fm11S from 1994 to 2005. They find that 
family owned firms and finns with high proportions of inside ownership are significantly less likely to 
acquire, and when they do, they destroy shareholder value. 
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mode! to estimate the selection equation based on whether or not the IPO fmn makes an 
acquisition in the five years following the IPO. We estimate the following equationlo: 
(3) 
Where Yi=1 for IPO acquirers within 5 years ofiPO, and zero otherwise. 
In the second stage, we add the inverse Mills ratio to our explanatory variables in eq. (2) 
and estimate it using the logit procedure. The results are presented in colunms 2 and 3 of 
Table 1.6. We fmd that the coefficient of VC backed is negative and significant at the 5 % 
leve! (-5. 14, t-statistic = -2.10). Thus, venture capital IPOs are significantly less likely to 
engage in acquisitions during the lockup period than non-venture capital IPOs, confmning 
H2b. To the extent that VC backing and the lockup period are complements - since the 
earliest possible time the venture capitalists tends to dispose of their shares is when the 
lockup agreement expires - we explore whether the lockup period interacting with VC 
back.ing influences the probability of an IPO firm to engage in M&A activity. Column 4 of 
Table 1.6 shows that the coefficient of VC backed*Lockup is positive and significant at the 5 
% leve! (1.01 , t-statistic = 2.16). This in1plies that the longer the lockup period is, the higher 
the probability of a venture backed IPO firm mak.ing an acquisition during this period. A 
longer lockup period could indeed increase the investors' confidence about the quality of the 
decisions made after the IPO and encourage venture capital.ists to accept any corporate 
decisions such as acquisitions. Atihurs et al. (2009) also fmd that the lockup period length 
could be used as a signal oflast resori to communicate firm value. 
10 The same selection equation is used for all the regressions when we should correct for the sample 
selection bias. 
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Tab le 1.6 IPO characte1istics and the likelihood of an acquisition 
Five years DUJing the lockup period 
following the 
IPO 
(1) (2) 3) 
Constant -1 .52*** -42.80*** -43.77** 
(-5.9 1) ( -2.75) ( -2.55) 
Underpricing 0.20* 3.55** 4.62*** 
(1.69) (2.3 1) (2.72) 
Proceeds 0.21 *** 2.54** 3.03** 
(3.06) (2.32) (2.52) 
Prestige 0.03 0.44 0.61 
(0.26) (1.05) (1.35) 
VC backed 0.2 1 * 0.28 -5. 14** 
( 1.92) ( 1.5 1) (-2. 10) 
Lockup 1.56*** 
(5.17) 
VC backed*Lockup 1.01 ** 
(2 .16) 
SEO 0.68*** -0.11 -0.17 
(6.38) (-0.64) (-0.99) 
CHlNS 2.99*** 0.22 0.22 
(7.79) (0.75) (0. 75) 
Bubble -0.04 -0.19 -0.40 
(-0.19) (-0.1 8) (-0.37) 
Merger wave 0.1 8 0.35 0.56* 
(0.99) ( 1.14) (1.86) 
lnvmi ll s 26.70** 34.89** 
(2.14) (2.54) 
In dushy dummy Y es Y es Y es 
Year dummy Y es Y es Y es 
Observation 1,739 789 789 
Pseudo R2 0.08 0.09 0.07 
ote: In mode! 1, the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if an IPO firm makes at !east one acquisition in 
the five years fo llowing the IPO, and 0 othenvise. ln models 2 and 3, the dependent vruiable takes the value of 
1 if an IPO firm makes an acquisition during the lockup period, and zero otherwise. Underpricing is the priee 
run-up in the first trading day after the IPO. lt is defined as the difference between the first day closing priee 
and the offer priee given as a percentage of the offer priee. Proceeds is a measure of the size of the IPO finn 
defined as the natural log of the total capital raised at the ti me of the lPO. Prestige is a dununy vruiable that 
takes the value of l if the underwriter is top ti er and 0 other\Vise. VC baclœd is a dummy va1iable taking the 
value of one if the IPO is backed by a venture capita l firm and zero other\Vise. Loc/eup is the natural logarithm 
of the number of days between the IPO date and expiration date (lockup). SEO is a dummy variable that takes 
the va lue of 1 if the IPO finn conducts a seasoned equity offe1ings during the first 5 years following the !PO, 
and zero otherwise. CHJNS i the absolu te value of the ·difference between post-IPO and pre-IPO inside 
ownership. Bubb/e is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for IPOs dm-ing 1999 and 2000, and zero 
otherwise. Merger wave is a dununy va1iable taken the value of l if an M&A wave occurs in any of the five 
post-IPO years we consider, and zero other\Vise. The inverse Mills ratio (!nvmills) is included in models 2 and 
3. The regressions also include a constant tenn, year and industry dummies. For each independent vari able, the 
fi rst row report its estimated coefficient and the second row, the con·esponding robust t-statistic. ***, **and * 
ind icate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 1 0% leve] respecti ve! y. 
1.4.3 Determinants of payment method in post-IPO acquisitions 
Table 1.7 repOlis the results of the following regression designed to test hypothesis 3: 
}[t = {30 + {31 Underpricingit + {32 Proceedsit + {33 Prestigeit + {34 VC backedit + 
f35 Privateit + + {36 Bubbleit + {37 Mer ger waveit + {38 SEOit + {39 Relatednessit 
+{310 NUMAit +{311STDFORit + /312 Underpricingit * NU MAit 
+{313 Underpricing * STDFORit+Eit (4) 
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To estimate regression (4), we use Heckman' s (1979) method to correct for sample 
selectivity bias . We find that fmns with a higher degree of IPO underp1icing are more likely 
to conduct stock-fmanced acquisitions following IPO. Our results show that the coefficient of 
Underpricing is positive and significant at the 5% leve! for year 0 (0.81, t-statistic= 2.07) and 
over years 0-4 (0.36, t-statistic= 2.38), with a higher coefficient is observed for year O. This 
implies that the effect of IPO underpricing on the probability of stock-financed transactions is 
more pronounced during the IPO year. 
The results for our different proxies of the extent of information asymmetry faced by the 
target when evaluating the acquirer support our hypothesis. Specifically, we find that the 
coefficient of NUMA is positive and statistically significant at the 1% leve! over years 0-4 
(0 .07, t-statistic = 4.43) . Thus, a higher number of analysts forecast following IPO acquirer 
increases significantly the likelihood of stock-financed acquisitions over years 0-4. As 
discussed above, as more analysts follow the firm, more information is revealed to the public 
and thus less information asymmetry exists about the finn's valuation. This could encourage 
target frrms to accept stock offers. The result for our interaction variable 
Underpricing*NUMA confirms this evidence. Its coefficient is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% (0 .09, t-statistic = 3.18) over years 0-4. Thus, IPO fmns with higher 
underpricing and followed by higher number of analysts are significantly more likely to 
conduct stock-fmanced acquisitions. Our results a1so show that the coefficient of STDFOR is 
negative and significant at the 1% leve! for year 0 (-2.80, t-statistic= - 2.82). This suggests 
that less agreement between analysts about IPO acquirer's valuation increases the degree of 
information asymmetry about the acquirer which could drive targets to refuse stock offers. 
Furthennore, Table 1.7 shows that the coefficient of the interaction variable 
34 
Undè1pricing*STDFOR is negative and significant for year 0 (-2.48, t-statistic= -2.52) and 
over years 0-4 (-4.31, t-statistic= -2.08) indicating that IPO fmns with high degree of 
underpricing could not take ad vanta ge of their overvalued stocks to pa y for stock acquisitions 
when there is a high extent of infonnation asymmetry faced by the target when evalua ting the 
acquirer, providing support for H3. 
Our results also show that the total proceeds raised at the tin1e of the IPO is negatively 
related to the probability of stock-fmanced acquisitions over horizons ranging from the IPO 
year to year 4. This implies that IPO finns with higher proceeds are more likely to engage in 
cash-financed acquisitions, thereby supporting the capital infusion hypothesis of Celikyurt et 
al. (20 1 0). Furthem1ore, we fmd that the coefficient of Priva te is positive and statistically 
significant inclicating that IPO fm11S prefer to use stock for private targets (Chang, 1998). 
Controlling for the bubble period, we find that IPO fmns are significantly more likely to use 
stocks to pay for acquisitions during intemet bubble period. 
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Note: The dependent variable is equal to one for stock-financed acqu iSitions and zero fo r cash-financed 
acqui sitions over the period from year 0 (the IPO year) to year 4 fo ll owing the IPO. Underpricing is the priee run-
up in the fir t trading day after the !PO. lt is defined as the difference between the first day closing priee and the 
offer priee given as a percentage of the offer priee. Proceeds is the natural logari thm of the tota l capita l raised at 
the ti me of the IPO, ta ken as a measure of the !PO acqu irer size. Prestige is a dummy va1iable that takes the va lue 
of 1 if the underwriter is top ti er and 0 otherwise. VC backed is a dummy variable tak:ing the value of one if the 
IPO is backed by a venture capital fi1m and zero otherwise. ?rivale takes on the value of 1 if the target is a 
pri vately held finn and 0 otherwise. Bubble is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the IPO occuiTed 
du ring 1999-2000, and zero otherwise. Merger wave is a dummy variable taken the value of 1 if an M&A wave 
occurs in any of the fi ve post-IPO years we cons ider, and zero otherwise. SEO is a dum my vari able that takes the 
va lue of 1 if the IPO finn conducts a seasoned equi ty offerings during the fi rst 5 years following the fPO, and 
zero otherwi se. Relatedness is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the acquirer and the target are in the 
ame industry, and 0 otherwise. NUMA is the number of analysts fo llowing the acquirer. STDFOR is the standard 
deviation of analysts' ea.rnings forecasts about the acquirer. We est ima te the mode! using the Heckman procedure. 
The inverse Mills rati o (Invmi/ls) is included in the table. Regressions include a constant term, indu try and year 
dummies. For each (ndependent variable, the first row reports its estimated coefficient; the second row reports the 
con·esponding robust t-statistic. ***, ** and * ind icate stati stical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% leve! 
respecti vely. 
We further investigate the role of cross-holdings in explaining the choice of payment 
method in acquisitions by IPO fmns by running the following regression 11 : 
Yi = {30 + {31 Underpricingi + {32 Proceedsi + f33 Prestigei + f34VC backedi + {35Bubblei 
+ {36 Merger wavei + f37SEOit + f38 Relatednessi + {39 NUMA + {310STDFOR 
+f311NUMCRHi + {312BIEQOWi + f313 TAREQOWi + /314 LARBCRi + {315 LARTCRi + 
(5) 
Table 1.8 presents estimation results for regression (5) where the dependent variable is 
one if the acquisition was by stock and zero if it was by cash. We use Heckman 's (1979) 
method to correct for sample selectivity bias as we are interested only in IPO acquirers. We 
fmd that the probability of stock-financed acquisition is positively and statistically related to 
the number of cross-holdings at the 1% level. The coefficient of NUMCRH is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level (0.89, t-statistic= 2.76). This implies that the higher 
the number of institutional bidder shareholders that own shares in the target firm, the higher 
the probability of an IPO firm conducting a stock-fmanced acquisition. In Columns 2 and 3 of 
Table 1.8, we test whether the cross owner's proportion of shares held in the acquirer and the 
target fmns influences the likelihood of conducting stock-fmanced acquisitions. We find that 
cross bidder ownership seems to be unrelated to the probability of stock acquisition. The 
11 We do not include the control variable private in eq. (6) as we do not have sufficient data on cross-
holding shares for priva te M&A. 
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coefficient of BIEQOW is positive but not statistically significant (5.73 , t-statistic= 1.01). 
However, there is a positive and significant relation between the proportion of shares held in 
the target and the likelihood to engage in stock acquisition. The coefficient of TAREQOW is 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level (12.87, t-statistic= 2.86). This result 
suggests that institutional cross-sharebolders who own a larger percentage of shares in the 
target prefer to receive shares rather than cash in a merger transaction to increase their 
ownership and obtain influence in the combined fmn. Columns 4 and 5 of Table 1.8 show 
that baving a large cross-owner in the acquirer's equity influences positively but not 
significantly the probability of choosing stock as a mode of pa)'lnent. The coefficient of 
LARBCR is positive but not statistically significant (0.76, t-statistic= 1.21). However, there is 
a positive and significant relation between the existence of a large cross-owner in the target's 
equity and the likelihood of a stock-fmanced acquisition. The coefficient of LARTCR is 
positive and statistically significant at the 10% level (1.43 , t-statistic= 1.91 ). These results 
indicate that IPO acguirers ' institutional shareholders also having a large propo1tion of shares 
in the target frrm would accept acquisition using overvalued stocks since they will be able to 
compensate their !osses as IPO acquirer shareholders by potential gains from the target firm . 
Further, in mode! (6), when we consider the proportion of sbares that are cross-held, we fi.nd 
that the coefficient of COM_ HOLD is positive and statistically significant at the 10% leve! 
(5 .03, t-statistic= 1.69). This result suggests that IPO firrns where the common institutional 
shareholders ownership in the IPO acquirer and the target firm is high are more inclined to 
use stocks to pay for future acquisitions, confirming H4. 
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Table 1.8 Cross-holdings and payment method in post-IPO acquisitions 
Lo il es ti mates 
( 1 (2) 3 (4) (5) (6) 
Constant 6.67 7.48 6.89 8.32 8.57 6.43 
(0.85) (0.9 1) (0.90) ( 1.20) (1.23) (0.80) 
Underpricing 0.49 0.64 0.5 1 0.6 1 0.36 0.62 
(0.92) ( 1.1 6) ( 1.06) ( 1.04) (0.74) ( 1.23) 
Proceeds - 1.70** - 1. 55* -1.60* - 1. 52** - 1.4 1 * -1.53* 
(-2.06) (-1 .86) (-1. 82) (-2.05) ( - 1. 88) ( - 1.82) 
Prestige -0.76 -0.59 -0.75 -0.8 1 -0.99 -0.49 
(-0.65) (-0.42) (-0 .69) (-0 .71) (-0.88) ( -0.38) 
YC backed 0.66 0.71 0.63 0.8 1 0.75 0.66 
(0.80) (0.88) (0.76) ( 1.00) (0 .95) (0 .82) 
Bubble 1.25 0.84 2.49 0. 19 0.77 1.69 
(0 . 76) (0.47) ( 1.51) (0. 10) (0 .43) (0.98) 
Merger wave 3.4 1 *** 3.06*** 2.87*** 3.1 9*** 2.89*** 2.99*** 
(3.40) (3 .1 9) (2.96) (3 .1 4) (3 .1 0) (3. 19) 
SEO -0.60 -0.68 -0.63 -0.74 -0.66 -0.62 
(-1.1 3) (- 1.28) ( - 1.1 5) (-1.33) ( -1.20) (-1.1 8) 
Relatedness 0.6 1 0.94 0.85 0.98* 0.86 0.91 
( 1.00) ( 1.59) ( 1.36) ( 1.66) ( 1.44) ( 1.51 ) 
NUMA 0. 17* 0.12 0. 18* 0. 11 0.10 0.14* 
( 1.68) ( 1.54) ( 1.73) ( 1.5 1) (1.26) ( 1.69) 
STDFOR - 1.70 -2.46 -4.85 - 1.46 -2.57 -3 .60 
( -0.48) (-0.85) (- 1.21) (-0.50) (-0.90) ( -1.11 ) 
UMCRH 0.89*** 
(2. 76) 
BJEQOW 5.73 
(1.0 1) 
TAREQOW 12.87*** 
(2.86) 
LARBCR 0.76 
( 1.21 ) 
LARTCR 1.43* 
( 1.91) 
COM_HOLD 5.03* 
( 1.69) 
fnvmills - 1.89 -2.08 -2.59 -1.98 -2.58 -2.13 
(-0.70) (-0.79) (-0.98) (-0.84) (- 1.07) (-0 .81) 
lndust:Jy dununy Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es 
Yeardummy Y es Ye Y es Y es Y es Y es 
Observations 133 133 133 133 133 133 
Pseudo R2 0.36 0.33 0.42 0.3 1 0.33 0.38 
Note: The dependent vatiab le is equal to one for stock-financed acquisitions and zero for cash-financed acqui sitions over the fi ve years 
fo llowing IPO. Unde1pricing is the ptice nm-up in the fi rst trading day after the IPO. lt is defmed as the difference between the first day 
clos ing ptice and ù1e offer ptice given as a percentage of the offer ptice. Proceeds is a measure of ù1e size of the lPO finn defined a ù1e 
naturallog of the total capital raised at the time of the TPO. Prestige is a dummy va riable ùmt takes ù1e value of 1 ifù1e underwriter is top ti er 
and 0 othetwise. VC backed is a du mm y variable ta king ù1e va lue of one if the IPO is backed by a ventu re capita l finn and zero othetw ise. 
Bubble is a dummy variab le that takes the va lue of 1 if the IPO occutTed du ring 1999-2000, and zero othetwise. Merger wave is a dununy 
variable taken the va lue of 1 if an M&A wave occurs in any of the fi ve post- IPO yea rs we consider, and zero otherwise. SEO is a dummy 
variable that takes ù1e value of 1 if ù1e IPO finn conducts a seasoned equity offerings during the first 5 years following the IPO, and zero 
otherwise. Relatedness is a dununy vatiable that takes ù1e value of 1 if the acquirer and the target are in ù1e same industty, and 0 otherwise. 
NUMA is ù1e number of analysts following the acquirer. STDFOR is the standard deviation of analysts' eamings forecasts about ù1e acquirer. 
NUMCRH is the log of ù1e number of ins titutional bidder shareholders that own shares in ù1e target. BJEQOW is ù1e percentage of shares 
held by bidder cross-owners at the end of the last quatter pti or to the merger. TAREQOW is the percentage of hares held by target cross-
owners at the end of ù1e last quatter prior to the merger. LARBCR is a dummy ta ki ng the va lue of one if there is a blockholder (who owns 
more than 5% of the acquirer) in the bidder cross-owners, and zero othetwi e. LARTCR is a dununy ta king the va lue of one if there is a 
blockholder (more than 5%) in the target cross-owners, and zero othetw ise. COM_HOLD is ù1e percentage of the bidder and target finns's 
share that are cross held . The regressions also include a constant tem1 , industty and year dutrunies and the inverse MiUs ratio (Jnvmills) 
fro m the Heckman estimation. For each independent va tiable, the first row repotts its e timated coefficient and the second row, the 
cotTesponding robust 1-statistic. ***, **and * indicate statistica l siguificance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respecti vely 
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1.5 Detemunants of frequent acquisitions by IPO flrms 
Previous studies fmd that IPO fm11s tend to be frequent acquirers in the short period after 
the decision to go public. For instance, Celikyurt et al. (20 1 0) note that 77% of fmns conduct 
at !east one acquisition witlun the fmt flve years of the IPO, and the typical IPO flm1 makes 
fom acquisitions in this five-year period. Hovakimian and Hutton (20 1 0) show that many 
frrms make more than one acquisition after the IPO, averaging slightly over two mergers per 
finn. The natural question to ask at this point is why sorne IPO fums engage in only one 
acquisition wlule some others carry out seriai acquisitions over the few years following their 
IPO? In tlus section, we investigate the effect of IPO characteristics on the acquisition 
activity after the IPO. Hovakimian and Hutton (20 1 0) consider that market valuations can 
drive both acquisition and IPO activities. They retain the market tinung hypothesis which 
states that IPOs facilitate future acquisitions by providing an opportunity to take advantage of 
favorable stock priees and make acquisitions on more attractive tem1S . Speciflcally, they fmd 
that overpricing resulting in lugh IPO underpricing and post-IPO retums increases the 
likelihood of acquisitions, suggesting that market tinung is a stronger factor in acquisitions. 
We expect that IPOs will exploit their frrst day underpricing to make frequent acquisitions in 
the short period after the IPO. Furthennore, IPOs followed by a prestigious underwriter 
wou1d also be frequent acquirers. IPO literature demonstrates that high prestige underwriters 
with a good reputation and superior infom1ation about the issuing frrm's prospects can 
credibly certify the value of the issues that they are underwriting (e.g. Chemmanur and 
Fulghieri, 1999). When choosing an underwriter, an IPO frrm does not only consider whether 
the services are effective at the time of the IPO but also during the post-IPO period. In 
particular, the underwriter services would also be useful when the issuing fim1 considers 
making acquisitions following its IPO. Arikan and Capron (2010) argue that an acquisition 
advisor serving as lead underwriter could reduce search costs when matching the newly 
public acquirer with target firms, reduce information asymmetry between the IPO acquirer 
and the target, and provide superior technical and flnancial expertise in merger negotiations. 
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Following Billett and Qian (2008), we define a frequent acquirer as an IPO finn 
announcing at least two acquisitions within five years after the IPO. Based on this definition, 
our initial sample of 2,54 7 IPO acquirers includes 1,350 frequent acquirers ma king 4,583 
acquisitions in the five yea.rs followiil.g the IPO. The remaining IPO fim1s (1,197) constitute 
our single acquirer sample. 
Panel A of Table 1.9 reports descriptive statistics and univariate tests for single and 
frequent IPO acquirers respectively. The results show that frequent IPO acquirers have 
significantly higher proceeds and a higher leve] of underpricing than single acquirers. The 
mean underpricing of single IPO acquirers is 24% whereas it is 32% for frequent IPO 
acquirers. This difference is significant at the 5% level. We also find that IPO firms where the 
underwriter plays the san1e role as the acquisition advisor are more likely to be frequent 
acquirers. The differences in means and medians are significant at the 1% level. The mean 
change in insider ownership of frequent IPO acquirers is 0.27 compared to that of single IPO 
acquirers of 0.21. This difference is significant at the 5% level. 
We then run tl1e following multivariate logit regression where the dependent variable 
takes the value of one if the IPO firm makes at ]east two acquisitions within five years of the 
IPO, and zero otherwise: 
Yi= {30 + {31 Underpricingi+f32 Proceedsi + f33 Prestigei + f34 VC backedi + 
{35Advisori + f36SEOi + f37 Bubblei + {38 Merger wavei+f39CHINSi + Ei (6) 
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The estimation results of regression (6) are reported in panel B of Table 1.9. We find that 
IPO frrms with higher underpricing are significantly more likely to be frequent acquirers 
following IPO. This suggests that the level of underpricing determines the intensity of 
acquisition activity of an IPO frrm following going public. Fmther, subsequent capital raised 
after IPO seems to be an important factor that influences the acquisition activity of IPOs 
following going public. Our resu1ts show that IPO frrms that make SEOs are significantly 
more 1ikely to be frequent acquirers. The coefficient of SEO is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level (0.59, t-statistic= 3.98). We also find a positive and significant 
coefficient for CHINS (1.15, t-statistic= 2.68) indicating that a higher decline in the post-IPO 
insider ownership leads to a higher probability that an IPO finn to engage in more than one 
acquisition. In model (2), when we replace Prestige by Advisor, the coefficient is positive and 
statistically significant at the 10% level (0.61 , t-statistic= 1.85). Th us, IPO frrms that retain 
their underwriter as acquisition advisor are significantly more likely to be frequent acquirers. 
Renee, the underwriter's expertise in M&As would help new ly public frrm to be active 
acqmrer. 
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Ta ble 1.9 IPO characteristic and the likelihood of frequent acquisitions by IPO finns 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics and uni va1iate tests 
Single IPO acquirers (N= 505) Freguent IPO acguirers(N=356) Mean Med ian 
Mean SD Median Mean SD Median test test 
Underplicing 0.24 0.43 0.13 0.32 0.53 0. 16 -0.07** -0.03*** 
Proceeds 3.61 0.87 3.60 3.70 0.87 3.69 -0.09 -0.09* 
Prestige 0.61 0.48 0.66 0.47 1 -0.05 0.00 
YC backed 0.50 0.50 1 0.50 0.50 1 0.00 0.00 
Ad vi sor 0.22 0.4 1 0.00 0.38 0.48 0.00 -0.16*** 0.00*** 
SEO 0.40 0.49 0.00 0.53 0.49 1 -0.13*** - 1 *** 
Bubble 0.16 0.37 0.00 0.17 0.38 0.00 -0 .0 1 0.00 
Merger wave 0.19 0.39 0.00 0.22 0.42 0.00 -0.03 0.00 
CHINS 0.2 1 0. 16 0. 18 0.27 0.36 0.1 8 -0.06** 0.00 
Panel B: !PO characteristics and the likelihood offreguent acqui sitions by IPO firms 
Logit estimates 
( 1) (2) 
Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics 
Constant -1.84 -1.10 -0.24 -0.07 
Underp1i cing 0.38* 1.78 0.50 1.05 
Proceeds 0.10 0.63 0. 16 0.47 
Prestige 0.26 1.42 
YC backed 0.02 0. 12 -0.38 -1.1 0 
Ad vi sor 0.61 * 1.85 
SEO 0.59*** 3.98 0.30 1.00 
Bubble -0.37 -1. 10 -0.61 -0.98 
Merger wave 0.24 0.84 0.49 0.82 
CHINS 1.1 5*** 2.68 0.08 0.09 
Invmill s 0.66 0.47 0.38 0.13 
lndust1y dummy Y es Y es Y es Y es 
Yeardummy Y es Y es Y es Ye 
Observations 835 253 
Pseudo R2 0.04 0.08 
ote: Panel A presents summary statistics and uni variate tests fo r the differences in means and medians for single and 
frequent IPO acquirers respectively. Panel B reports multiple regression results. Underpricing is the priee run-up in the 
fir t trading day after the IPO; it is defi ned as the difference between the first day closing priee and the offer priee given as 
a percentage of the offer priee. Proceeds is the natural log of the total capital raised at the ti me of the IPO. Prestige is a 
dummy variable that takes the va lue of 1 if the underwriter is top ti er and 0 otherwi se. VC backed is a dul1llny variable 
taking the value of one if the !PO is backed by a venture capital fim1 and zero otherwise. Advisor is a dummy variable 
taking the value of one if the unde1writer from IPO is the same as the acqui sition advisor, and zero otherwise. SEO is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the IPO finn conducts a seasoned equity offerings during the first 5 years 
following the IPO, and zero otherwise. Bubb/e is a dummy valiable that takes the value of 1 if the IPO occurred during 
1999-2000, and zero otherwi se. Merger wave is a dummy variabl e taken the va lue of 1 if an M&A wave occurs in any of 
the five post-IPO years we consider, and zero otherwise. CHJNS is the absolu te value of the difference between post-IPO 
and pre-IPO inside ownersh ip. The results of the !-tests for the difference in means and non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum 
tests for the difference in medi ans are repo1ted in parentheses. The regressions include a constant term, industJy and year 
dummies and the inverse Mi li s ratio (Jn vmills) from the Heckman estimation. ***, **and * indi cate significance at the l %, 
5% and 10% levels respective! y. 
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1.6 Robustness tests 
In this section, we rely on a survival analysis technique12 to investigate both the 
likelihood of an acquisition by an IPO finn and its timing relative to its IPO. In other words, 
why some IPOs tend to engage in acquisition in the IPO year or one year after IPO while 
ethers conduct their fust acquisition later? The mode! estimation is conducted with the partial 
likelihood method using the proportional hazards mo del proposed by Cox (1972) 13 . The basic 
mode! assumes the following fonn: 
(7) 
Where h;(t) is defmed as the probability of engaging in an acquisition during the five 
years following the IPO. }"a (t) is the baseline hazard function and the second part of the 
equation is the exponentiated set of covariates for fim1 i. 
The regression mode! is as follows: 
Y= {30 + /]1Underpricing + /]2Proceeds + {J3 Prestige + f34 VC backed + {J5 SEO + 
{J6 Bubble + f37 Merger wave + {J8 CHINS + E (8) 
Table 1.10 repOlis the survival analysis results for regression (8). We fmd that IPOs with 
higher underpricing are more likely to make an acquisition. More specifically, the likelihood 
of making an acquisition by fmns with higher underpricing is more than 1.29 ( e026) times that 
of firms with lower leve! of underpricing. Our results show that VC-backed IPOs are 
significantly more likely to make acquisitions than non VC-backed IPOs. We also fmd a 
positive but insignificant relation between tl1e change in insider ownership post-IPO and the 
likelihood and the timing of acquisition following going public. Extemal factors such as 
12 We also considera Poisson specification, where the dependent variable is the number of years an 
IPO fmn takes to conduct its first acquisition during the 5 years following its IPO and our conclusions 
remain qualitatively unchanged. 
13 The Cox mode! is a statistical technique for analysing survival data that does not require the 
specification of an underlying distribution. Its main assumption is that the hazard function of fmn i is a 
multiple of an unspecified baseline hazard function. 
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bubble period and period of high M&A activity also seem to influence positively but non 
significantly the likelihood and the timing of acquisitions by IPO fm11S . 
Underpricing 
Proceeds 
Prestige 
VC backed 
SEO 
Bubble 
Merger wave 
CRINS 
lndustry dummy 
Yeardummy 
Observations 
Wald test 
Log likelihood 
Table 1. 10 Survival analysis results 
Cox 
0.26*** 
(5.06) 
0.17*** 
(4.83) 
0.14* 
( 1.81) 
0.21 *** 
(3 .56) 
0.03 
(0.55) 
0.11 
(1.64) 
0.23 
( 1.27) 
0.03 
(0.26) 
Y es 
Y es 
2,357 
7652 
-9787 
'ote: Unde1pricing i the priee run-up in the first trading day after the IPO; it is defined as the difference between 
the first day closing priee and the offer priee given as a percentage of th e offer priee. Proceeds is the natural log of 
the total capital raised at the tirne of the !PO. Prestige is a dummy variable that takes the va lue of 1 if the underwriter 
is top tier and 0 otherwi e. VC backed i a dummy vatiable taking the va lue of one if the IPO is backed by a venture 
capital fi nn and zero otherwise. SEO is a dummy variable that takes the va lue of 1 if the IPO finn conducts a 
seasoned equi ty offetings during the first 5 years fo llowing the IPO, and zero otherwise. Bubble is a dummy variable 
that takes the va lue of 1 if the IPO occuned during 1999-2000, and zero otherwise. Merger wave is a dummy variable 
taken the value of 1 if an M&A wave occurs in any of the five post-IPO years we consider, and zero otherwise. 
CHINS is the difference between post-IPO and pre-IPO inside ownership. The regressions also include industry and 
year dummi es. For each independent variable, the first row reports it e timated coefficient and the second row, the 
correspondi ng robust 1-stat:isti c. ***, ** and * indicate statistical sign ificance at the 1%, 5% and 10% leve! 
respecti v el y. 
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We fwther test the robustness of our results with regard to determinants of payment 
metbod in post-IPO acquisitions by running an ordered logit regression. The dependent 
variable takes on the following values: one for cash acquisitions, two for rnixed acquisitions 
and tlu·ee for stock acquisitions. The results presented in Table 1.11 show that the probability 
of stock-fmanced acquisitions increases with the degree of IPO underpricing. The coefficient 
of Underpricing is positive and significant at the 1.% level (in models 1 and 2). Specifically, 
taken the mo del 1, we find that a one standard deviation increase in the IPO underpricing 
leads to about 5% increase in the likelihood of stock acquisitions, 1.72% increase in the 
likelihood of rnixed acquisition and 6.64% decrease in the likelihood of cash acquisitions. 
Similarly, we find that issuing IPO dming the bubble period increases the likelihood of post-
IPO stock and mixed acquisitions by about 37% and 1.90% respectively and decreases the 
likelihood of cash acquisitions by about 38%. Our results also show that higher nun1ber of 
analysts leads to significantly higher probability of stock-financed acquisitions. Consistent 
with om prior findings , IPO fmns are less likely to exploit theil· high level of underpricillg to 
engage in stock-financed acquisitions when the extent of illfonnation asynm1etry faced by the 
target when evaluating the acquirer is high. We find that one standard deviation increase in 
Underpricing*STDFOR leads to about 50% decrease li1 the likelihood of stock-financed 
acquisitions, about 18% decrease in rnixed-fmanced acquisitions and about 70% increase ill 
cash-fmanced acquisitions. This result is consistent with Chenunanur et al. (2009) who find 
that the probability of a cash acquisition (relative to that of a stock and rnixed acquisition) is 
increasing with the standard deviation of analyst forecasts. 
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Ta ble 1.11 Ordered logit regressions regarding the choice of paym ent m ethod 
Ordered logit estimates 
( 1) 2) (3) 4) (5 
Underpti cing 0.27*** 0.30*** 0.05 
(3.82) . (3.69) (0.35) 
Proceeds -0 .46*** -0.50*** -0.45** -0.49*** -0.33* 
(-4.6 1) (-4.92) ( -2.42) (-4.77) ( -1.80) 
Prestige 0.58*** 0.58*** 0.67*** 0.60*** 0.56*** 
(4.86) (4.60) (2.76) ( 4.88) (2 .95) 
VC backed 0.26** 0.26** 0.55** 0.26** 0.78*** 
(2.08) ( 1.99) (2.37) (2.05) (3.59) 
Private 0.60*** 0.60*** 0.49** 0.59*** 0.59*** 
(5 .28) (5.22) (2.46) (5. 18) (3.36) 
Bubble 1.7 1 *** 1.84*** 2.18*** 1.78*** 2.22*** 
(6. 13) (6.42) (5. 09) (6.29) (5.45) 
Merger wave 0.2 1 * 0. 19 0.14 0.20 0.2 1 
( 1.71 ) ( 1.47) (0.69) ( 1.55) ( 1.1 6) 
SEO -0.26** -0 .1 9 -0.04 -0.24* -0.19 
(-2. 11 ) (-1.52) (-0.1 8) (-1.9 1) (-0.98) 
Relatedness 0. 12 0.08 0. 13 0. 10 0.21 
( 1.23) (0.76) (0.76) ( 1.03) ( 1.37) 
UMA 0.04** 
(1.97) 
STDFOR -2. 14 
( -0. 76) 
Underpricing*NUM A 0.08*** 
(3.74) 
Underpricing*STDFOR -2.98* 
(-1.86) 
lnvmi lls -1.22 *** -1 .24*** -0.1 7 - 1.25*** 0.23 
( -2. 73) (-2.66) (-0. 19) ( -2. 72) (0.25) 
lndustry dummy Y es Y es Ye Y es Y es 
Year du mmy Y es Y es Y es Y es Ye 
Observati ons 1,804 1,734 663 1,734 663 
Pseudo R2 0.08 0.09 0. 12 0.08 0. 11 
ote: The dependent variable is equal to one for cash-fi nanced acquisitions, two for mixed-fi nanced acquisitions and three for 
stock-fi nanced acquisitions over 5 years following !PO. Underpricing is the ptice run-up in the fir t trading day after the IPO; it 
is defined as the difference between the fi rst day cio ing priee and the offer ptice given as a percentage of the offer priee. 
Proceeds is the natural logarithm of the total capital ra ised at the time of the IPO, taken as a measure of the acquirer size. 
Prestige is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the underwriter is top tier and 0 oth erwise. VC backed is a dummy 
taking the value of one if the IPO i backed by a venture capita l fi nn and zero otherwise. ? rivale takes on the valu e of 1 if the 
target i a privately held fi tm and 0 otherwise. Bubb/e is a du mm y variable that takes the value of 1 if the fPO occurred during 
1999-2000, and zero otherwise. Merger wave is a du mm y variable ta ken the value of 1 if an M&A wave occurs in any of the five 
post-IPO years we consider, and zero otherwise. SEO i a du mm y variable that takes the value of 1 if the !PO fi rm conducts a 
seasoned equi ty offerings during the first 5 year fo llowi ng the !PO, and zero otherwise. Relatedness is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of l if the acquirer and the ta rget are in the same industry and 0 otherwise. NUMA is the nu mber of analysts 
fo llowing the acquirer. STDFOR is the standard deviation of ana lysts ' earnings fo recasts about the acquirer. We estimate ù1e 
mode! using the Heckman procedure. The inverse Mill s ratio (Jnvmills) i included in the table. Regressions include a constant 
term, induSUJ' and year dummi es. For each independent variable, the first row reports its e timated coefficient; tl1 e second row 
reports the corresponding robust 1-sta ti sti c. ***, ** and * indi cate stati stical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% leve! 
res pee ti v el y 
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1. 7 Conclusions 
In this paper, we considera sample of 6,705 IPOs that covers the period from January 
1980 to December 2010, to investigate the acquisition motive for newly public fmns. Our 
results can be summarized as follows. First, post-IPO insider ownership · significantly 
influences the acquisition activity after the IPO. Our findings support the view that IPO fmns 
with high change in insider ownership from preto post-IPO period are more likely to engage 
in M&A activity. When we exanline the ro1e of VC-backed IPOs in explaining the likelihood 
of M&A events following IPOs, we fmd that VC-backed IPOs are more likely to conduct 
acquisitions than are non-VC-backed IPOs in the five years following the IPO. This 
probability decreases during the lockup period, suggesting that venture capitalists avoid any 
acquisition during the lockup period as their objective is to disengage from their relationship 
with the IPO firm and to cash out rapidly after the IPO. We also find that conducting an SEO 
within the five years following the IPO increa.ses the likelihood of an IPO fm11 to conduct 
acquisition 
Second, our analysis of method of payment of acquisitions following IPO suggests that 
IPO underpricing bas a significant effect in explaining stock-fmanced acquisitions. However, 
when we consider the extent of infom1ation asymmetry faced by the target when evaluating 
the IPO acquirer, we fmd that a higher leve! of infom1ation asymmetry decreases the 
likelihood of an IPO fmn to conduct stock-fmanced acquisitions, suggesting that target fmns 
may prefer cash offer if they don 't know enough about acquirer 's stock valuation. 
Fwthermore, we find that high leve! of cross-holdings influence positively the likelihood of 
stock-fmanced acquisitions and that having larger ownership in the target frm1 encourage IPO 
acquirers to conduct stock-financed transactions. 
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Why sorne IPO fmns engage in only one acquisition while sorne others carry out seriai 
acquisitions over the few years following their IPO? To answer this question, we investigate 
the effect of IPO characteristics on the acquisition activity after the IPO and fmd that IPO 
fmns with higher underpricing, higher change in insider ownership, IPOs where the 
underwriter acts as an acquisition advisor and IPO fmns that make seasoned equity offerings 
are significantly more likely to be frequent acquirers. Overall , our findings contribute to our 
understanding of the motivation of going public. Ow- results confirm indeed that an IPO 
represents an opportunity for new issuers to become acquirers and even frequent acquirers. 
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ABSTRACT 
We examine whether making frequent acquisitions in the first year of the IPO affect the 
long-run performance of IPOs differently than do infrequent acquisitions. We fmd that 
frequent acquirers do indeed experience significantly poorer performance in the five years 
following the IPO regardless of the benchmark used. For example, the cumulative abnormal 
retums for 1 tlu·ough 4 years based on industry, size, and book-to-market ratio matching 
method are -20.07% for frequent acquirers as compared to -6 .22% for infrequent acquirers. 
Fmiher, we find that being a frequent acquirer in the frrst year after going public increases the 
probability of not smviving. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Why do initial public offerings (IPOs) underperform in the long run? Severa! arguments 
have been proposed in the literature to elucidate this puzzling result, including the divergence 
of opinion hypothesis (Miller, 1977), the '-'impresario" hypothesis (Aggarwal and Rivoli, 
1990), and the "windows of opportunity" hypothesis (Ritter, 1991 and Loughran and Ritter, 
1995). Various authors also fmd that there are cross-sectional patterns related to IPO 
characteristics. For exemples, Brav and Gompers (1997) show that venture-backed IPOs 
outperforn1 non-venture-backed IPOs in the five years following the IPO. Cao, Jiang, and 
Ritter (2013) report that this IPO pattern is reversed from 1999-2006. 
Dong et al. (2011) find a positive relation between the quality of underwriters and the 
long-run performance of newly public fin11S. Examin:ing the relation between insider trading 
and long-mn post-IPO perfom1ance, Kuntara et al. (2007) fmd that IPOs with high block 
sales underperfonn IPOs with low block sales from the lockup expiration until the third year 
after the issue. Hsuan-Chi et al. (2012) examine the long-mn stock perforn1ance ofiPO fin11S 
following lockup expiration and find that IPO firms with insider selling and IPO fmns with 
abnonnal net sales by top executives within 126 trading days after the lockup expiration also 
exhibit poor long-run performance. Billet et al. (20 11) fmd that fin11s that do multiple 
extemal financings after the IPO subsequent! y underperform. 
Recently, corporate decisions after IPOs, such as M&As, have received the attention of 
many researchers. Celikyurt et al. (2010) explore the acquisition motive for IPOs and find 
that 77% of fm11S conduct at least one acquisition within the first five years of the IPO and 
that the typical IPO fmn makes four acquisitions in this five-year period. Hovakimian et al. 
(20 1 0) fmd that 36% of IPOs complete at !east one acquisition in the three years following 
the IPO and that, on average, an IPO finn makes two mergers within the same time period. 
Brau et al. (2006) survey 336 chief financial officers and find that the creation of an 
acquisition currency and the establishment of market priee are the two most important 
reasons for going public. Based on these results, a new question could be raised about the 
impact of acquisition activity on the long run perfonnance of IPOs. To the best of our 
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knowledge, Brau et al. (2012) provide the frrst study that addresses this question. Examining 
whether the acquisition behavior of IPO fim1s helps to explain the long-run negative IPO 
perfonnance anomaly, they fmd that newly public fm11S that acquire within the first year after 
going public experience significantly poorer long-run performance after the frrst year than 
IPO firms that do not acquire in the fust year. 
In this paper, we reexamine the acquisition activity effect on the long-run performance of 
newly public frrms. We contribute to the existing literature in severa! ways. Brau et al. (2012) 
have attempted to test whether newly public frrms that acquire within the frrst year after 
going public underperform differently from IPO fim1s that do not acquire in the first year. We 
extend their work by distinguishing between IPOs making only one acquisition one year after 
going public and IPOs making multiple acquisitions within the same period. An examination 
of our IPO sample reveals that while some IPOs do not conduct any acquisition during the 
frrst-year of the IPO, others engage in as many as 14 acquisitions within the same period. In 
other words, first year frequent acquisitions are not rare events. 
Based on previous findings that acquirers' perfonnances vary from deal to deal in 
acquisition programs (see Ismail, 2008, Billett and Qian, 2008, and Aktas et al., 2009, 2011 
and 2013, amongst others), we examine whether the long-run performance of an IPO fmn 
that frequently acquires in the frrst year after going public differs from the long-ru.n 
perfom1ance of an IPO frrm that does not frequently acquire in the same period. 
In doing so, we pay considerable attention to the methodological issues related to the 
calculation of abnonnal returns First, to measure long-ru.n abnom1al stock returns of IPO 
frrms, previous studies usually match IPO fm11S to control finns on the basis of finn 
characteristics, in particular size and book-to-market (BM) ratio. Bessembinder and Zhang 
(2013) show that IPO firms differ significantly from their size- and book-to-market matched 
cou.nterparts in tenns of other frrm characteristics, such as idiosyncratic volatility, illiquidity, 
market beta, and retm.n momentum. They fmd that allowing for differences between IPO and 
control frrms in these additional frrm characteristics substantially explains the apparent 
abnormal returns ofiPO firms . In this study, we in1plement propensity score matching (PSM) 
based on Rosenbaum and Rubin's (1983) propensity score theorem. This technique makes it 
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possible to simultaneously match as many finn dimensions as needed, thereby helping to 
produce accurate matches and to elil11inate possible sources of bias due to differences 
between IPO and control firms 
Second, another in1portant empirical issue is related to overlapping observations. Mitchell 
and Stafford (2000) argue that ignoring cross-sectional correlation in abnorinal retmns 
induced by overlapping observations will produce overstated test statistics and will lead to 
serious nusspecification. In our case, an overlapping problem occurs when the sample 
includes some frequent acquirers that have acquired more than one target within the period of 
the event under investigation. Tlus implies that stock retruns are affected by multiple 
takeover events, and consequently bias the financial performance calculation. Antoniou et al. 
(2004) find that the average three-year buy-and-hold abnom1al returns of all acquiring firms 
are higher than those of non-overlapping fums (i.e., fums making one acquisition in three 
years). They suggest that the lugher average abnmmal returns of the overall sample are 
inflated by the high positive abno1mal retums of the overlapping fun1s. Further, Loughran 
and Vijh (1997) and Wiggenhom et al. (2007) propose considering only the frrst acquisition 
when the IPO fim1 makes more than one, removing all subsequent acquisitions from the 
sample. However, ignoring the effect of subsequent acquisitions on the long-tem1 abnonnal 
return calculation could bias the results. Third, to exan1ine whether acquisition order helps to 
understand the long-run perfonnance of frequent IPO acquirers, we divide the first-year 
abnormal returns ofiPO acquirers into retums before the frrst acquisition, retums between the 
frrst and second acquisition, and returns after the second acquisition for frequent acquirers. 
Fomih, to complement our long-rw1 performance analysis, we focus on the survival 
profile of IPO finns that make acquisitions in the first year after going public. The question 
addressed at this point is whether the post IPO survival tirne is influenced by the nmnber of 
acquisitions made by IPO firms in the frrst year after going public. 
Using a sample of 5,055 U.S. IPOs from 1980 through 2006, we find that newly public 
fums that make frequent acquisitions within the fmt year after going public show 
significantly poorer long-run performance after the frrst year than do IPO fi1ms making only 
one acquisition in the first year. The mean differences between the two subgroups are 
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statistically significant for the 2 to 5 years following the IPO and across all benchmarks used. 
These findings suggest that, while making an acquisition in the first year of the IPO is a 
potential driver for the long-run underperfom1ance of IPO f11111s, frequent acquisitions in the 
same period worsens this long-mn behavior. 
Additionally, our results indicate that IPO fums that make acquisitions in the fust year 
after going public and that continue to be active acquirers in the subsequent 4 years show 
better long-run performance than do IPOs making acquisitions only the fust year after going 
public. We also find that the underperformance of IPO frequent acquirers occurs after the 
second acquisition, suggesting the importance of deal arder in examining the negative long-
mn perfom1ance of IPOs making frequent acquisitions in the fust year after going public. Our 
results also indicate that frequent IPO acquirers are less likely to survive in the five years 
following the IPO than are single IPO acquirers. Additionally, we fmd that the higher the 
number of acquisitions made by IPO fm11S in the first year after going public, the lower the 
survival duration. Our fmdings also show that the acquisition behavior of IPO firms has a 
distinct impact on the delisting procedure. Specifically, we fmd that being a frequent IPO 
acquirer significantly decreases the survival duration when we compare survivors to IPOs 
delisted for negative reasons. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows : Section 2 presents the literature 
review. In section 3, we describe the data and methodology. Section 4 presents the 
perfom1ance results and the survival analysis, and section 5 concludes. 
2.2 Literature review 
The long-run perfmmance of newly public fim1s remains a puzzling issue. Since Ritter's 
(1991) results highlighting the underperfom1ance of IPOs in the long run, many researchers 
have attempted to explain this phenomenon. For instance, Brav and Gompers (1997) 
investigate the after-market perfonnance of a sample of 934 venture-backed IPOs and 3,407 
non-venture-backed IPOs during the 1972-1992 period. They fmd that venture-backed IPOs 
outperform non-venture-backed IPOs using equally weighted returns. However, the leve! of 
underperformance as well as the differences between the two IPO groups are reduced using 
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value weighted returns. Further, using various benchmarks and the Fama and French (1993) 
three-factor model, they fmd that venture-backed IPOs do not significantly underperform, 
while the smallest non-venture-backed comparues do. In the same vein, Krishnan et al. (2011) 
investigate the relation between several alternative venture capital reputation measures and 
subsequent IPO issuer perforn1ance. They fmd that VC reputation, measured by the past 
market share ofVC-backed IPOs, positively affects and the long-run performance ofiPOs. 
Cruier et al. (1998) examine the long-run performance of 2,292 IPOs. They fmd that the 
underperformance ofiPO stocks relative to the market over a three-year holding period is less 
severe for IPOs handled by more prestigious underwriters. More recently, Dong et al. (2011) 
analyze the relation between the quality of the underwriter and the long-run perfonnance of 
6,622 "non-bubble" IPOs ru1d 785 Internet bubble IPOs. Their results show that the number 
of managing undenvriters and the underwriter rating positively affect the long-run 
performance. They also fmd that underwriters had a different impact on the long-run 
performance during the bubble period when compared to the non-bubble period. 
Other explanations of the long-run underperformance of fmns going public are advanced 
in the IPO literature. Teoh et al. (1998) examine a sarnple of 1,649 IPO firms during the 
period 1980-1984. They conclude that issuers with higher discretionary accruals, which is a 
proxy for earnings management, have poorer stock return performance in the subsequent 
three years. Using different test specifications, including event time cross -sectional 
regressions and a calendar tune series approach, they find that issuers with unusually high 
accruals in the IPO year experience poor stock return performance in the subsequent three 
years. Kuntara et al. (2007) examine the relation between block sales and long-run 
performance following the IPO. Testing a sample of 3,087 IPOs during the 1993-2000 period, 
they find that from 20 days after the IPO to the lockup expiration date, IPOs with high block 
sales outperform IPOs with low block sales. However, an underperfonnance of high block 
sales compared to low block sales is observed from the lockup expiration until the third year 
after issue. Hsuan-Chi et al. (2012) analyse the relation between insider trading activity 
followmg lockup expiration and the long-run performance of IPO frrms. Usù.1g a sample of 
2,269 IPO fmns from 1988 to 2003 , they find that IPO frrms with insider sellmg and IPO 
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fmns with abnormal net sales by top executives within 126 trading days after the lockup 
expiration underperfonn in the three-year period following the initial offetings. 
Another literature strand highlights the relation between post-IPO acquisition activity and 
the long-run perfom1ance of newly public flrms. This potential explanation stems from the 
fact that numerous studies argue that IPO fms tend to be active acquirers in the post-IPO 
period. Brau and Fawcett (2006) survey 336 CFOs and show that the creation of public shares 
for acquisitions and the establishment of the market priee or value of the fmn represent the 
two most important reasons for going public. They fmd that 59% of CFO respondents agree 
with this statement. Brau et al. (2003) thus argue that an IPO could serve as a chatmel for 
creating public shares usèd as currency in acquiring other companies or being acquired in a 
stock deal. Celikyurt et al. (20 1 0) analyze the post-IPO acquisition activity of 1295 US IPOs 
issued between 1985 and 2004. They fmd that 77% of fmns conduct at least one acquisition 
within the frrst flve years of the IPO and that the typical IPO finn makes four acquisitions 
during this flve-year period. Furthem1ore, Hovakimian et al. (20 1 0) examine the sample of 
2,059 IPO flrms conducting 4,265 mergers between 1980 and 2006 and flnd that 36% of 
IPOs complete at !east one acquisition in the tlnee years following the IPO and that, on 
average, an IPO fun1 makes two mergers within the same time period. 
Brau et al. (2012) is the fust study that analyzes the relation between acquisition activity 
and the long-run stock perfom1at1ce of IPO flrms . Using a sample of 3,547 IPOs, of which 
1,181 are involved in M&A activity within tl1e frrst year after the IPO, they fmd that the 
acquisition activity of IPOs is a contributing factor in explaining the long-run 
underperformance of IPO fms. Their results show that the meat1 3-year buy-and-hold 
abnom1al retums for IPOs that acquire within the frrst year after going public is -15.6% 
compat·ed to 5.9% for non-acquirers for the same period. The long-run underperformance of 
IPO flrst-year acquirers is also confirmed using calendar-time factor model regressions. 
Furthermore, they flnd that making an acquisition within the flrst year lowers the abnormal 
returns by almost 30% over years 2-4 after going public, based on the market-adjusted retum. 
1 
In this paper, we contribute to the existing literature by distinguishing between IPOs making 
on1y one acquisition one year after going public and IPOs making multiple acquisitions 
within the same period. Our rationale is that frequent acquisitions perfom1 differently in the 
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long run than single acquisitions. For instance, Ismail (2008) considers a sample of 16,221 
US takeovers between 1985 and 2004 to examine whether takeovers by multiple acquirers are 
perceived differently by the market than those by single acquirers. He fmds that single 
acquirers out-perfonn indeed multiple acquirers by 1.66%. Billett and Qian (2008) examine 
acquirer abnonnal returns at the armouncement of an acquisition and fmd that frequent 
acquirers underperform in the short run compared to infrequent acquirers. These authors 
retain the hubris, developed from past acquisitions, as a plausible explanation to value-
destructive deals. Aktas et al. (20 11) examine the CEO bidding behavior in sequences of two 
successive M&A deals and confrrm the learning hypothesis. Specifically, they fmd (p. 19) 
that "CEOs oppem- to acknowledge the signals thot investors send and dynamical!y adjust 
their biddingfrom deal to deaf'. 
2.3 Data and Methodology 
We identify initial public offerings by U.S. fmns from 1980 to 2006 using Thomson 
Financial' s SDC New Issues database. We exclude ADRs, unit offerings, and IPOs with an 
offer priee of less than $5. We also exclude fmancial finns (two-digit SIC 60) and utility 
(two-digit SIC 49) fmns from the IPO sample. To require priee data, we use databases from 
the Center for Research in Security Priees (CRSP) and Compustat. We retain a sample of 
5,055 IPOs after applying these filters. We use the SDC Merger and Acquisitions database to 
detennine whether theil· IPOs become acquirers in the 5 years following the IPO. Our fmal 
sample comprises 2,471 IPOs that make acquisitions within 5 years of the IPO and 2,584 
IPOs that did not make any acquisition within the same period. Following Brau et al. (2012), 
we define fust-year-acquirer IPO fm11s with a merger effective date that occurs before the 
frrst anniversary of the IPO. Of the 2,471 IPO acquirers, 968 of them (39. 17%) take part in 
acquisition activity within the fust year of the IPO. Classifying frrst -year acquirers into 
frequent and single acquirers, our sample contains 303 IPOs making more than 2 acquisitions 
within the fust year after going public (frequent acquirers) and 665 IPOs makit1g only one 
acquisition within the same period (single acquit·ers). The number of acquisitions made by 
frequent acquirers varies between 2 and 14 acquisitions (the highest number of acquisitions is 
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observed in years 1996 and 1998). The mean number of acquisitions made by frequent 
acquirers varies from 2 to 3.5 acquisitions. 
Table 2.1 reports descriptive statistics for the sample. The number of IPOs in our sample 
varies over time. Higher levels are especially observed in 1996 and during the Internet bubble 
(1999-2000) . The number and percentage of IPOs making acquisitions within the fmt year 
after going public follow a trend that especially increases from 1991 to 1999 (38.67% in 1999 
compared to 13.60% in 1991). An analysis of frequent acquisitions by flrst-year IPO 
acquirers reveals a similar pattern, with frequent IPO acquirers increasing from 8 in 1991 to 
65 in 1999. Our industry distribution (see Table 2.2) shows that most of the IPOs in the 
sample are in manufacturing and service industries. W e also observe that IPOs in 
communications, sanitary services and services are more likely to make acquisitions in the 
flrst year after the IPO, with the highest level of frequent IPO acquirers observed in 
c01mnunication industries. 
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Table 2.1 Frequency Distribution by IPO Year 
%of l st- Mean 
umber of Number of 1 st- Year number of 
IPO year Frequency % oftota1 l st-Year %of lst-Year IPO Yearfrequent frequent acquisition 
sample fPO acquirers by first year 
acquirers IPO acquirers IPO frequent IPO 
acquirers 
ac uirers 
1980 7 0.14 14.29 0 
1981 24 0.47 4 16.67 0 
1982 12 0.24 3 25.00 0 
1983 49 0.97 14 28.57 0 
1984 25 0.49 7 28 .00 0 
1985 34 0.67 2.94 0 
1986 240 4.75 9 3.75 1 1. 1 1 3 
1987 203 4.02 8 3.94 12.50 3 
1988 79 1.56 4 5.06 25 2 
1989 86 1.70 7 8. 14 2 28.57 2.5 
1990 89 1.76 13 14.6 1 7.69 2 
1991 228 4.5 1 31 13.60 8 25 .81 2.5 
1992 337 6.67 53 15.73 9 16.98 2.55 
1993 427 8.45 80 18.74 19 23 .75 2.3 1 
1994 374 7.40 58 15 .5 1 2 1 36.21 2.71 
1995 399 7.89 80 20.05 27 33.75 2.85 
1996 60 1 11.89 129 21.46 41 31.78 3 
1997 385 7.62 105 27.27 34 32.38 2.61 
1998 219 4.33 68 31.05 32 47.06 3 
1999 375 7.42 145 38.67 65 44.83 2.73 
2000 307 6.07 64 20.85 21 32.81 2.43 
200 1 65 1.29 12 18.46 2 16.67 3 
2002 57 1.13 8 14.04 2 25.00 2 
2003 44 0.87 8 18. 18 5 62.50 2.4 
2004 147 2.91 17 11 .56 4 23.53 2.25 
2005 123 2.43 27 21.95 5 18.52 3.2 
2006 11 9 2.35 12 10.08 2 16.67 3.5 
Tota l 5055 100 968 100 303 
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Table 2.2 Industry distribution 
Number Number of % offirst Numberof % offirst 2-Digit frrst year frrst year year 
of % ofiPOs year IPO SIC IPOs IPO acquirers frequent frequent Industry acquirers acquirers acquirers 
Agriculture 01 -09 2 0.04 0 0 
Natural resource 10-14 77 1.52 2 2.60 0 
Construction 15-17 46 0.91 8 17.39 2 
Manufacturing 20-39 2273 44.97 287 12.63 55 
Transportation, 40-49 
communication and sanitary 371 7.34 85 22.91 40 
services 
wholesale+retail trade 50-59 592 11.71 114 19.26 31 
Finance, insurance and real 60-67 90 1.78 10 11.11 3 
state 
Services 
Total 
70-89 1604 31.73 462 28.80 172 
5055 968 303 
To calculate the long-mn perfom1ance of IPO fmns, we use two approacbes. First, as an 
event time approach, we consider the standard cumulative abnom1al retum (CAR) measure. 
Our choice of CAR rather than the buy and hold abnonnal retum (BHAR) is based on the 
results of prior studies. Fama (1998) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000) argue that abnormal 
performance measures, such as cw1mlative abnormal retwns (CARs) and time-series 
regressions, are less likely to yield spurious rejections of market efficiency compared to 
methods that use buy and hold returns. The latter is due to the fact that the nature of 
compounding single period retums at the monthly frequency could magnify 
underperfonnance. Brav et al. (2000) also point out that buy and hold returns tend to over-
estin1ate the long-run underperfonnance. Second, as a calendar time approach, we use the 
alphas from the Fama and French (FF) three-factor model. 
We calculate mean cumulative abnormal retwns (MCAR) based on three benchmarks: (i) 
the value-weighted CRSP index; (ii) a sample of firms matched by industry, size, and book-
to-market ratio; and (iii) a sample of frrms matched using PSM. In order to select matching 
flrills based on industry, size, and book-to-market ratio, we frrst create a sample of possible 
matching fl.rillS listed on CRSP and having at least 5 years data without any stock issues 
25.00 
19.16 
47.06 
28.07 
30.00 
37.45 
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within 5 years. Second, we identify ali :firrns within the same industry (2-Digit SIC) as the 
IPO sample. Tllli·d, following Lyon et al. (1999), we choose all fmns with market 
capitalization between 70% and 130% of the IPO fmns at the end of the fiscal year in which 
the IPO takes place. Finally, from this subset, we choose the fm11 with the book-to-market 
ratio closest to that of the IPO firm. Further, to obtain control firms that are as sinular as 
possible to IPO :finns, we consider the propensity score technique. The outcome of tms 
method is the conditional probability, called the propensity score ofbeing in the treated group 
(in our case IPO decision) given the observed variables. We estin1ate the propensity score as 
follows: let Yi,t be an event indicator that is equal to 1 for IPO firms and 0 for non-IPO fm11S. 
Let Xi,t be a vector of independent variables (:firm characteristics) observed for firm i (IPOs 
as well as non-IPO firms) in fiscal year t (the IPO year). A propensity score logit function is 
defined as Pu = (Yu = 1/ Xu) for each fiscal year (t takes a value from 1980 to 2006). We 
use the "nearest neighbor" matclung method wluch allows us to match each IPO firm to a 
single control fmn with the closest propensity score (Pit value). Speci:fically, we use six 
finn characteristics as conditim1ing variables to estimate the propensity score: idiosyncratic 
volatility, illiquidity, momentum, market beta, size, and book-to-market ratio. Following 
Bessembinder and Zhang (2013), we measure idiosyncratic volatility as the annualized 
standard deviation of the residuals in monthly regressions of daily stock returns on the three 
Fama and French (1993) factors over the 12 months after the IPO. A measure ofilliquidity is 
constructed using the An1ihud (2002) method. For each stock and for each of the 12 months 
after the IPO, we measure illiquidity as the average of the da il y ratio of absolute stock retum 
to the dollar trading volume. Market beta is éstimated for each frrm and for each of the 12 
months after the IPO by implementing the market model in daily stock returns. All these 
estimates are averaged across 12 months. Return momentum is computed as the cumulative 
return from month 1 to month 11 after the IPO. Firm size is defmed as the market 
capitalization at the fiscal year-end following the IPO. Book-to-market ratio is measured as 
the book value of equity over the market value of equity at the end of the fiscal year of the 
IPO event. 
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2.4 Empirical results 
In this section, we frrst discuss uni varia te tests to detennine if there are any differences in 
abnom1al retums between IPOs making acquisitions in the frrst year of the IPO and IPOs not 
making acquisitions within the same period, and between IPOs making frequent acquisitions 
in the frrst year after going public and IPOs making only one acquisition within the same 
period. Second, we run a multivariate regression to test whether acquisition activity in the 
frrst year of the IPO affects the long-run perfom1ance of newly public firms, controlling for 
other factors that cou ld influence the IPOs ' long-run perfom1ance. 
2.4.1 Univariate results 
2.4.1.1 Event time approach 
We focus on IPO long-run performance starting at month 13 after the IPO date. Indeed, 
when we consider the first-year window, we aUow retums before the acquisition to be 
included in the abnormal retums calculation, which could bias the results. Thus, cumulative 
abnormal retums (CARs) are calculated for 2, 3, 4, and 5 years after the IPO as (13 -24), (13-
36), (13-48), and (13-60) months after going public. CAR from month q to month sis defmed 
as: 
(2) 
(3) 
ARu is the monthly abnormal return for fli111 i during the month t . Ri.t is the retum of the 
finn i during the month t and R h,r is the retum on the benchmark during the corresponding 
tune period. A month is defined as successive 21-trading-day periods. CARs are computed 
using the three previously- discussed benchmarks: CRSP value-weighted index; control fim1s 
matched by industry, size, and book-ta-market; and control fmns matched using the PSM 
method. 
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Table 2.3 presents CAR results . Panel A shows that IPOs underperform in the long run 
for almost all horizons, regardless of the benchmark used. In Panel B and C of Table 2.3, we 
compare the long-run performance between IPO first-year acquirers and non-acquirers. We 
fmd that excluding the first year from CAR calculation when using PSM, IPO acquirers 
underperfom1 IPO non-acquirers by 10.51 %, 16.47%, 10.58%, and 10.24% in years 2, 3, 4, 
and 5 following the IPO, respectively. Tlùs underperformance is statistically sigtùficant for 
all horizons regardless of the benchrnark used. Our fmdings are thus in line with Brau et al. 
(2012) who argue that acquisition activity is one of the factors that could explain the long-run 
underperfonnance of IPO fmns. 
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In this study, we go beyond this conclusion by testing whether being frequent acquirers in 
the first year after going public affects the long-run perfom1ance of IPO firms differently than 
does making a single acquisition (an infrequent acquirer). Table 2.4 reports abnom1al return 
results for frequent and infrequent IPO first-year acquirers for 2, 3, 4, and 5 years following 
the IPO and excluding the fust year. A comparison between Panel A (frequent acquirers) and 
Panel B (infrequent acquirers) allows us to conclude that abnormal returns for first-year 
frequent acquirers are significantly lower than abnormal retums for infrequent first-year 
acquirers in all horizons and regardless of the benchmark used. Specifically, we find that 
frequent frrst-year acquirers underperfonn infrequent acquirers by more than 3 times. For 
example, CAR1,4 based on industry, size, and book to-market ratio matching is -20.07% for 
frequent acquirers while it is - 6.22% for infrequent acquirers. We fmd a larger difference 
between CAR1,5 based on PSM for frequent acquirers (-20.59%) and infrequent acquirers 
(-3.99%). The mean differences between the two subgroups are statistically significant for the 
2 to 5 years following the IPO and across all benchmarks used. These findings suggest that, 
while making an acquisition in the frrst year of the IPO is a potential driver that exp lains the 
long-run underperfonnance of IPO firms, frequent acquisitions in the same period worsens 
this long-run behavior. 
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2.4.1.2 Calendar time approach 
In this section, we employ the Fama and French (1993) three-factor mode! to estimate the 
long-rw1 perfom1ance of IPOs. For each calendar month, we calculate the retmn on a 
portfolio composed of IPO fin11S that caiTy out an IPO between 13 and 48 months prior to the 
cUITent month and engage in M&A activity within the frrst 12 months of going public. To 
determine the retum on a portfolio, we use value-weighted average retums. The calendar-
time retums on this portfolio are used to estimate the following regression: 
(4) 
Where Rpr is the monthly retum on a value-weighted calendar-time portfolio ofiPOs, Rft 
is the monthly retum on treasury bills, Rmt is the retum on a value-weighted market index, 
SMBt is the difference, each month, between the retums of a value-weighted portfolio of 
small and big stocks, and HMLt is the difference, each month, between the retums of a value-
weighted portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and low book-to-market stocks. aP is the 
intercept term and represents the mean monthly excess retum on the calendar-time portfolio. 
We estimate this mode! for ali IPO frrms, frrst-year IPO acquirers and non-acquirers, and 
first-year frequent and infrequent IPO acquirers. 
As shown in Panel A of Table 2.5, the mean monthly calendar-time abnormal retums for 
ail IPO finns is - 0.12%, suggesting that IPO firms underperform in the long run; this result is 
not however statistically significant. Panel B and C show that frrst-year IPO acquirers have 
mean monthly abnormal retums of -0.69%, which is significant at the 5% level, whereas the 
non-acquirer group presents a positive but not statistically significant mean monthly 
abnonnal retum of 0.03%. Consistent with Brau et al. (2012), om results confrrm that being 
an acquirer in the frrst year after going public negatively affects the long-run performance of 
IPO frrms. We also estima te regression ( 4) for frequent and infrequent first-year acquirers. 
The results reported in Panel D and E of Table 2.5 show that IPO firms that frequently 
acquire in the frrst year after going public have mean monthly abnonnal retwns of -0.56% 
73 
(significant at the 10% level). In line with om event tin1e results, frequent IPO first-year 
acquirers seem to have lower long-run perfom1ance than do infrequent acquirers. 
T a ble 2.5 Calendar time factor mode! regressions 
Factors 
Alpha RMRF SMB HML 
Panel A: Va lu e weighted calenda r-time portfo lio (a li sa mple) N = 4986 
Estima te -0.00 12 1.3022 1.0721 -0.2875 
t-stati stics -0.62 25.97*** 9.96*** -3.39*** 
Panel B: Va lu e weighted ca lend ar -tim e por tfoli o (acqui rers) N = 952 
Estimate -0.0069 1.3380 1.0398 -0.27 17 
1-stati stics -2.3 1 ** 16.1 6*** 6.46*** -2 .17** 
Panel C: Va lue weighted calendar-ti me po r tfolio ( on-acquirers) = 4034 
Estimate 0.0003 1.2866 1.0943 -0.2847 
t-statistics 0.14 25.90*** 1 0.90*** -3.4 1 *** 
Pa nel D: Value weighted ca lend ar-tim e portfolio (Freq uent acqui rers) ' = 300 
Estimate -0.0056 1.2656 0.8994 -0.3474 
t-stati stics - 1.69* 14.43*** 4.89*** -2. 14** 
Panel E: Va lu e weighted ca lendar-tim e portfoli o (No n-frequ ent acqui rer s) N = 652 
Estimate -0.0038 1.3153 1. 1038 -0.1415 
t-statistics -1.06 19.41 *** 11.3 1 *** -1.37* 
Mode! characteristics 
Adjusted R-
sguared 
82.62% 
65.53% 
82. 11 % 
55.97% 
68.90% 
F-stat 
561.83*** 
223.39*** 
542.76*** 
130.21 *** 
238.83*** 
Note: Table 2.5 presents the results fo r Fa ma and French three-factor mode!. Monthly returns on a portfolio compo ed of alllPO tinns are 
calcu lated from montb 13 to month 48 followi.ng the IPO. The dependent vari abl e is the difference between month ly return on va lue-
weigh ted calendar-time portfolio and monthly return on three-month Treasury bills. The independent variables are (1) RMRF is the 
difference between the return on a value-weighted market index and the monthly return on the three-month Treasu1y bill ; (2) SMB is the 
d ifference in the returns ofvalue-weighted portfo lios of small stocks and big stocks, and (3) HML is the difference in the returns of va lue-
weighted portfolios of high book-to-market stocks and low book-to-market stocks. Panel A reports estimates for ail IPOs. Panel B and C 
present regression resul ts for lPO tirst year acquirers and non -acq uirers, respecti vely. Panel D and E show estimate for tirst year frequent 
and non-frequent acquirers, respectively. The results for t-statistics, adjusted R-squared and F-stat are reported for each mode!. ***, **and 
* iodicate statistica l significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% leve!, respective! y. 
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2.4.2 Robustness tests 
ln this section, we perform several robustness checks. First, we analyze IPO flrst-year 
abnormal returns for IPO acquirers before and after the frrst acquisition. Second, we attempt 
to determine whether overlapping acquisitions influence the long-run performance of frrst-
year IPO acquirers. 
2.4.2.1 Decomposition of frrst-year abnormal return: 
The purpose of this frrst test is to examine whether the abnormal returns of frequent 
acquirers after the acquisition depend on the order of the deal. To do so, we decompose fu·st-
year abnormal returns into (1) retums before the frrst acquisition, (2) retums between the fu-st 
and second acquisition, and (3) returns after the second acquisition. Table 2.6 provides 
abnonnal return results. We flnd that the mean CAR from the IPO to the flrst acquisition is 
highly positive and significant at the 1% level. It becomes lower but positive from the fu-st 
acquisition to the second. However, a negative and statistically significant mean CAR is 
observed after the second acquisition, stopping at the end of the frrst IPO year. For example,_ 
the mean market-adjusted (PSM) CAR is 33.59% (49.40%) from the IPO date to the fust 
acquisition. It becomes 3.90% (2.32%) between the fu-st and second acquisition and -5.73% 
( -5.90%) after the second acquisition. Our results are robust for both the effective and 
announcement date of the acquisition. This implies that if the flrst deal of frequent acquirers 
does not negatively affect the long-run perfom1ance ofiPOs, the second deal does. Renee, we 
confirm that frequent acquisitions in the fust year after going public represent an important 
driver of underperfom1ance. 
Table 2.6 Decomposition of first- year retums for frequent IPO acquirers 
Calculation period 
From IPO to 1" deal 
CAR (Market-adj) 
CAR(PSM) 
From 151 to 2"d deal 
CAR (Market-adj) 
CAR(PSM) 
Panel A: by effective date 
Mean p-value 
33.59% 
49.40% 
3.90% 
2.32% 
0.000 
0.000 
0.022 
0.052 
From 2"d deal to the end of the 1 st yea r after IPO 
CAR (Market-adj) 
CAR(PSM) 
-5.73% 
-5.90% 
0.07 1 
0.021 
Panel B: by announcement date 
Mean p-value 
32.33% 
41.35% 
9.60% 
5.95% 
-6.14% 
-7.48% 
0.000 
0.000 
0.008 
0.081 
0.070 
0.001 
75 
Note: Table 2.6 reports mean cumulative abnormal retums for IPOs that frequently acquire in the frrst 
year of going public. Results are given from the IPO date to the frrst acquisition, from the frrst 
acquisition t0 the second acquisition and from the second acquisition to the end of the fust year 
following goi.ng public, respectively. Panel A gives results using the effective date of acquisitions and 
Panel B gives results using the announcement date of acquisitions. The benclunark used is either CRSP 
value-weighted Index or PSM matched firms. 
2.4.2.2 Subset of non-overlapping acquisitions 
IPO frrms that frequently acquire in the frrst year after going public could pursue their 
acquisition activity in a longer horizon. At the same vein, IPq firms making only one 
acquisition in the first year after going public could be considered as frequent acquirers if 
they engage in other acquisitions in the subsequent years. This implies that using a longer 
estimation period would increase the probability of frrst-year acquirers pursuing other 
acquisitions and thereby influencing the abnormal retum estimation. To understand further 
this case and following Loughran and Vigh (1997), we considera subset ofiPOs that conduct 
acquisitions (frequent or not) only in the frrst year after going public without any other 
acquisitions between months 13 and 48 following the IPO (non-overlapping acquisitions) 14 • 
We report in Table 2.7 our event tirne results . Overall, we conflflTI that non-overlapping cases 
14 We are aware that from a trading strategy perspective, this could induce a look ahead bias since we 
do not have information if the firm will pursue acquisition or not at the offering. 
76 
have lower long-run perfom1ance than overlapping cases, regardless of the benchmark used. 
This implies that flrst-year IPO acquirers that stop their acquisition activity at the end of the 
fust year after going public have poorer long-run performance than those that continue the 
acquisition activity in the next 4 years. For example, we fmd that CAR1,4 is -22.51 (using 
PSM method) for overlapping cases and frequent flrst year acquirers, while it is -27.82 for 
non-overlapping cases and frequent fust year acquirers. 
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2.4.3 Multivariate results 
In order to understand the marginal effect of frequent acqwrers on the long rm1 
performance of lPOs, we next estima te a multivariate regression model that controls for IPO 
characteristics that might influence performance. Our baseline model is as follows: 
(5) 
The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal returns calculated from months 13 to 
60 following the IPO using the PSM method. Frequent is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 if an IPO firm conducts frequent acquisitions dwing the first year of the IPO, and 
zero otherwise. Multiple is a dun1111y that takes the value of 1 if the IPO finn continues to 
acquire in the 4 years following the first year of IPO, and zero otherwise. Underpricing is 
defmed as the priee rm1-up in the first trading day after the IPO and measured as the 
difference between the first day closing priee and the offer priee, which is given as a 
percentage of the offer priee. VC backed is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
IPO is backed by a venture capital frrm, and zero otherwise. Proceeds is defmed as the 
natural logarithm of the capital raised at the time of the IPO. Prestige is a dun1111y variable 
that takes the value of 1 if the lPO's w1derwriter is in the top tier, and zero otherwise, using 
the rankings of Loughran and Ritter (2004) 15• SEO is a dun1111y variable taking the value of 1 
if the IPO conducts seasoned equity offerings in the 4 years following the first year of the 
IPO, and zero otherwise. We include this variable given the fact that SEOs in the fust few 
years following the IPO could affect the long-run performance of newly public firms . We 
also control for hot issues market following Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) and Ritter (1984). We 
defme a hot issue market as a month in which average first-day retw11 is above the median 
month's average frrst-day retwn. HOT is then defmed as a dummy variable that takes the 
15 We thank Professor Jay. R. Ritter for making IPO underwriter reputation rankings data available on 
his web site. 
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value of 1 for hot issue market, and zero otherwise. To control for high M&A activity, we use 
Harford 's (2005) industry merge wave indicator. A merger wave is identified when the 
number of acquisitions over 24 months exceeds the 95th percentile of the simulated 
probability distribution based on ten years ofM&A activity. We use Merger wave, a dummy 
variable taken the value of 1 if an M&A wave occurs in any of the five post-IPO years we 
consider. We also includeHigh-Tech variable to control for technology fmns 16. 
Fmther, as we find previously that IPO acquirers have different characteristics than IPO 
non-acquirers, we use the Heckman method to cotTect for potential sample selectivity bias. ln 
the first stage, we considera probit model to estirnate the selection equation based on whether 
the IPO firm acquires or not in the frrst year following the IPO. We estin1ate the following 
equation: 
Yi = (30 +(31Underpricingi + (32 VC backed; + (33 Proceeds; 
+ (34 Prestigei +ci 
Where Yi = 1 for IPO acquirers within 5 years of the IPO, and zero otherwise. 
(6) 
In the second stage, we estirnate the regression (5) adding the inverse Mills ratio. Model 1 
of Table 2.8 presents our estimation results for regression (5). Our results show that the 
coefficient of Frequent is -0 .31 and significant at the 5% level, confrrming that IPOs that 
frequently acquire in the frrst year of the IPO underperform more in the long run than do 
IPOs that infrecjuently acquire within the same period. To be sure that our findings are not 
influenced by any other acquisition transaction made by IPO firms during the 13-60 month 
period after the IPO, we include the variable Multiple in regression (5). Our results indicate 
that the coefficient of Multiple is positive (0.29) and significant at the 5% level. This irnplies 
that, while frequent frrst-year acquirers have poorer long-run perfom1ance than infrequent 
acquirers, conducting other acquisitions in years 2-5 following the IPO affects positively the 
long-run perfom1ance. This result is in accordance with the hypothesis of leaming gains 
through repetitive acquisitions as suggested by Aktas et al. (2013) . 
16 Teclmology firms are identified using Loughran and Ritter ' s (2004) list of tech SIC codes . We adjust 
this list by ad ding internet IPOs as defmed in the J ayR. Ritter web site (updated through April 20 12). 
http :/ /bear. warrington. ufl. edu! ri tter/ipodata.htm 
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In Models 2, 3 and 4 of Table 2.8, we run further tests . Specifically, in Mode! 2 of Table 
2.8, rather than using a durnrny variable that control for frequent acquirers, we consider the 
impact of the nurnber of acquisitions made by acquirers in the first year after going public on 
the IPO's long-mn perfom1ance. Our results show that the coefficient of N UM_ACQ (i .e. , ln 
(1 + nurnber of acquisitions)) is negative (-0.59) and statistically significant at the 5% leve!. 
Thus, we conflill1 that a higher nurnber of acquisitions made in the fust year after going 
public lowers the long-run perfom1ance of IPO firrns . In Mode! 3, we examine the long-JUil 
perfonnance of frequent fust-year acquirers versus non-acquirers on the one hand, while in 
Mode! 4, we examine the long-run perfom1ance of infrequent first-year acquirers versus non-
acquirers on the other band. Our results show that frequent and infrequent first-year acquirers 
have significantly poorer long-mn perfonnance than IPOs that do not make any acquisitions 
within the fust year of the IPO. Specifically, we fmd that being a frequent acqui.rer reduces 
the CAR1.5 by -0 .35% (Mode! 3), while being an infrequent acquirer reduces the CAR1.5 by 
-0.14% (Mode! 4). Renee, we confinn that conducting frequent acquisitions in the fust year 
of the IPO amplifies the IPO's long-run underperfom1ance. 
Constant 
Frequent 
NUM_ACQ 
Multiple 
Underpricing 
VC backed 
Proceed s 
Prestige 
SEO 
HOT 
Merger wave 
High_Tech 
lnvmi lls 
FR.E_NACQ 
FRE_ ACQ 
lndusny dummy 
Yeardummy 
Obsetvarion 
R-squared 
(1) 
-0.17 
(-0.02) 
-0.3 1 ** 
(-2. 18) 
0.29** 
(2.02) 
-0.07 
(-0.07) 
-0 .02 
(-0. 11 ) 
-007 
(-0.72) 
0.19 
( 1.1 8) 
0. 17 
(0. 18) 
-0.20 
( -1.28) 
-0. 13 
(-0.58) 
0.46*** 
(3 .01) 
0.40 
(0.07) 
Y es 
Y es 
470 
0.12 
Table 2.8 Multiple regressions results 
(2) 
-0.34 
(-0.04) 
-0.59** 
(-2.51) 
0 .30** 
(2.05) 
-0.0 1 
(-0.02) 
-0 02 
(-0 .11 ) 
-0.06 
(-0.61) 
0.20 
(1.24) 
0.25 
(0.28) 
-0 .18 
( -1.23) 
-0. 13 
(-0 .47) 
0.45*** 
(2.65) 
0.76 
(0 .14) 
Y es 
Y es 
470 
0. 12 
OLS estimates 
(3) 
0.3 1 
(0.96) 
-0.08 
(-1.58) 
0.05 
(0. 76) 
-0.11 *** 
(-2.9 1) 
0.17** 
(2.39) 
0.27*** 
(4.39) 
0.04 
(0.5 1) 
-0. 16 
(-1.58) 
0. 18** 
(2.54) 
-0.35*** 
(-3. 10) 
Y es 
Y es 
1,878 
0.07 
(4) 
0.99*** 
(3.07) 
0.0 1 
(0. 11 ) 
0.03 
(0.49) 
-0 .1 3*** 
(-3.54) 
0.14** 
(2. 19) 
. 0.32*** 
(5.52) 
0.01 
(0. 16) 
-0.16 
(-155) 
0.22***• 
(3.22) 
-0.14* 
(-1.70) 
Y es 
Y es 
2,030 
0.09 
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Note: The dependent variable is the cumulative abnonnal retum calcu lated from month 13 to month 60 fo llowing the !PO date using the 
PSM matchi ng method. Frequent is dummy variable th at takes the va lue of 1 if an IPO firm conducts frequent acquisitions du ri ng the fir t 
year of IPO, and zero otherwise. Multiple is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the IPO finn continues to acqu ire in the 4 years 
following the first year of IPO, and zero otherwise. Prestige is a dummy variab le that takes the va lue of one if the lPO's underwriter is in 
the top ti er, and zero otherwise. Proceeds are defined as the natura l logarithm of the capita l rai sed at the ti me of the !PO. VC backed is a 
dummy variab le that takes the value of 1 if the lPO is backed by a venture capital finn , and zero otherwise. SEO is a dummy vari able 
taking the val ue of 1 if the IPO conducts seasoned equity offerings in the 4 years fo ll owing the fi rst year of TPO, and zero otherwise. 
Underpricing is defined as the priee run-up in the first trading day after the IPO and mea ured as the difference between the first day 
closing priee and the offer priee given as a percentage of the offer priee. HOT is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the IPO 
occurred during hot IPO market, and zero otherwise. Mer-ger wave is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the IPO occuned 
during period of merger wave, and zero otherwise. High_Tech is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the IPO finn is in a 
technology industry or an internet finn, and zero otherwise. In mode! (2), we replace Frequent by NUM_ACQ which is the natural 
logarithm of one plus the number of acquisitions made by acquirers in the first year of going public. We estima te models ( 1) and (2) using 
the Heckman procedure. lnvmills is the inverse Mil ls ratio. ln mode! (3), we include FRE_NACQ is a dummy taking the value of 1 for 
frequent IPO acquirers and zero for IPO non-acquirers within the first year of !PO. NFRE_NACQ is a dummy that takes the va lue of l for 
single !PO acquirer and zero for IPO non-acquirer within the first year following going public. We a l o control fo r !PO indu try and !PO 
year by including industry and year dummy vari ables in the basic mode!. For each independent variable, the first row reports its estimated 
coefficients and the second row reports the cotTesponding p -values. ***, **and * indicate stati stical ignificance at the l %, 5% and 10% 
leve! , respecti vely. 
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Our multivariate analysis confinns that IPOs conducting frequent acquisitions obtain 
poorer long-run performance than both non-acquirers and IPOs making only one acquisition 
witbin the first year after going public. 
2.4.4 Survival analysis ofiPO acquirers 
In this section, we consider survival analysis 17 for IPO acqmrers to complement our 
previous results on long term performance. First, we apply a logistic regression methodology 
to examine factors that affect the probability of surviving for acquirers in the first few years 
following the IPO. Second, we use an accelerated failure time (AFT) model that allows us to 
assess the conditional probability of failure given that the IPO finn has survived up to the 
present time. 
2.4.4. 1 The multinonùallogit model 
We consider tbree post-IPO states two to five years after the IPO: survivor, acquired, and 
non survivor. We exclude the first year as it is the year of acquisition. Survivors are IPO 
firms that continue to operate as public corporations from months 13 to 60 after the IPO date. 
Renee, non-survivors are defmed as IPOs that are delisted from the trading exchange for 
either negative reasons 18 (failure group) or being acquired in the same time period. Following 
Jain and Kini (1999), we fust perform a multinonùallogit regression analysis to evaluate the 
effect of our independent variables on the likelihood of survival. W e estima te the following 
models: 
17 For further details on IPO survival studies, see for examples Shultz (1993) , Hensler et al. (1997), 
Jain and Kini (1999 and 2000), Boubakri, Kooli and L'Rer (2005) , and Kooli and Meknassi (2007). 
18 As suggested by Jain and Kini (2000), negative reasons include insufficient capital, insufficient 
float, liquidation, bankruptcy, non-payment of fees or delinquent in filings, fai lure to meet financial 
guidelines to list, insufficient number of market makers, priee falling below acceptable levels, and 
insufficient number of shareholders. 
(35 Prestigei + (36 Vc backedi+f37 SEOi + (38 H0Ti + (39 Merger wavei 
+(310High_Techi + Ei 
(35 Prestigei + (36 Vc backedi+(37 SEOi + (38 HOTi + {39 Merger wavei 
+(310High_Techi + Ei 
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(7) 
(8) 
Where A = acquired, S = survivor, and NS = non surviving. PA is the probability of being 
acquired, Ps is the probability of surviving, and P s is the probability of not surviving for 
negative reasons. Using eq. 7 and 8, we derive an eq. (9) to compare acquired and non 
surviving finns. We estimate the following mode!: 
(34 Underpricingi + (35 Prestigei + (36 Vc backedi+f37 SEOi + (38 H0Ti + 
(39 Merger wavei + (310 High_Techi + Ei (9) 
Our multinomial logit mode! results are reported in Table 2.9 . Panel A presents 
regression results with the variable Acquirer to test whether acquiring in the first year after 
going public affects the probability of IPO fum survival. In Panel B, we include the variables 
Frequent and Multiple to assess whether IPO fums that frequently acquire in the fmt year 
after going public and continue their acquisition activity in the subsequent 4 years are more 
likely to survive in the post-IPO pe1iod. Panel C provides regression results with the variable 
NUM_ACQ to evalua te the impact of the nwnber of acquisitions made in the flrst year of the 
IPO on the likelihood of surviving. Our results show that the probability of not surviving 
relative to surviving is significantly higher if the IPO fllTil becomes an acquirer in the flrst 
year after going public. We also find that making an acquisition in the fust year of the IPO 
makes it more likely that an IPO fmn is acquired as opposed to surviving. Further, IPO fllTils 
that acquire in the first year of the IPO are less likely to be acquired as opposed to not 
surviving, although this relation is not statistically significant. Panel B results highlight the 
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effect of being a frequent acquirer in the first year after going public on the likelihood of 
surviving. We fmd that frequently acquiring in the first year after the IPO significantly 
increases the probability of not surviving relative to surviving. Our findings also indicate that 
IPOs that conduct frequent acquisitions in the fust year after going public are more likely to 
be acquired than to survive. This relation is significant at the 5% level. We also notice that 
making frequent acquisitions in the fust year of the IPO negatively affect the probability of 
being acquired relative to not surviving, although this relation is not statistically significant. 
Panel C of Table 2.9 shows that the higher the number of acquisitions made by IPO fmns 
within the first year of the IPO, the higher is the probability of not surviving relative to 
surviving. This relation is significant at the 1% leve!. Additionally, we fmd that IPOs making 
a large number of acquisitions in the fust year after going public are significantly more likely 
to be acquired than to survive. Our results also show that higher number of acquisitions 
decrease the probability ofbeing acquired relative to not surviving (which is significant at the 
10% leve!). 
Tùming to our control variables, we find that larger IPO fmns (fin11s with higher gross 
proceeds) are more likely to survive than not to survive. This relation is significant at the 1% 
leve!. IPOs with higher proceeds are also less likely to be acquired than to survive. In 
addition, we find that the larger the IPO firm 's size, the higher the probability of being 
acquired relative to not smviving. Om findings also indicate that prestigious underwriters 
negative! y affect the likelihood of not surviving relative to surviving. It also seems that IPOs 
underwritten by prestigious underwriters are more likely to be acquired than to not survive or 
survive. This result is indeed in line with Jain and Kini (1999) . Also, conducting SEOs seems 
to be a significant factor in explaining the three post-IPO states. Specifically, we notice that 
IPOs that make SEOs in the fust few years after going public are significantly less likely to 
fail or be acquired than to survive, and significantly more likely to be acquired than fail. 
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Table 2.9 Multinomiallogit regression results 
Panel A Panel B Panel C 
Log(PF/Ps) Log(PA/Ps) Log(PA/PF) Log(Pd Ps) Log(PA!Ps) Log(PA/PF) Log(PF/Ps) Log(PA!Ps) Log(PA/PF) 
Constant 2.5 1 *** 1.85*** -0.65 3.19*** 3.97*** 0.78 1.93* 3. 15*** 1.42 
( 5. 73) ( 5.83) ( -1.80) ( 3. 18) ( 4.85) ( 0.99) ( 1.89) ( 3.65) ( 1.46) 
Acq ui rer 0.56** 0.30* -0.26 
( 2.40) ( 1.78) ( -1.22) 
Frequent 1.02** 0.89** -0. 13 
( 2.24) ( 2.69) ( -0.34) 
Multiple -1.28*** -1 .26*** 0.02 -1 .40*** -1.24*** 0.22 
( -2.80) ( -3.88) ( 0.06) (-3.07) (-3.84) (0.57) 
NUM_ACQ 2.20*** 1.40*** -0.78 
(3.27) (2 .64) (-1.39) 
Proceeds -0. 78*** -0.47*** 0.3 1 *** -0.74*** -0.76*** -0.02 -0.8 1 *** -0.78*** 0.01 
( -6.02) ( -5 .58) ( 2.70) ( -3 .07) ( -3 .88) ( -0.09) ( -3.33) ( -3.96) ( 0.06) 
Underp1ic ing 0.27 0.05 -0.22 0.5 1 0.4 1 -0. 10 0.56 0.45 -0. 17 
( 1.58) ( 0.35) (-1.43) ( 1.48) ( 1.54) ( -0.4 7) ( 1.57) ( 1.62) ( -0.82) 
Presti ge -0.53** 0.42** 0.95*** -0.78 0.48 1.26*** -0.77 0.46 1.30*** 
( -2.2 1) ( 2.26) ( 4.35) ( -1.59) ( 1.3 1) ( 3. 16) ( -1.61) ( 1.26) ( 3.1 6) 
VC backed 0.06 0.29* 0.23 0.33 0.46 0. 13 0.36 0.48 0.06 
( 0.27) ( 1.87) ( 1.1 2) ( 0.82) ( 1.54) ( 0.40) ( 0.89) ( 1.59) ( 0. 19) 
SEO -1.87*** -1 .2 1 *** 0.64** - 1.47*** -0.93*** 0.54 -1.54*** -0.96*** 0.65 
( -6.48) ( -7.54) ( 2.25) ( -3.35) ( -3.20) ( 1.30) ( -3.58) ( -3 .30) ( 1.57) 
HOT 0.20 0.26* 0.06 0.47 -0. 11 -0.57 0.41 -0. 15 -0.65 
(0.95) ( 1. 67) (0.28) (1.08) (-0.36) (-1.43) (0.94) (-0.52) (- 1.56) 
Merger wave 0.4 1 0.22 -0. 19 0.30 -0.56 -0.86* 0.24 -0.56 -0.88** 
( 1.45) (1.08) (-0.75) (0.59) ( -1.35) (-1.95) (0.49) (- 1.34) (-2.02) 
High_Tech -0.32 0.06 0.40* -0.53 -0. 12 0.4 1 -0.49 -0 .1 2 0.5 1 
(- 1.34) (0.40) (1.83) (- 1.1 8) (-0.39) ( 1.06) ( -1.08) (-0.37) ( 1.27) 
Log -904.45 -271.8 16 -265.03 
pseudolikelihood 
Pseudo R2 0. 10 0. 13 0. 15 
ote: The dependent variable takes the va lue of 1 fo r survivors, 2 fo r non-survivors and 3 fo r acquired. PA is the probabili ty of the 
"Acquired" state, P s is the probability of "Non-Survivors" state and Ps is the probabili ty of th e "Su rvivors" state. ln Panel A, we include 
Acquirer, a dummy variabl e that tak es the va lue of 1 if th e IPO fi nn conducts an acquisition during the first yea r of IPO, and zero 
o therwise. ln Pane l B, we inc lude Frequent , a dummy va riable that takes the va lue of 1 if an !PO firm conducts frequent acquisiti ons 
during the fi rst year of !P O, and zero otherwise. ln Pane l C, we replace Frequent by NUM_ACQ wh ich represents the natural logalithm of 
one plus the number of acquisitions made by acquirers in the first year of going publi c. Proceeds is a measure of the s ize of the !PO finn 
defined as the natura l logarithm of the tota l capita l raised at the ti me of the IPO. Unde1pricing is d1e priee run-up in the fi.rs t trading day 
after the !PO defined as the difference between the fi rst day closing priee an d the offer priee g iven as a percentage of the offer ptice. 
Prestige is a dummy variab le th at takes the va lue of 1 if the undetw riter is top ti er and 0 othetw ise. VC backed is a du mm y ta king the va lue 
of one if th e JPO is backed by a venture capita l fitm, and zero othervvise. SEO is a dummy variable taken d1 e va lue of 1 if IPO finn 
conducts sea oned equi ty offerings between mon th 13 and mon th 60 foll owing the IPO, and zero otherwise. HOT is a dummy variable that 
takes the va lue of 1 if the IPO occun·ed duting hot IPO market, and zero od1 erwise. Merger wave is a dummy variabl e th at takes the va lue 
of 1 if the IPO occutTed dUiing peri od of merger wave, a nd zero othetw ise. High_Tech is a dummy vatiable th at takes the val ue of 1 if the 
IPO finn is in a techno logy industiy or an in ternet finn, and zero othetw ise. For each independent variabl e, the firs t row reports its 
estimated coefficien ts and the second row repOit s the con·esponding t-stati sti cs. ***, **and * indi cate statistical signifi cance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% leve!, respecti vely. 
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2.4.4.2 The AFT model 
One feature of the AFT model is that the baseline hazard function follows an assumed 
density function based on prior expectations. The basic model is given by the following 
equation: 
Ln T(t;X) = a +Xf3 (10) 
Where T is the length of the trading period in months, X is a vector of independent 
variables that could have an effect on the length of the trading period, and ~ is a vector of 
model parameters. Following Hensler et al. (1997), we assume that the baseline hazard 
function follows a log-logistic density function. 19 Renee, we estimate a log-logistic AFT 
model where the dependent variable is the nurnber of months an IPO survives from the date 
of listing to the date of delisting or the end of the fifth year following the IPO date (at the 60th 
month). The positive coefficient of the AFT model indicates both a higher probability of 
survival and an increasing trading period. Thus, a change in independent variables does not 
necessarily have a proportional effect on failure time, but can accelerate or decelerate the 
time-to-fai lure. We estimate the following AFT model for non-survivors and acquired IPO 
frrms: 
Ln T(t; X) = (30 + f31Frequent + f32 Multiple + f33 Proceeds + f34 Underpricing 
+ (35 Prestige+ (36 VC backed + {37 SEO + f38 HOT + f39Merger wave 
+f310 High_Tech (11) 
The estimation results are reported in Table 2.1 O. We frrst test whether becoming an 
acquirer in the first year after going public affects the survival duration by including the 
variable Acquirer instead of the variable Frequent in the AFT mode!. We fi.nd that making 
acquisitions in the fi.rst year after going public is not related to the survival duration of 
acquired IPOs (the variable Acquirer is not statistically signifi.cant) . However, there is a 
19 Hensler et al. (1997) argue that the duration to IPO delisting is likely to be non-monotonie. They 
suggest that the log-logistic is the most appropriate distribution function. 
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strong negative and significant relation between the survival duration of non-surviving IPOs 
and acquiring within the fmt year of the IPO. Second, when we consider the differentiai 
effect between being a frequent or in.frequent acquirer in the fust year after going public, we 
find that making frequent acquisitions in the first year of the IPO significantly decreases the 
time-to-failure for acquired firms, suggesting that frequent IPO acquirers are more likely to 
be quickly acquired in the post-IPO period. The same conclusion could be drawn for non-
surviving fmns. Specifically, we fmd a negative and significant relation between being a 
frequent acquirer in the first year after going public and survival duration. A higher Frequent 
coefficient (-0.29 vs. -0 .21 for acquired results) means that frequent acquisitions strongly 
affect the time-to-failure for non-suxviving IPOs relative to acquired firms . 
We further address the issue of whether the number of acquisitions affects the suxvival 
duration for both acquired and non-surviving IPOs. The results repmied in Table 2.10 
indicate that there is a negative and significant relation between the survival dmation and 
acquired IPOs. We find the same result for non-surviving group. The higher coefficient of 
NUM_ACQ for non-surviving IPOs relative to acquired IPOs(-0.65 compared to -0.41) 
implies that large number of acquisitions within the first year of the IPO decrease the survival 
duration for non-surviving IPOs relative to acquired fin11S, which is consistent with our 
multinornial logit results. Tuming to our control variables, our results show that higher 
proceeds are positively and significantly related to survival dmation for both acquired and 
non-surviving fums, suggesting that the tirne-to-survive increases along with size, this being 
in line with our previous results. We also fmd that there is a positive and significant relation 
between underwriter prestige and the survival duration of non-surviving IPOs. Fwiher, we 
notice that IPO underpricing does not have a significant effect on the survival duration of 
acquired firms, while it significantly decreases the survival duration for non-surviving IPOs. 
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Table 2.10 Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) mode! resu/ts 
Surviva l vs. Acq uired Survival vs. Non surviva l 
( 12 (2) (3) {1) (22 (32 
Constant 3.49*** 3.20*** 3.46*** 3.36*** 2.98*** 3.41 *** 
(34.19) (16.70) ( 16.83) (26.2 1) (8.5 1) (9.87) 
Acquirer -0 .06 -0.24** 
(-1.14) (-2 .52) 
Frequent -0.21 ** -0.29* 
(-2.48) ( -1.77) 
Mu ltiple 0.32*** 0.33*** 0.50*** 0.53*** 
(3.83) (3.57) (2 .94) (2 .64) 
NUM_ACQ -0.41 *** -0 .65*** 
(-2.96) (-2.65) 
Proceeds 0.12*** 0.1 3*** (2.55) 0.23*** 0.23** 0.23 ** 
(4. 13) (2.60) -0.10 (5. 12) (2.3 1) (2.39) 
Underpricing 0.03 0.02 (0.54) -0.03 -0. 18* -0.19* 
(0.65) (0.32) -0 .08 (-1.1 7) (- 1. 86) (- 1 .70) 
Prestige -0.1 3** -0. 10 (-0.96) 0.23** 0.36** 0.38** 
(-2.22) (- 1.04) 0.31 *** (2 .26) (2. 12) (2.00) 
VC backed -0.08 . -0.07 ( -1.07) -0 .01 -0.03 -0 .02 
(-1.63) (-0.92) 0.13** (-0 .14) (-0.20) (-0. 13) 
SEO 0.47*** 0.31 *** (3.80) 0.68*** 0.47*** 0.48*** 
(8.84) (3 .88) 0.14 (6.21) (2.70) (2.84) 
HOT 0.0 1 0.13 (1.59) -0 .09 -0.14 -0.09 
(0 .18) (1.60) 0.01 (-1.02) ( -0.86) (-0.56) 
Merger wave -0.1 8*** 0.02 (0.08) -0.20* -0.05 -0.02 
(-2.60) (0.14) -0.08 ( -1.78) ( -0.27) (-0.08) 
High_Tech -0.03 -0.07 (-0.86) 0.12 0.05 -0.02 
(-0.53) (-0.83) (0 .54) (1.29) (0.32) (-0.09) 
Observations 846 263 263 502 152 152 
Wald tet 13 1.3 52.07 64.30 138.4 58.89 59.56 
Log likelihood -726.3 -209.2 -208 .1 -305 .7 -89.75 -87. 15 
Note: We estimate theAFT mode! for acquired and non-surviving IPOs. Acquirer is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 if the IPO finn conducts an acqui siti on during the first year of IPO, and zero otherwise. Frequent is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if an IPO firm conducts frequent acqui sitions during the first year ofiPO, 
and zero otherwise. Multiple is a dummy th at takes the value of 1 if the IPO finn cont inues to acquire in the 4 years 
fo llowing the first year of IPO, and zero otherwise. NUM_ACQ is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of 
acquisiti ons made by acquirers in the first year of going publi c. Proceeds is a measure of the size of the !PO fim1 
defined as the na tura! logruithm of the total capital raised at the time of the lPO. Underpricing is the priee run-up i11 
the first trading day after the IPO defmed as th e difference between the fir t day c1osing priee and the offer priee 
given as a percentage of the offer priee. Prestige is a dummy variable that takes the va lu e of 1 if the underwriter is 
top tier and 0 otherwi se. VC backed is a dummy ta king the va lue of one if the IPO is backed by a venture capital 
finn , and zero otherwise. SEO is a dummy variable taken the va lue of 1 if IPO finn conducts seasoned equi ty 
offerings between month 13 and month 60 fo llowing the !PO, and zero otherwise. HOT is a dummy variabl e that 
takes the va lu e of 1 if the lPO occurred duting hot IPO market, and zero otherwise. Merger wave is a dummy 
variable th at takes the value of 1 if the IPO occun·ed du ring period of merger wave, and zero otherwise. J-Jigh_ Tech 
is a dummy variabl e th at takes the va lue of 1 if the IPO firm is in a technology industJy or an internet finn, and zero 
otherwise. For each independent variable, the first row reports its estimated coefficients and the second row reports 
the corresponding 1-statistics. ***, ** and * indicate stati stical signifi cance at the 1%, 5% and 10% leve!, 
respective! y. 
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2.5 Conclusion 
This paper reexamines whether making acquisitions in the frrst year of the IPO explains 
the long-run perfonnance of IPOs. We extend the work of Brau et al. (2012) in three 
directions: (1) we distinguish between IPOs making only one acquisition one year after going 
public and IPOs making multiple acquisitions within the same period; (2) we take into 
account the clustering of acquisition events by the same finn and consider the cases of 
overlapping and non-overlapping frrms separately. The p111-pose is to evaluate whether 
acquisition order helps to exp lain the long-nm perfom1ance of frequent IPO acquirers; (3) we 
move beyond the long-run perfom1ance analysis and provide evidence on whether the post 
IPO survival tune is influenced by the number of acquisitions made by IPO fm11S in the frrst 
year after going public. 
Using both event-time and calendar-tÎ111e approaches to assess long-run abnormal retums 
of IPO firms, we fmd that that frequent acquirers experience significantly poorer perfom1ance 
in the five years following the IPO. This result is robust for the use of PSM, a new matching 
technique that allows us to more accurately defme control fmns. We perfonn several 
robustness checks for our results. First, we decompose first year abnonnal returns and fmd 
that the frrst deal of frequent acquirers does not negatively affect the long-run perfom1ance of 
IPOs. The second deal however does. Second, to ensure that our results are not affected by 
overlapping cases defmed as IPOs that acquire rn the frrst year of the IPO and contume their 
acquisition activity in the followmg 4 years, we calculate cumulative abnom1al returns for 
overlapping and non-overlapping cases. Our fmdings indicate that first-year IPO acquirers 
continue to underperfmm five years fo llowing the IPO. Nevertheless, overlappli1g 
acquisitions help to alleviate the level of long-nm 1111derperformance. We also find strong 
evidence that IPOs that frequently acquire within the first year after gomg public have a 
much lower perfonnance than those that illfrequently acquu·e, using a calendar-tli11e approach 
and excluding overlappu1g acquisitions. 
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We control for making additional acquisitions in the 4 years following the flrst year of the 
IPO and fmd that while frequent flrst-year acquirers have poorer long-run perfonnance than 
infrequent acquirers, conducting other acquisitions in years 2-5 following the IPO affects 
positively the long-run performance. The hypothesis of leaming gains through repetitive 
acquisitions (Aktas et al. 2013) could be a plausible explanation for this result. 
Further, we perfom1 a survival analysis to examme the effect of being a flrst -year 
acquirer on the survival profile of IPOs in the following 5 years. Our multinomial logit 
models show that being a frequent acquirer in the fust year after going public increases the 
probability of not surviving and that the higher the number of acquisitions is, the higher is the 
probability of not surviving. Our AFT mode! conflm1s this evidence, suggesting that 
frequently acquiring in the flrst year of the IPO decreases the time-to-survive for non-
surviving fmns and that making a large number of acquisitions is also likely to decrease the 
survival duration of non-surviving IPOs. Our fmdings offer new driver to the well-
documented IPO long-run underperfom1ance. We hope to see additional research on the role 
and motivations of serial acquisitions after the IPO. 
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ABSTRACT 
We band collected data from IPO prospectus on the primary use ofproceeds ofiPO fmns 
and related it to their long-run stock perfom1ance, operating performance, and survival 
profile. Specifically, we cover the 1996-2012 period and examine four categories of proceeds 
use: debt payment, investment, marketing and sales promotion, and general corporate 
purposes. We fmd that IPOs declaring investment plans as the prima1-y use of proceeds 
exhibit lower underperformance in the three years following the IPO, while IPOs that state 
debt paytnent or general corporate purposes as the primary use of proceeds are the highest 
underperfonners. Fwiher, we fmd significant declines in operating performance when the 
issuer declares debt paytnent as the intended use of proceeds. We also provide new evidence 
for the role that the primary use of proceeds plays in explaining the tinlli1g motive of IPO 
frrms. Our survival analysis shows that stating debt paytnent as use of proceeds increases the 
risk of failure during the five years following IPO by about 90%. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Previous empirical studies provide evidence that initial public offerings (IPOs) exhibit 
poor long-run stock performance compared to non-issuing fmns (Ritter, 1991, Loughran and 
Ritter, 1995, Brav and Gompers, 1997, Brav et al. 2000, Schultz, 2003 , an1ong others). 
Several possible explanations for the poor subsequent stock performance of issuing firms are 
advanced in the literature, including the divergence of opinion hypothesis (Miller, 1977), the 
"impresario" hypothesis (Aggarwal and Rivoli, 1990), and the "windows of opportunity" 
hypothesis (Ritter, 1991 and Loughran and Ritter, 1995). Several studies have also 
documented significant declines in post-IPO operating performance (Jain and Kini, 1994, and 
Mikkelson et al. , 1997, among others). However as noted by Eckbo et al. (2007, p. 339)" the 
proper interpretations of the law long-run returns following security issuances remains an 
unsettled issue" . 
In this study, we introduce the intended use of proceeds as an explanatory variable for the 
long-run performance of IPO fms. When a company files to go public, it must prepare a 
prospectus which contains information about how it intends to use the proceeds in accordance 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rules. An issuer may satisfy this 
requirement by providing specifie details or a vague overview. For example, the intended use 
of proceeds stated in the S-1 form (the registration statement filed with the SEC) could be, 
among others, future acquisitions, R&D, debt repayment, or general corporate purposes 
without any specification. The infom1ation disclosed in the stated use of proceeds may 
provide insight into the motivation of initial public offerings. Why finns go public has been 
widely documented in previous studies. Pagano et al. (1998) find that the predominant reason 
Italian firms go public is to rebalance their accounts after a period of high investment and 
growth to exploit mispricing, rather than to raise capital to finance subsequent investment. 
They point out that investment and profitability decrease after the offering. Rosen et al. 
(2005) explore the going public decision of depository institutions and fmd that the initial 
public offering is a channel through whicb banks raise capital to fmance their· acquisition 
strategy. Brau et al. (2006) survey 336 chief financial officers to compare practice to tbe01-y 
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rn, among other things, motivations for fm11S going public. Their results show that the 
creation of public shares for acquisitions and the establislm1ent of the market priee or value of 
the fmn are the two most important reasons for going public. Explanations such as lowering 
the cost of capital and establishing a pecking order of altemative fmancing sources are 
viewed as the two least important reasons. Kim et Weisbach (2008) examine changes in total 
assets, capital expenditures, acquisitions, R&D, cash holdings and long-tem1 debt after going 
public of 17,226 IPOs and fmd that fm11S spend substantial amounts on R&D and capital 
expenditures, which suggests that equity offerings are primarily used to raise capital to 
fmance investment. The different ways in which IPOs might spend the capital they raise at 
the offering raises questions about whether the ex-ante disclosure of the intended purpose for 
the proceeds has an effect on their post-IPO performance. To the best of our knowledge, this 
question has not been previously examined in the IPO context. 
We investigate four intended uses of proceeds that are generally stated in the firm ' s S-1 
forrn for the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC): debt repayment, investment, 
marketing and sales promotion, and general corporate purposes. In the investment group, we 
include acquisition, R&D, and capital expenditure. The category of general corporate 
pm-poses includes fums that choose to be ambiguous about their planned use of proceeds 
without any clea.r specification. Our intuition is that issuing firms which state investment 
purposes as the use of proceeds are less likely to underperfom1 in the long run. The increased 
investment expenditures should be viewed favourably as they are associated with higher 
investment opportunities. However, comparues specifying debt payment as the intended use 
of proceeds may take advantage of overvalued stocks by tin1ing IPOs to periods of 11igh 
returns to pay down theil· debt. Consequently, they are more likely to w1derperfonn in the 
long run (according to the window opportmuty hypothesis). Baker and Wurgler (2002) 
present evidence suggesting that market timing of equity offerings is an important 
determinant of the observed capital structure of firms. Market tlimng considerations also 
seem to be u11portant for fmns that do not provide details about the intended use of proceeds. 
Autore et al. (2009) find that SEOs without specifie liwestment plans are more likely to 
underperfonn in the tlnee years following the issue than those with specifie investment 
purposes. 
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We contribute to the existing IPO literature in severa! ways. First, we band collected data 
on the intended use of proceed from IPO prospectus and examine the link between ex -ante 
stated use of proceeds and the long-run stock perfonnance of IPO frrms. This issue remains 
indeed an unexplored area . Kim and Weisbach (2008) examine ex-post use ofproceeds and 
find that frrms raise capital both to invest and to exploit favourable market conditions. In this 
study, we examine whether the pre-IPO disclosure of the intended use of proceeds affects the 
stock performance of IPO fm11S . Second, we examine changes in the operating perfom1ance 
of our IPO sample from one year prior to the offering to three years after based on the 
intended use ofproceeds. Third, we provide evidence about the possible relationship between 
ex-ante use of proceeds disclosure and IPO motives. Particularly, we extend the existing 
literature by documenting a link between timing and not timing motives and the different 
categories of intended use of proceeds. Finally, we explore whether the survival profile of 
IPO fmns is affected by their stated use of proceeds. 
W e fmd that IPO firms that state investment as intended use of proceeds exhibit 
insignificant average abnormal retums in the three years following the IPO. However, when 
the stated use of proceeds is debt payment, our results show significant poorer stock 
underperfonnance. Moreover, we find no evidence of post-IPO deterioration in operating 
performance when IPOs cite investment as use of proceeds, but significant declines in 
operating perfonnance when the stated use ofproceeds is debt payment. Our survival analysis 
shows that IPOs that cite investment as use of proceeds are more likely to survive during the 
five years following the IPO. However, declaring debt payment as intended use of proceeds 
increases the risk of failure by about 90%. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the literature 
review, Section 3 describes the data and methodology, Section 4 provides the results, and 
Section 5 concludes. 
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3.2 Literature review 
Recent empirical studies have focused on the relationship between the intended use of 
proceeds and the long-run performance of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). Walker and 
Y ost (2008) consider a sample of 438 ·firms issuing SEOs between 1997 and 2000. They 
examine the ex-ante reasons stated by the finn for the use of capital, the actual ex-post use of 
capital, and the market reaction to this information. They find that, regardless of the stated 
use of proceeds, issuing frrms increase R&D and capital expenditure following the offering. 
They also frnd that the leve! of long tenn debt increases after the offering even for fmns that 
specify that proceeds are being put towards debt reduction. Regarding the prima1-y use of 
proceeds, Walker and Yost (2008) frnd that the market reacts more favourably if the firm 
provides specifie investment plans about the use of the capital being raised. The ir results also 
show that changes in operating performance from one year prior the issue to two years after is. 
lower for frrms that do not disclose specifie investment programs for the use of funds than for 
those that do. 
Autore et al. (2009) considera sample of 880 SEOs from 1997 to 2003 to examine the 
link between seasoned equity issuers ' stated intended use of proceeds and tbeir stock and 
operating performance in the three years following the issue. They calculate significant 
negative average abnormal returns when the stated use of proceeds is recapitalization or 
general corporate purposes. However, average abnormal returns are not significant for issuers 
specifying investment plans for the proceeds. They also frnd significant declines in industry-
adjusted operating perfo1mance when the intended use of proceeds is recapitalization or 
general corporate purposes. Less evidence of decline is observed when the stated use is 
investment. Autore et al. (2009) argue that SEO fmns citing recapitalization or general 
corporate purposes as the intended use of proceeds employ a timing strategy by issuing equity 
when the market overvalues their stocks, which explains theil· poor long-run performance. 
However, firms that state investment as the intended use of proceeds signal their future 
investment opportunities. Consequently, they should not be expected to underperfonn in the 
long run. 
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Jeanneret (2005) examines the relationship between the intended use of proceeds and the 
long-run performance of French SEOs between 1984 and 1998. He finds that fmns which 
state they are going to use proceeds for capital structme purposes do not experience long-run 
underperformance within the three years following the issue. However, when the intended 
use of proceeds is for fmancing; investment projects, SEO fmns show significant long-run 
underperfonnance. According to J eanneret (2005), finns that cited debt payment as the 
intended use of proceeds are concemed about preserving their financial flexibility and 
irnproving their capital structure. Therefore, they should not underperfom1 in the long run. 
However, when the stated use of proceeds is investment, issuing finns may face the 
infom1ation asymmetry problems or agency conflicts that are predicted by theories about 
marginal fmancing decisions. In this case, they could underperform in the post-issue period. 
Leone et al. (2007) empirically examine the economie consequences of the use of 
proceeds disclosure on the frrst-day retums of IPO frrms. They fmd that IPOs disclosing 
specifie information about use of proceeds experience less underpricing than IPOs without 
any specification. This result could be explained by the fact that disclosmes reduce the ex-
ante uncertainty about the true value of the stock. Om study ex tends this strand of research by 
examining the relationship between the intended use of proceeds and the long-run 
perfom1ance of IPOs. 
3.3 Data and methodology 
3.3.1 Sample selection and use ofproceeds classification 
Our initial sample of IPOs is collected for the period 1996 to 2012 using Securities Data 
Company's (SDC) Globa l New Issues Database. We exclude ADRs, unit offerings and IPOs 
with an offer priee of less than $5. We also exclud~ fmancial firms (two-digit SIC 60) and 
utility (two-digit SIC 49) fmns. To be included in the sample, the stock return data of the IPO 
fmns must be available from the Center for Research in Securities Priees (CRSP) for the 
three years subsequent to the issue. Om next requirement is that the fim1s must have fmancial 
data available froh1 COMPUST AT for the fiscal year prior to the IPO. 
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The primary intended use of proceeds is hand collected from the firms ' S-1 filings in 
EDGAR. Although this inf01mation is also provided by the SDC, there is no specifie use of 
proceeds for the maj01ity of cases. Our manual collection from the S-1 filings provides more 
precise information . Our sample begins in June 1996 because the companies ' fi ling 
statements are not available bef ore this date. Our frnal sample contains 1,140 IPOs classified 
in four groups according to their primary use of proceeds: investment, debt pa)'lnent, 
marketing and sales promotion, and general corporate purposes. The IPOs in the first group 
(INVEST) are those that state that the proceeds are to be used primarily for investment 
purposes, including future acquisitions, R&D, or capital expenditures. Issuers in the second 
group (DEBT) largely specify repayment of debt as the primary use of proceeds without 
mentioning any specifie investment plans. IPOs in the third group (SALES) are those that 
state that the majority of proceeds are to be used to expand sales and marketing activities. 
Issuers in the fourth group (GENERAL) choose to be ambiguous about their pla1med use of 
proceeds, stating general corporate purposes. 
Summary statistics for our sample, grouped by the use of proceeds, are presented in Table 
3 .1. W e frnd that IPOs that state investment as the primary use of proceeds have the lowest 
fmt-day underpricing. The mean (median) underpricing for these IPOs is 16.26% (2.5%) as 
compared with 44.65% (25.83%) for IPOs that state marketing and sales promotion as the 
intended use of proceeds and 42.22% (14.05%) for IPOs choosing to give a vague overview 
about the ir primary use of proceeds. The mean level of underpricing for the fu-ms' stated debt 
payment is relatively low (19.90%) when compared with marketing activities and general 
categories. Our results are consistent with Leone et al. (2007), who find that issuers 
disc!osing specifie details about their intended use of proceeds reduce the ex-ante uncertainty 
about the true value of their shares and are consequently subj ect to less underpricing. They 
also frnd a negative and significant relationship between, on the one hand, investment and 
debt payment as the intended use of proceeds and, on the other, the level of underpricing, 
while this relation becomes positive but insignificant when the stated use of proceeds is 
marketing and sales promotion. 
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Table 3.1 also shows that fmns that state marketing and sales promotion as the futended 
use of proceeds are larger and raise more proceeds. The mean market value of these finns is 
$1,044.5 million as compared to $186.33 million for IPOs that state investment as the 
primary use of proceeds. This implies that small fmns issue equity for growth prospect 
purposes, a notion which is consistent with our expectations. We also find that the debt ratio 
bef ore the offering is higher for IPOs that state debt pa)'lnent as the intended use of proceeds. 
The mean proportion of total debt relative to total as sets is 0.3 73 for the debt payment group 
as compared to 0.27, 0.17, and 0.22 for the investment, marketing and sales promotion, and 
general corporate purposes categories, respectively. 
Underpricing 
Market value 
P roceeds 
D ebt ratio 
R elative offer size 
Number of IPOs 
Year 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
20 10 
20 11 
2012 
1996-2012 
Table 3.1 Sample summary statistics 
Panel A: Number of issues per year 
Number of issues 
167 
166 
122 
210 
165 
18 
10 
20 
38 
15 
29 
59 
6 
10 
28 
42 
35 
1140 
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Panel B: IPO characteristics by intended use of proceeds categories 
INVEST DEBT SALES GENERAL 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
16.26 2.5 19.90 9.09 44.66 25.83 42.23 14.05 
186.34 64 .9 28 1.24 84.3 1044.50 142.35 452.20 172.95 
77.96 50 92.63 49 .5 290.32 57.25 106.78 65.9 
0.28 0.19 0.37 0.29 0.17 0.1 0 0.23 0.08 
3.13 0.43 2.80 0.42 0.92 0.28 47.41 0.28 
245 369 11 2 414 
ote: Table 3.1 presents frequency distri bution and descriptive statistics by intended use of proceeds category of 1140 !PO finns. 
1 VEST is the group of IPOs stated investment as intended use of proceeds. DEBT is the group of IPOs stated debt payment a 
intended use of proceeds. SALES is the category of IPOs cited marketing and sales promotion as intended use of proceeds. GENERAL 
is the categ01y of IPOs choosing to give ambiguous view about their use of proceeds. Underpricing is the priee run-up in the fi rst 
trad ing day after the !PO defi ned as the difference between the first day closing priee and the offer priee given as a percentage of the 
offer priee. Market value is the stock priee times the number of shares outstanding on the day prior to the offer. Proceeds is a mea ure 
of the size of the !PO finn defined as the natural logarithm of the total capital raised at the ti me of the fPO. Relative o.ffer size is the 
number of shares offered divided by the number of shares outstandi ng on the day prior to the offer. Debt ratio is the ratio of long-tenn 
debt plus hort-tenn debt to tota l book assets in the year prior to the issue. 
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3.4 Methodology 
3.4.1 Long-run stock performance 
To calculate the long-run perfom1ance of IPO fi.rms, we use two approaches. First, we 
take an event time approach using the standard cumulative abnormal retum (CAR) measure. 
We then adopt a calendar time approach ~sing the alphas from the Fama and French (FF) 
three-factor mode!. 
For each calendar month, we calculate the return on a portfolio composed of IPO fim1s 
that carry out an IPO in the past 36 months. To determine the retum on a portfolio, we use 
value-weighted average retums. The calendar-time retums on this portfolio are used to 
estimate the following regression: 
(1) 
Where Rpt is the monthly retum on a value-weighted calendar-time portfolio ofiPOs, Rft 
is the monthly retum on treasury bills, Rmt is the retum on a value-weighted market index, 
SMBr is the difference, each month, between the retums of a value-weighted portfolio of 
small and big stocks, and HM Lr is the difference, each mon th, between the retmns of a value-
weighted portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and low book-to-market stocks. ap is the 
intercept tenn and represents the mean monthly excess retum on the calendar-time portfolio. 
W e calcula te mean cumulative abnormal retums (MCAR) based on three benchmarks: (i) 
the value-weighted CRSP index; (ii) a sample of firms matched by industry, size, and book-
to-market ratio; and (iii) a sample of firms matched using a propensity score matching (PSM) 
technique based on Rosenbaum and Rubin ' s (1983) propensity score theorem. 
In order to select matching firms based on industry, size, and book-to-market ratio, we 
first create a sample of possible matching fmns listed on CRSP and having at least 5 years 
data without any stock issues within 5 years. Second, we identify ail fmns within the same 
industry (2-Digit SIC) as the IPO sample. Third, following Lyon et al. (1999), we choose ail 
fmns with market capitalization between 70% and 130% of the IPO fmns at the end of the 
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fiscal year in which the IPO takes place. Finally, from this subset, we choose the firrn with 
the book-ta-market ratio closest to that of the IPO finn. Further, to obtain control fm11S that 
are as similar as possible to IPO finns, we employ the propensity score matching technique. 
The outcome of this method is the conditional probability, called the propensity score, of 
being in the treated group (in our case, the IPO decision) given the observed variables. We 
estima te the propensity score as follows: let Yi,t be an event indicator that is equal to 1 for 
IPO finns and 0 for non-IPO fmns. Let Xi ,t be a vector of independent variables (fm11 
characteristics) observed for finn i (IPOs as well as non-IPO finns) in fiscal year t (the IPO 
year). A propensity score logit function is defmed as Pu = (Yi,t = 1/ Xu) for each fiscal 
year (t takes a value from 1980 to 2006). We use the "nearest neighbor" matching method 
wlùch allows us to match each IPO finn to a single control frm1 with the closest propensity 
score (Pi ,t value). Specifically, we use six fmn characte1istics as conditioning variables to 
estimate the propensity score: idiosyncratic volatility, illiquidity, momenturn, market beta, 
size, and book-to-market ratio. Following Bessembinder and Zhang (2013), we measure 
idiosyncratic volatility as the annualized standard deviation of the residuals in monthly 
regressions of daily stock returns calculated with the three Fama and French (1993) factors 
(over the 12 post-IPO months). A measure of illiquidity is constructed using the Amihud 
(2002) method. For each stock and for each of the 12 months after the IPO, we measure 
illiquidity as the average of the daily ratio of absolute stock return to the dollar trading 
volume. Market beta is estimated for each fmn and for each of the 12 months after the IPO 
by implementing the market mode! in daily stock returns. All these estimates are averaged 
across 12 months. Return momentum is computed as the cumulative return from month 1 to 
month 11 after the IPO. Firm size is defined as the market capitalization at the fiscal year-end 
following the IPO. Book-to-market ratio is measured as the book value of equity over the 
market value of equity at the end of the fiscal year of the IPO event. W e calcula te mean 
cumulative abnormal returns over three years following the IPO starting one month after the 
IPO date to avoid any short run effect. We further incorporate use of proceeds dummy 
variables with other IPO characteristics that could influence the post-IPO long-run stock 
perfom1ance in a multivariate regression analysis. Our objective is to assess the differentiai 
effect of the use of proceeds categories on the IPO stock performance. Our dependent 
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variable is the cumulative abnonnal returns over tlu-ee years following the lPO obtained using 
the propensity score matching method. 
3.4.2 Long-run operating performance 
W e employ two measures of the opera ting performance of lPO frrms. The frrst measure is 
the operating cash flow scaled by total assets defined as the operating income before 
depreciation and taxes minus capital expenditures, divided by total assets. The second 
measure is operating income scaled by sales. Following Jain and Kini (1994) and Barber and 
Lyon (1996), we use median values given the fact that operating performance measures could 
be skewed and sensitive to outliers. 
We focus on changes in the operating performance of our lPO sample. We measure 
unadjusted change in operating performance as the median change in levels from the year 
prior to the lPO to two years following the offering, the lPO year to two years following the 
offering, and the lPO year to three years following the offering. Further, we measure changes 
in adjusted operating perfonnance using two matching techniques. First, we use industry 
adjusted operating perfom1<mce by matching each lPO firm with fmns in the same industry 
based on the two-digit SIC code. We compute the industry-adjusted change in operating 
performance of an lPO flfll as the difference between its change in operating performance 
and the median change in operating performance of all firms in its industry. 
Second, as Barber and Lyon (1996), we use a matching method based on industry and 
prior lPO opera ting performance. W e employ this technique to control for possible mean 
reversion resulting from abnonnal pre-event perfom1ance at the industry level. For each lPO 
fim1, we identify all fmns with the same two-digit SIC code and with an operati:ng 
performance between 90% and 110% of the lPO ' s opera ting performance at the end of .the 
fiscal year prior to the offering. Among these firms, we choose the matching flfll with the 
closest perf01mance measure to that of our sample fim1. If there is no match based on these 
criteria, we use a one-digit code and if that does not generate any matches, we use the pre-
issue perfom1ance without the SIC c1iterion. We compute changes in industry and pre-lPO 
adjusted operating performance by subtracting the operating performance change of the 
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control finn from the operating perfom1ance change of the IPO fmn. All changes are 
computed from the year prior to the IPO to two years following the offering, the IPO year to 
two years after the offering, and the IPO year to three years after the offering. 
Following Autore et al. (2009), we further run median quantile regressions to assess the 
effect of differences in intended use of proceeds on the long-run operating perfomnnce of 
IPO fmns. We also consider OLS estimations based on winsorized operating perfom1ance 
measures at the. Su' and 95u' percentiles. 
3.5 Empirical results 
3.5.1 Long-run stock performance 
Table 3.2 reports mean cumulative abnonnal retums for the 36-month h01izon following 
the IPO beginning in the month immediately following the offer month using the three 
matching teclmiques. Our results show that IPO finns, regardless of the matching method, 
significantly underperf01m in the long run, which is consistent with prior literature (Ritter, 
1991). For example, the CAR for the 36-month is -1 6.32% and statistically significant at the 
1% level when we use the PSM method. Wben IPO proceeds are expected to be used for 
specifie investments, the mean cumulative abn01mal retums are negative but weakly 
significant with size/industry/BM adjusted retums (-7.49) . They are insignificant however 
when we use the PSM method. Thus, compared to the debt payment, marketing and sales 
promotion, and general corporate pm-poses classifications, IPOs that state investment as the 
intended use of proceeds present more favorable long-run stock performance. For example, 
using PSM method, we find that the CAR for the 36-month horizon is only -9.55% for the 
investment group whereas it is about -22%, - 13%, and -1 7% when the intended uses of the 
proceeds are debt reduction, marketing activities, and general corporate pm-poses 
respective! y. 
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Panel D of Table 3.2 reports differences in means between the investment group and ali 
other groups. We find that differences between the investment and debt payment groups ((1) 
vs. (2)) are significant at the 10% level, indicating that CARs are significantly higher if 
investment is stated as the prin1ary use of proceeds than if debt payment is the stated use. The 
results also show that the three-year horizon abnmmal returns for IPO fmns are significantly 
grea ter wh en the fmn states specifie investment plans for their use of proceeds as opposed to 
debt repayment, marketing activities or general corporate purposes. 
Table 3.2 Mean cumulative abnormal returns 
Cumulative abnonnal retums over 3 year fo llowing the IPO 
Panel A: Mea n CARs using market adj usted returns 
Ali issuers 
INVEST(1) 
DEBT(2) 
SALES(3) 
GENERAL(4) 
N 
1140 
245 
369 
11 2 
414 
Mean(%) 
-3.74 
3.71 
-22 .93*** 
8.59 
6.07 
Panel B: Mean CARs using industry, size and BM adjusted returns 
Ali issuers 1139 -16.98*** 
INVEST 245 -7 .49* 
DEBT 369 -16.01 *** 
SALES 111 -28.77*** 
GENERAL 4 14 -20.30*** 
Panel C: Mean CARs using propensity sco re matching technique (PSM) 
Ali issuers 713 ·-16.32*** 
INVEST 140 -9.55 
DEBT 211 -21.09*** 
SALES 82 -13 .32 
GENERAL 280 -16.9 1 *** 
Panel D: P-value of differences in mea ns 
( 1) versus (2) 
(1) versus (3) 
(1) versus (4) 
(1) versus (2,3 and 4) 
Market-adj 
0.09 
0.30 
0.23 
0.11 
Ind-size-BM-adj 
0.33 
0.02 
0.07 
0.07 
P-value 
0.18 
0.33 
0.00 
0.28 
0.20 
0.00 
0.09 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.14 
0.00 
0.12 
0.00 
PSM- adj 
0.06 
0.56 
0.14 
0.06 
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1ote: Table 3.2 present mean cumulative abnormal retums over three year following the IPO. Panel A report 
market adju ted abnonnal returns. Panel B presents abnonnal returns using matches based on industry, size and 
book to market ratio. Panel C presents same statistics using propensity score matching method. The fir t row of each 
panel repOlis results for ali issuers and the subsequent four rows presents Mean CARs for fou r categories of 
intended use of proceeds: lNVEST where investment is stated as use of proceeds, DEBT where debt repayment is 
stated as use of proceeds, SALES where marketing and sale promotion is cited as use of proceeds and GE ŒRAL 
where the stated u e of proceeds i general corporate purposes. Panel D reports P-values for tests of difference in 
mean CARs between the four categ01ies by matching method. 
Table 3.3 presents the mean monthly calendar-time abnom1al retums. Estimating the 
three factor madel afFama and French, we fmd that the alpha for the debt repayment group is 
-0 .99% and statistically significant at the 5% level. However, alphas for the other groups are 
not statistically significant, confrrming that debt payment as the intended use of proceeds is 
associated with significantly poorer long-run stock performance for IPO frrms. Furthem1ore, 
results in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 confinn that fm11S specifying investment as the primary use of 
proceeds exhibit insignificant negative abnormal retums. We find, however, mixed results for 
the marketing and sales promotion and general corporate purposes groups. While CAR 
analysis shows indeed significant negative abnormal retums, there 1s no evidence of 
significant long-run underpeliormance using calendar-time analysis. 
In Table 3.4, we report the results of the multivariate regression analysis based on the 
following madel: 
CARb,36 months = a+ {31DEBTi+/3zlNVESTi + {33 GENERALi + {34SALESi + 
{35 Proceedsi +{36 VCbackedi + {37 Underpricingi + {38 Prestigei 
+{39 Bubblei + /310SEOi + {311 Leveragei + /312R&Di + {313 CAPEXi + {314ADVERTi + 
(2) 
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The dependent variable is the cumulative abnonnal retum calculated from month 1 to 
month 36 following the IPO date using the PSM matching method. The key parameter of 
interest are coefficients on four variables: (1) DEBT is a durruny variable that takes the value 
of 1 if the stated use of proceeds is debt repayment and 0 otherwise; (2) INVESTis a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if the intended use of proceeds is investment plans and 0 
otherwise; (3) GENERALisa dummy that takes the value of 1 if the intended use ofproceeds 
is general corporate pm-poses and 0 otherwise; and ( 4) SALES is a dunm1y that takes the value 
of 1 if the intended use of proceeds is marketing and sales promotion. Proceeds is the natural 
log of the total capital raised at the time of the IPO. VC backed is a dunm1y taking the value 
of one if the IPO is backed by a ventme capital firm and zero otherwise. Unde1pricing is the 
priee mn-up in the first trading day after the IPO and is defmed as the difference between the 
first day closing p1ice and the offer priee given as a percentage of the offer p1ice. Prestige is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the IPO ' s undenvriter is in the top tier, and zero 
otherwise, using the rankings ofLoughran and Ritter (2004). Bubble is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 if the IPO occurred during 1999-2000 and zero othe1wise. SEO is a 
dmm11y variable that takes the value of 1 if the finn conducts seasoned equity offerings in the 
tl1ree years following the IPO, and zero otherwise. Leverage is total long tenn debt prior the 
offering scaled by total assets prior the offering. R&D measures research and development 
intensity prior the offering calculated as R&D ex penses to total assets. CAP EX measures 
capital expenditure intensity prior the offering calculated as capital expenditures expenses to 
total assets. AD VERT measures advertising exp ens es intensity prior the offering calculated as 
total adve1iising expenses to total assets. 
Our results show that debt payment stated as the intended use of proceeds is one of the 
driver for the IPO long-mn underperformance. Specifically, we fmd that citing debt payment 
in the IPO prospectus as the intended use of proceeds lowers the abnormal returns by almost 
33%. Mean:w"hile, stating investment as the use of proceeds seems to have no statistical 
significant effect on IPO long-mn underperformance which is consistent with our univariate 
results. In examining the influence of IPO-related characteristics, we fmd that IPO 
underpricing is negatively and significantly related to the Jong-run stock performance which 
is consistent with Ritter (1991). Our results also show that there is no significant difference in 
the long-run stock perfom1ance between venture backed and non-venture IPOs and the 
112 
prestige of the underwriter seems to have a positive but insignificant effect on IPO long-mn 
underperfom1ance. These latter observations must be interpreted with cautious giving our 
sample selection and the low level of the adjusted R-squared for this regression. 
Overall, our results supp01t the view that the market reaction is affected by the IPO's 
statements. The intended primary use of proceeds allows the market to assess the quality of 
the expected use of the capital following the offering. Our fmdings suggest that IPO fim1s 
that state that the intended use of proceeds is to pa y clown debt are associated with significant 
negative abnormal returns. This implies that the market could consider these finns as 
opportunistic market timers and consequ~ntly reacts less favorably. The insignificant 
negative abnormal retums identified for IPOs that state specifie investment as the intended 
use of proceeds suggests that the market reacts favorably to frrms tbat appear to have 
valuable growth prospects. When an IPO provides a vague overview for the intended use of 
proceeds, the market could consider that the expected capital is not being used in a value 
increasing manner. For instance, IPOs that state general corporate purposes as the intended 
use of proceeds are more likely to be opportunistic market timers than to have valuable 
growth opportunities. 
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Table 3.3 Cal en dar time regressions of long run stock retums 
All issuers INVEST DEBT SALES GENERAL 
Alpha -0.03 -0.15 -0.99* 0.20 0.27 
(-0.08) (-0.35) ( -1.68) (0.30) (0 .69) 
MKT 1.26*** 1.20*** 1.15 1.41 *** 1.40*** 
(17.34) (12 .81) (8.80) (9 .57) (15.52) 
SMB 0.92*** 0.97*** 0.9 1 *** 0.93*** 0.98*** 
(5.77) (6.83) (5 .75) (4.34) (5.27) 
HML -0.60*** -0.45*** 0.09*** -0.83*** -1.01 *** 
(-4.66) (-3.45) (0.43) (-3.22) (-7.64) 
Adjusted R2 0.74 0.65 0.48 0.52 0.76 
Note: Table 3.3 presents the results for Fama and French three-factor mode!. Month ly returns are ca lcul ated from 
month 1 to month 36 following the TPO. The dependent variable is the difference between monthly retum on 
va lue-weighted calendar-time portfolio and month ly return on three-month Trea UJY bill s. The independent 
variables are (1) MKT is the difference between the return on a va lue-weighted market index and the monthly 
retum on the three-month Treasury bills; (2) SMB is the difference in the returns of value-weighted portfolios of 
small stocks and big stocks, and (3) HML is the difference in the retums of va lue-weighted portfolios of high 
book-tc-market stocks and low book-tc-market tocks. Alpha is the intercept term and represents the mean 
monthly exce s return on the calendar-time portfolio. Coefficient estimates are displayed for a il issuers and each 
of the four categories of intended use of proceeds: INVEST is the group of TPOs stated investment as use of 
proceeds. DEBT is the categ01y of IPOs cited debt payment as intended use of proceeds, SALES is the group of 
IPOs declared marketing and sa les promotion as use of proceeds and GENERAL is the group of JPOs stated 
general COilJorate puqJoses as use of proceeds .. ***, ** and * indi cate statistica l significance at the O. 1%, 1% and 
5% leve!, respectively. 
Constant 
DEBT 
IN Y EST 
GEENRAL 
SALES 
Underpricing 
Proceeds 
Prestige 
YC backed 
Bubble 
SEO 
Le vera ge 
R&D 
CAP EX 
AD VERT 
Observations 
Adjusted R2 
Table 3.4 Multivariate regressions explaining post-IPO performance 
( 1) 
0.7 1 ** 
(2.26) 
-0.33* 
(- 1.85) 
-0.20 
(- 1.14) 
-0.20 
(-1.23) 
-0.24*** 
(-3 .28) 
-0 .1 4** 
(-2.40) 
0.11 
(0.93) 
-0.12 
(-1.1 3) 
-0.03 
(-0.28) 
0.20** 
(2.05) 
437 
0.06 
OLS estimates 
(2) 
0.38 
( 1 .32) 
0. 12 
(0.87) 
O. 13 
(0.99) 
0.33* 
( 1. 85) 
-0.24*** 
( -3.28) 
-0.14** 
( -2.40) 
0.11 
(0.93) 
-0.1 2 
(-1.13) 
-0.03 
( -0.28) 
0.20** 
(2.05) 
437 
0.06 
(3) 
0.99** 
(2.58) 
-0.37* 
(- 1 .74) 
-0.36 
(-1.61) 
-0.29 
(- 1 .47) 
-0.28*** 
( -3.05) 
-0.1 6** 
(-1.99) 
0.07 
(0.43) 
-0.22 
(-1.65) 
-0.02 
(-0.14) 
0.24** 
(2.02) 
-0.17 
( -0.65) 
294 
0.07 
114 
(4) 
0.47 
( 1.54) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.09 
(0.64) 
0.27 
( 1 .49) 
-0.23*** 
(-3. 17) 
-0. 14** 
( -2.22) 
0.07 
(0.55) 
-0.16 
(-1 .36) 
-0.07 
(-0.58) 
0.20* 
(1 .90) 
0.1 7 
(1.33) 
0.01 *** 
(6.04) 
-0 .30 
(-0.34) 
403 
0.07 
Note: The dependent vatiable is the cumulative abnormal retum calculated from mon th 1 to mond1 36 following ilie IPO date 
using the PSM matching method. DEBT is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the intended use of proceeds i debt 
paytnent, and zero otherwise. INVEST is a dummy variable that take the value of 1 if IPO finns cite in vestment a intended 
use of proceeds. GENERAL is a du mm y variable that takes the value of 1 if the intended u e of proceeds is general corporate 
purposes. SALES is a dununy variable that takes the value of 1 if the intended use of proceeds is marketing and sale 
promotion, and zero otherwise. Proceeds are defined as the natural logarithm of the capital raised at the time of the IPO. VC 
backed is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the !PO is backed by a venture capital finn, and zero oilierwise. 
Underpricing is defined as ilie ptice run-up in the first trading day after the !PO and mea ured as ilie difference between d1e 
first day closing priee and the offer priee given as a percentage of the. offer ptice. Prestige is a dummy vatiable dl at takes the 
value of one if the TPO's underwriter i in the top ti er, and zero otherwise. Bubble is a dummy variable that takes d1e va lue of 1 
if the TPO occutTed during 1999-2000, and zero othetwise. SEO is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the finn 
conducts seasoned equity offerings in the tlu·ee years following the TPO, and zero otherwi e. Leverage is total long tenn debt 
prior d1e offering scaled by total assets ptior the offet·ing. R&D measure research and development intensity ptior d1e offering 
calculated as R&D expenses to total assets. CAPEX measures capital expenditure intensity prior the offering calculated as 
capital expend itures expenses to total assets. ADVERT measures advertising expenses intensity prior the offering calculated as 
total advertising expenses to total assets. For each independent variable, coefficient estimates and d1e corre ponding robust t 
statistics are reported. ***, **and * indicate statistica l significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% leve!, respective! y. 
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3.5.2 Long-run operating performance 
In Table 3.5 and 3.6, we examine changes in the operating performance of IPO fm11S. 
Specifically, in Table 3.5, we present results for unadjusted and industry-adjusted operating 
performance measured by operating cash flow to assets and operating income to sales. We 
report changes for the whole san1ple as weil as for each group of intended uses of proceeds 
for three periods: from the year prior to the IPO to two years following the IPO, from the IPO 
year to two years following the IPO, and from the IPO year to three years following the IPO. 
In Table 3.6, we provide the same analysis using industry and pre-IPO adjusted operating 
performance. 
Previous IPO studies report that the operating performance of IPO fmns significantly 
declines in the five years following the offering relative to a matched sample (Jain and Kini, 
1994; Mikkelsen et al. , 1997). Our results confirm indeed this fmding. We find significant 
declines in operating performance for ali issuers in the two and three years following the IPO. 
With regard to proceeds use categories, our results show that IPOs that state debt payment as 
the intended use of proceeds exhibit significant declines in their operating performance for ail 
the periods studied. However, there is no evidence of operating performance deterioration for 
the investment group.-We find mixed results for the SALES and GENERAL categories. 
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Table 3.5 Operating performance changes based on industry-adjusted measures 
Median changes in operating cash flow Median changes in opera ting income 
scaled by total assets scaled by sales 
-1 to 2 0 to 2 0 to 3 -1 to 2 0 to 2 0 to 3 
Ali issuers 
Unadjusted 0.029*** -0.040*** -0.013*** -0. 124*** -0.001 *** -0.001 *** 
Industry adjusted 0.044*** -0.025*** -0.010*** 0.005*** 0.008*** 0.013*** 
Observations 682 704 676 636 676 648 
INVEST 
Unadjusted 0.0 19* -0.01 0 -0 .012 0.024 0.009 0.030** 
Industry adjusted 0.033** 0.004 -0 .007 0.034 0.014 0.046** 
0 bserva ti ons 142 143 146 123 130 131 
DEBT 
Unadjusted -0.034*** -0.026*** -0.024** -0.020** -0 .016** -0.015 
Industry adjusted -0.0 16*** -0.0 17*** -0.015** -0.005** -0.0 10** 0.001 
Observations -2.499 -4.247 -2.054 -2.176 -2.317 -0.732 
194 212 235 194 213 235 
SALES 
Unadjusted 0.075*** -0.025* 0.006 -0.327*** 0.1 15*** 0. 128*** 
Industry adjusted 0.098*** -0.013* -0.004 0.432*** 0.130*** 0. 143*** 
Observations 73 73 57 67 71 56 
GENERAL 
Unadjusted 0.111*** -0.047*** -0.006 -0.180*** 0.01 0*** 0.036*** 
Industry adjusted 0.118*** -0.032*** -0.012 0.102*** 0.027*** 0.046*** 
Observations 273 276 238 252 262 226 
ote: Table 3.5 presents unadju sted and industry-adjusted changes in operating performance in the years sun·ounding the IPO 
date using two measures: operating cash flow to tota l assets and operati ng income to sales. We obtain industry-adjusted operating 
performance by matching each lPO finn with fi rms in the same industiy based on two-digit SIC code. We compute industry-
adjusted change in opera ting perf01mance of an IPO firm as the difference between its change in operating pe1fonnance and the 
median change in operating pe1fonnance of ali finn s in its industry. Results are reported for ali issuers and each of the four 
categories of intended use of proceeds: INVEST if IPOs cite in vestinent as use of proceeds, DEBT if lPOs state debt pa)'lnent a 
intended u e of proceeds, SALES if marketing and sales promotion is the intended use of proceeds and GE ERAL if lPOs cite 
general corporate pUI-poses as intended use of proceeds. Wilcoxon signed rank test is used to exam ine whether the change is 
significantly different from zero. ***, **and * ind icate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levet, respective! y. 
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Table 3.6 Operating performance changes based on industry and pre- IPO performance 
adjusted measures 
Median changes in operating cash flow Median changes in operating income 
scaled b~ total assets scaled b~ sales 
-1 to 2 0 to 2 0 to 3 -1 to 2 0 to 2 0 to 3 
Ali issuers 
Unadjusted -0.009*** -0.030*** -0.007*** 0.001 *** -0.0 10*** -0.010*** 
Industry\ pre -0.027*** -0.037*** -0 .013*** -0.009*** -0.0 17*** -0.014*** 
performance adjusted 
Observations 606 605 498 552 522 444 
INVEST 
Unadjusted 0.017 0.004 0.011 0.005 -0.005 -0.0 11 
Industry\ pre -0.010 -0.012 -0.003 -0.007 -0.0 13 -0.025 
perfom1ance adjusted 
Observations 111 111 93 96 92 81 
DEBT 
Unadjusted -0.034*** -0.023*** -0.015 -0.009*** -0.001 *** -0.014*** 
Industry\ pre -0 .035*** -0.027*** -0.021 -0.012*** -0.017*** -0.015*** 
performance adjusted 
Observations 224 223 188 224 206 181 
SALES 
Unadjusted 0.036 -0.009 0.033 0.049 0.032 0.044 
Industry\ pre 0.019 -0.023 0.008 0.030 0.029 0.064 
perfonnance adjusted 
Observations 53 53 45 42 44 37 
GENERAL 
Unadjusted 0.036*** -0.050*** -0.009 0.028** -0.001 *** 0.009 
Industry\ pre 0.011*** -0.049*** 0.004 -0.004** -0.017*** -0 .018 
perfom1ance adjusted 
Observations 218 218 172 190 180 145 
ote: Table 3.6 presents unadjusted and industry and pre IPO pe1fonnance adjusted changes in operating pe1fonnance in the 
years sun·ounding the IPO date using two measures: operating cash flow to total assets and operating income to sales We 
obtain industly and pre-LPO pe1f01mance adjusted operating pe1formance by matching each IPO finn with the contro l firm in 
the same industry based on two-digit SIC code and the closed p1ior fPO operating perfonnance. We compute industry and 
pre-perfonnance-adju ted change in operating pe1fonnance of an IPO finn as the difference between its change in operating 
pe1fonnance and the change in operati ng performance of the matched finn. Results are reported for ali is uer and each of the 
four categories of in tended use of proceeds: INVEST if IPOs cite in vestment as use of proceeds, DEBT if IPOs state debt 
payment as intended use of proceeds, SALES if marketing and sa les promotion is the intended use of proceeds and 
GENERAL ifiPOs cite general corporate purposes as intended use ofproceeds. Wilcoxon signed rank test is used to exam in e 
wh ether the change is significantly different from zero. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
leve], respectively 
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Furiher, we investigate changes in post-IPO operating performance usmg a quantile 
regression and OLS estimation where the dependent variable (b.(Y)) is either change in 
industry-adjusted operating cash flow to assets or operating income to sales, both from the 
year prior to the IPO to two years following the issue. Table 3.7 reports estimation results for 
the following regression: 
b.(Y)i =a+ {31 DEBT1+/32 INVESTi + /33 GENERAL1 + {34 SALESi + {35 Proceeds1 
+ {36 VCbacked1 + {37 Underpricing1 + {38 Prestigei +{39 Bubbleï+P9 Bubble1 + 
(3) 
Our results show that the coefficient of the variable DEBT is negative and statistically 
' 
significant for allmodels, indicating that IPOs that state debt payment as the intended use of 
proceeds present grea ter declines in their post-IPO operating performance. When the intended 
use of proceeds is investments, our results show no significant effect on post-IPO operating 
performance. We also fmd a negative but insignificant relationship between the long-run 
opera ting perfom1ance and general corporate purposes stated as the intended use of proceeds, 
while we fmd a positive relationship between the long-rw1 operating performance and 
marketing and sales promotion stated as use of proceeds. Overall, these results are consistent 
with our earlier univariate analysis fmdings. With regard to IPO characteristics, Table 3.7 
shows that venture backed IPOs ex.hibit significantly higher post-IPO operating performance 
than do non-venture backed IPOs. Underwriter prestige also seems to be positively and 
significantly related to the post-IPO operating perfonnance. Further, we fmd that issuing 
stocks during hubble period affects positively and significantly the post-IPO operating 
perfom1ance. 
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Table 3. 7 Multivariate regres ion analysis of opera ting incom e change 
Panel A: Quanti le rel[ession 
lndustry-adj usted operating ca h fl ow lndust1y -adjusted operating income 
to assets to sales 
( 1) {2) (3) {4) {12 {2) {3) (4) 
Constant 0.04 -0.05 0.02 -0.1 8 0.2 1 ** -0.02 0.3 1 *** -0. 09 
(0.49) (-0.84) (0.3 1) (- 1.11 ) (2.22) (-0. 19) (4.29) (-0.6 1) 
DEBT -0.09* -0.09* -0.23*** -0.29*** 
(-1.93) (-1.74) (-3 . 70) (-6.0 1) 
INVEST -0.07 0.02 -0.08 -0. 10 -0.22*** 0.00 -0.30*** -0. 10 
(-1 .43) (0.6 1) (- 1.51 ) (-1.2 1) ( -3.52) (0 .1 0) (-5.88) ( -1. 28) 
GE ERAL -0.03 0.06* -0.06 -0.03 -0. 17*** 0.05 -0.27*** 0.01 
(-0. 73) ( 1.77) (- 1.20) (-0.40) (-2.98) (1.3 1) (-5.74) (0.22) 
SALES 0.09* -0.0 1 0.23*** 0.23** 
( 1.93) (-0.12) (3 .70) (2.54) 
Underp ricing 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.05* -0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.05** -0.00 
(2.79) (2.79) ( 1.9 1) (-0.89) ( 1.04) (1.04) (-2. 10) (-0. 19) 
Proceeds -0.0 1 -0.0 1 -0 .0 1 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 
(-0.67) ( -0.67) (-0.37) (0.42) (-0.92) (-0.92) ( - 1.38) (-0.77) 
Prestige 0.00 0.00 0.0 1 -0 .05 0.07 0.07 0.06* 0. 15** 
(0. 11 ) (0. 11 ) (0.42) ( -0. 76) ( 1.55) ( 1.55) ( 1.9 1) (2.53) 
VCbacked 0.1 0*** 0. 1 0*** 0.14*** -0.02 0. 05 0.05 0.09*** 0.02 
(3.84) (3.84) (4.93) (-0.4 1) ( 1.41 ) (1.4 1) (3.27) (0.37) 
Bubble 0.07** 0.07** 0.07** 0.19*** 0.05 0.05 0.08*** 0. 13*** 
(2.38) (2.38) (2. 15) (3 .38) ( 1.26) ( 1.26) (2.62) (2.63) 
SEO 0.05* 0.05 * 0.04 0.09* 0.05 0.05 0.07** 0.11 ** 
( 1.88) ( 1. 88) (1.4 1) ( l. 72) ( 1.48) ( 1.48) (2 .58) (2.30) 
R&D 0.89*** 0.38*** 
(39.24) (6.63) 
CAP EX 0.90*** -0.03 
(2.80) (-0.09) 
AD VERT -0. 14 0.23 
(-0. 18) (0.38) 
Le vera ge -0 .0 1 -0.04 
( -0.35) (-1.04) 
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.04 297 0. 19 0.0 1 0.0 1 0.02 0.02 
Observati on 427 427 0.02 262 4 17 4 17 306 254 
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Tab le 3.7 (cont inued) 
Panel 8: OLS re~·ession 
Industry-adjusted operating cash flow lndustry-adjusted operating income 
to a ets to sa les 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4~ 
Constant 0.19 0.03 0.10 0.02 0.76 -0 .18 1.12 - 1.51 
( 1.60) (0.39) (0. 75) (0.13) (0.97) (-0 .37) (1.17) (-1 .25) 
DEBT -0.16* -0.17** -0.94* - 1.1 8* 
(-1.84) ( -1.97) (- 1.80) (-1.75) 
EST -0.09 0.07 -0.15 0.00 -0.96 -0.02 -1.09 -0.27 
(-0.90) ( 1.44) ( -1.63) (0.05) ( -1.57) ( -0.07) (-1.39) (-0.54) 
GENERAL -0.09 0.07* -0.12 -0.00 -0.77 0.17 -1.49** 0.09 
( -0.99) ( 1.77) (-1 .42) (-0.02) (-1.43) (0.7 1) (-2.19) (0.26) 
SALES 0.16* 0.05 0.94* 0.76 
(1.84) (0.4 1) (1. 80) ( 1. 1 0) 
Underpricing 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.04 -0. 12 -0.06 
( 1.05) (1.05) (0.54) (0.60) (0.24) (0.24) ( -0.3 7) (-0.36) 
Proceeds -0.02 -0.02 -0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.30 
(-0.75) (-0.75) (-0.13) (0.03) ( -0.09) (-0.09) (-0.18) (1 .06) 
Pre tige -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 -0.12* 0.27 0.27 0.33 0.14 
( -0.98) ( -0.98) (-0.56) (-1.66) (0.86) (0.86) (0.93) (0.28) 
VCbacked .14*** 0.14*** 0.21 *** 0.10* 0.40 0.40 0.71 ** 0.1 3 
(3.43) (3.43) (4 .27) (1.84) ( 1.62) (1.62) (2.44) (0.35) 
Bubble 0.12*** 0.12*** 0. 15*** 0.21 *** 0.2 1 0.21 0.29 0.49 
(2.61) (2 .61) (2. 70) (3.49) (0.84) (0 .84) (1 .02) (1.36) 
SEO 0.04 0.04 -0.01 0.06 0.2 1 0.21 0.12 0.44 
(0.92) (0.92) (-0.1 8) (1.11 ) (0.83) (0.83) (0.48) (1.16) 
R&D 0.08*** 1.68** 
(3.31) (2.27) 
CAP EX 0.99*** -1.10 
(3.59) (-0.47) 
AD VERT -0.34 2.68 
(-0.46) (0.99) 
Le vera ge 0.08 -0.36 
( 1.06) ( -0. 76) 
Adjusted R2 0.11 0.11 0.14 0.17 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.08 
Ob ervations 427 427 297 262 417 417 306 254 
'ote: The dependent variable is changes in indust:Jy- adjusted operating perfonnance measured by operating ca h flow to total assets 
or operating income to sales from the year prior !PO to two years after the offering. indust:Jy-adjusted change in operating 
performance of an IPO firm is the difference between its change in operating pe1f01mance and the median change in operating 
pe1formance of ali finns in its industry(based on two-digit SIC code). ). DEBT is a dummy variable that takes the value of l if the 
intended use of proceeds is debt repayment, and zero otherwise. INVEST is a dummy variable that takes the va lue of 1 if IPO finn 
cite investment as intended use of proceeds. GENERAL is a du mm y variable that takes the value of 1 if the intended use of proceeds 
is general corporate purposes. SALES is a du mm y variable that takes the value of 1 if the intended u e of proceeds is marketing and 
ales promotion, and zero otherwise See Table 4 for other variable definitions. For each independent va1iable, coefficient estimates 
and the corresponding robust t statistics are reported. ***, ** and * indicate statistical ign ificance at the 1%, 5% and 10% leve!, 
respective! y. 
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3.5.3 Robustness test: IPO surviyal profile 
In this section, we complement our long-run performance analysis by examining whether 
intended use of proceeds affects the survival profile of IPO fm11S . We first plot the survival 
function of our IPO sample by intended use of proceeds category. Figure 3.1 provides five 
years plot of the survival function using Kaplan Meier estimator. We find that IPO fmns 
stating debt payment as intended use of proceeds have lower survival profile compared to 
other categories and that IPOs stating investment as intended use of proceed seem to have the 
highest probability of survive. 
Next, we run multivariate hazard regressiOns using the proportional hazards model 
proposed by Cox (1972i 0. The basic model assumes the following fonn: 
(4) 
Where hi(t) is the conditional failure rate defmed as the probability of failure during the 
five years following the IPO. /,0(t) is the baseline hazard function and the second part of the 
equation is the exponentiated set of covariates for finn i. 
The regression model is as follows : 
Y= a+ (J1 DEBTi+(J21NVESTi + (]3 GENERALi + (J4 SALESi + (]5 Proceedsi + 
(]6 VCbackedi + (]7 Underpricingi + (]8 Prestigei +(]9 Bubblei+(J10 SEOi + 
(5) 
Table 3.8 reports the smvival analysis results for regressiOn (5). We find that the 
probability of failure significantly increases when the intended use of proceeds is debt 
payment. This result is robust for controlling the level of leverage p1ior the offering. 
Specifically, our results show that stating debt payment as use of proceeds increases the risk 
offailure during the five years following IPO by about 90% (1- e0·65). We also find a negative 
20 The Cox model is a statistical technique for analysing survival data that does not require the 
specification of an underlying distribution. Its main assumption is that the hazard function of fim1 i is a 
multiple of an unspecified baseline hazard function. 
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offai lure during the five years fol lowing IPO by about 90% (1 - e0 65). We also find a negative 
relationship between the probability of failure and investment as stai:ed use of proceeds, 
suggesting that firms stated investment as intended use of proceeds are less likely to fait 
during the five years fo llowing the IPO, although this relationship is not significant. With 
regard to IPO characteristics, we find a negative and significant relationship between the 
probabi lity of fai lure and total proceeds, suggesting that IPO firms raising higher amount of 
proceeds are more likely to survive in the five years fo llowing the IPO. 
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VC backed 
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Observations 
Wald test 
Log likelibood 
Table 3.8 Multivariate Cox Hazard regression 
(1) 
0.76** 
(2.19) 
-0 .00 
(-0.01) 
0.11 
(0.32) 
0.07 
(0.56) 
-0.1 8 
(-1.59) 
-0.10 
(-0.46) 
0.20 
(0 .98) 
-0.31 
(-1.48) 
-0.33 
( -1.56) 
366 
25.58 
-729.0 
Cox mode! estimates 
(2) (3) 
0.65*** 
(2.70) 
-0.11 
(-0.41) 
-0.11 
(-0.32) 
0.07 
(0.56) 
-0.1 8 
( -1.59) 
-0.10 
(-0.46) 
0.20 
(0.98) 
-0.31 
(-1.48) 
-0.33 
(-1.56) 
366 
25.58 
-729 .0 
0.76* 
(1.70) 
0.07 
(0 .15) 
0.15 
(0.35) 
-0.0 1 
(-0.07) 
-0.23* 
(-1.80) 
-0.05 
(-0.17) 
0.40* 
(1.70) 
-0.18 
(-0.76) 
-0.32 
(-1.35) 
0.04 
(0.12) 
275 
18.79 
-506.6 
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(4) 
0.65*** 
(2.71) 
-0.16 
(-0.55) 
-0.11 
(-0.32) 
0.07 
(0.57) 
-0.18 
(-1.53) 
-0.10 
(-0.44) 
0.19 
(0.89) 
-0.32 
( -1.50) 
-0.34 
(-1.62) 
-0.18 
(-0.51) 
-2.29 
(-1.64) 
-7.95* 
(-1.70) 
366 
30.73 
-725.3 
ote: DEBT is a dummy va1iable that takes the value of 1 if the intended use of proceeds is debt repayment, and zero 
otherwise. INVEST is a dummy variable th at takes the value of l if IPO finns cite investment as intended use of proceeds, 
and zero otherwise. GENERAL isa dummy variable that takes the va lue of 1 if the intended use of proceed is general 
corporate purposes, and zero othe1wise. SALES is a du mm y variable th at takes the value of l if the intended use of proceeds 
is marketing and sales promotion, and zero otherwise. See Table 4 for other variable definitions. For each independent 
variable, coefficient estimates and the corresponding t stati tics are reported. ***, **and * indicate statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% leve!, respective! y. 
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3.6 Conclusion 
In this paper, we hand collected data from IPO prospectus on the primary use of proceeds 
of IPO fmns and related to their long-run stock perfom1ance, operating perfonnance, and 
survival profile. Specifically, we cover the 1996-2012 period and examine four categories of 
proceeds use: debt payment, investment, marketing and sales promotion, and general 
corporate purposes. Our event time analysis shows that IPOs declaring investment plans as 
the primary use of proceeds exh.ibit lower underperfonmmce in the three years following the 
IPO. A higher and significant underperformance is calculated when the primary use of 
proceeds is debt payment or general corporate purposes. Our calendar tin1e regression of the 
tl1ree factor model confmns that w1derperformance is higher still when debt payment is the 
intended use of proceeds. Using a multivariate regression, our results confim1 our W1ivariate 
and FF factor analysis fmdings. 
Using two measures of IPO operating perfom1ance, we fmd no evidence of post-IPO 
performance deterioration when the stated use of proceeds is investment. However, our 
results show significant declines in operating performance when the issuer declares debt 
repayment as the intended use of proceeds. Our quantile and OLS regressions confmn these 
fmdings. 
Our study provides new evidence for the role that the primary use of proceeds plays in 
explaining the timing motive ofiPO fmns. IPOs that state debt payment as the prima1-y use of 
proceeds may be viewed by the market as oppottunistic. This implies that these fmns issue 
equity when their stocks are overvalued to refinance their debt. The negative market reaction 
to such behaviour is confmned by our results. If IPO fmns declare a specifie investment as 
the primm-y use of proceeds, this implies that the capital to be raised at ilie offering is going 
to be used to maximize value. Revealing future acquisitions, R&D projects, or capital 
expenditure purposes as the prin1ary use of proceeds may be seen as a positive signal 
regarding an IPO 's growth prospects. Consequently, the market reacts favourably. Our results 
also support this evidence. We test the robustness of our fmding by examining whether 
intended use of proceeds affects the survival profile of IPO fmns and fmd that stating debt 
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payment as use of proceeds increases the risk of failure during the five years following IPO 
by about 90%. 
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CO CLUSIO GÉ ÉRALE 
L ' introduction en bourse demeure une déc ision stratégique dans la v ie d' une entreprise. 
Cet évènement a suscité 1' intérêt de nombreux chercheurs qui ont tenté essentiellement à 
expliquer la performance des titres nouvellement introd ui ts sur un hori zon à cou rt, à moyen et 
à long terme. 
Partant du constat que la création d 'une va leur au marché des titres nouvellement émis 
présente un levier fi nanc.ier pour s ' engager dans des opérations de fusions et acquisitions 
futures (Brau et al. , 2006), la littérature fi nanc ière s' est intéressée à 1 ' examen des 
déterminants des opérati ons de fusion-acquisition et de comprendre les motivations et les 
conséquences des entreprises introduites en bourse via des émiss ions initia les. Cette thèse se 
situe dans ce nouveau courant de li ttérature où les recherches empiriques restent Limitées. 
Nous proposons d' explorer la relation entre 1 ' introduction en bourse et les opérati ons de 
fusion-acquisition . il comporte trois chapih·es, visant chacune des obj ectifs spécifiques et se 
fo ndant sur une méthodologie propre . 
L ' obj ectif du premier chapitre est d'examiner la relation entre cetta ines ca ractéri stiques 
liées à l' introduction en bourse et la probabilité qu ' une entrepri se nouvellement introduite en 
bourse s' engage dans une opération de fusion-acquisition durant les ci nq premières années 
subséquentes à l' introduction en bourse. Nos résultats montrent une relation positive et 
significative entre la probabilité de fa ire une acquis ition durant les cinq années après 
l ' émi ss ion et le degré de changement du pourcentage d ' actions détenues par les ini tiés. Nous 
concluons que plus ce chan gement est important, plus les entreprises in troduites en bourse 
s'engagent dans des acqui sitions. De plus, la présence d ' un spécia li ste en capital de risque 
dans Je processus d ' introduction en bourse a un effet positif et signi ficat if sur la probabili té 
qu ' une entreprise effectue des opérations de fusion-acquisition post-émi ss ion. Nous 
constatons auss i que les spécia listes en capital de ri sque tentent à éviter les acquisiti ons 
durant la période de blocage des fo nds. Les tests em piriques sur le choix de mode de 
paiement des opérations de fusion-acquisition post-émi ss ion montrent 1 ' importance de tenir 
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compte de l' asymétrie d ' information entre la cible et l ' entreprise émettrice. Plus 
pa1ticulièrement, la présence d' information asymétrique fait réduire la probabilité que 
J'entreprise acquéreuse puisse profiter de ses actions surévaluées pour payer ses opérations 
d ' acquisition. Nos résultats montrent aussi qu ' il existe une relation positive entre le nombre 
d'investisseurs institutionnels communs entre les deux entreprises acquéreuse et cible et la 
probabilité que les acquisitions soient. payées par les actions . Nos tests empiriques révèlent 
aussi que le degré de sous-évaluation initiale, les émissions subséquentes d ' actions et le degré 
de changement dans la proportion des actions détenues par les initiés sont liés positivement à 
la probabilité qu 'une entreprise introduite en bourse réalise plus que deux opérations 
d'acquisition durant les 5 ans post-émission. 
L'objectif du deuxième chapitre est de réexaminer l'impact des opérations d ' acquisition 
réalisées dans la première année post-cotation su r la performance à long terme des entreprises 
introdwtes en bourse en comparant les entreprises qui ont effectué une seule acquisition à 
celles qui se sont engagées dans une série d ' acquis itions. Nous proposons aussi d ' examiner 
l' impact de ces acquis itions sur la survie des entreprises dans les cinq années sub séquentes à 
l' introduction en bourse. os tests empiriques montrent que le rendement anormal cumulé 
moyen à long terme des entreprises introduites en bourse qui ont effectué plusieors 
acquisitions une année après l' émiss ion est plus faib le que le rendement anonnal des 
entrepri ses réalisant seulement une acquisition. Par exemple, le rendement anormal moyen 
cumulé sur 3 ans des entreprises qui ont effectué plusieurs acquisitions durant la première 
année après émiss ion est de -26,23% (ajusté aux rendements de marché) comparé à -2.71 % 
pour les entreprises effectuant seu lement une acquisition. Nos résu ltats montrent auss i que 
les entreprises qui continuent le processus d ' acquisition après la première année après 
ém ission ont pu atténuer le problème de la forte sous-performance à long terme. Notre étude 
de survie révèle que la probabilité de non-survie après introduction en bourse augmente avec 
Je nombre d' acquisitions réalisées durant la prem ière atmée après émission. 
L 'objectif du troisième chapitre est d ' explorer l' effet de l' utilisation prévue des fonds 
levés à l' introduction en bourse sur la performance financière et opérationnelle de l' entreprise 
cotée. Bien que la diffusion de l'information sur l' utilisation prévue des fonds ait rme grande 
importance pour les investisseurs, aucune étude empirique, à notre cotmaissance, n ' a tenté 
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d'évaluer son effet sur la santé fi nancière et économique de l ' entreprise. Nos tests empiriques 
montrent que les entreprises qui am1oncent que les fo nds levés vont être ut ili sés pour investir 
en projets de croissance à travers des opérations d 'acquisition, des projets de recherche et 
développement ou des dépenses d ' investissement du capital ont réa li sé la plus grande 
perfo rmance fi nanc ière à long terme. Par contre, ce lles qui ont déc laré que les fo nd s seront 
utilisés pour payer une partie de la dette ont la plus fa ible perfo rmance à long terme. Ces 
résu ltats suggèrent que le marché pourra it réagi r défavorablement aux entrepri ses qui 
montrent leur intérêt à utiliser les fo nds levés pour payer les dettes en les considérant comme 
des opportunistes qui ont choisi de s ' introduire en bourse dans des périodes de fo1te hausse 
de marché pour assainir leur structure fin ancière. Nos résultats montrent aussi qu ' il n 'y a pas 
une dégradation significative de la performance opérationnelle à IOJ1g terme lorsque 
1 'entreprise déclare qu ' elle va utiliser ses fonds levés pour investir. Cependant, nous 
observons un déclin significatif de la performance si 1 ' utilisation prévue des fo nds levés est 
le paiement de la dette. 
La motivation des émissions initiales d ' actions reste une problématique de recherche 
impo1tante. P lusieurs questions méritent encore d 'être explorées. Par exemple, nous avons 
examiné l'effet de l' utilisa tion prévue des fo nds levés à l' introdu ction en bourse sur la 
perfo rmance fi nancière et opérationnelle de l' entreprise cotée. Il serait intéressant dans ce 
contexte de comparer l' utili sation réelle des fo nds par rapport à l' utili sation prévue avant 
l' émission et d' analyser si les entreprises émettrices respectaient lems engagements et 
d 'examiner l' impact de cet écart sur la performance fi nancière. Récemment, Gao et al. (2014) 
ont constaté que le nombre des introductions en bourse a diminué considérablement depui s 
les années 2000. Il serait ainsi intéressant d ' éh1dier les raisons de cette baisse et de vérifier si 
c ' est un phénomène pa1t iculier au marché des introductions en bourse aux États-Unis . 
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